Editing Georges Clemenceau (section)

===Rhineland and the Saar===
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-2004-1110-502, Georges Clemenceau.jpg|thumb|300x300px|Clemenceau in his office, 1929]]
When Clemenceau returned to the Council of Ten on 1 March, he found that little had changed.{{citation needed|date=February 2021}} One issue that had not changed at all was the long-running dispute over France's eastern frontier and control of the German [[Rhineland]]. Clemenceau believed that Germany's possession of this territory left France without a natural frontier in the east and thus, was vulnerable to invasion. The British ambassador reported in December 1918 on Clemenceau's views on the future of the Rhineland: "He said that the Rhine was a natural boundary of Gaul and Germany and that it ought to be made the German boundary now, the territory between the Rhine and the French frontier being made into an Independent State whose neutrality should be guaranteed by the great powers."<ref>Watson, p. 337.</ref>

Finally, the issue was resolved when Lloyd George and Woodrow Wilson guaranteed immediate military assistance if Germany attacked without provocation.<ref>Watson, p. 347.</ref> It also was decided that the allies would occupy the territory for fifteen years, and that Germany could never rearm the area.<ref>Watson, p. 350.</ref> Lloyd George insisted on a clause allowing for the early withdrawal of allied troops if the Germans fulfilled the treaty; Clemenceau inserted Article 429 into the treaty that permitted allied occupation beyond the fifteen years if adequate guarantees for allied security against unprovoked aggression were not met. This was in case the U.S. Senate refused to ratify the [[Treaty of Guarantee (proposed)|Treaty of Guarantee]], thereby making null and void the British guarantee as well, since that was dependent on the Americans being part of it. This is, in fact, what did occur. Article 429 ensured that a refusal of the U.S. Senate to ratify the treaties of guarantee would not weaken them.<ref>Watson, p. 351.</ref>

President Poincaré and Marshal [[Ferdinand Foch]] both pressed repeatedly for an autonomous Rhineland state. Foch thought the Treaty of Versailles was too lenient on Germany, stating "This is not peace. It is an armistice for twenty years."<ref>Spencer Tucker and Priscilla Mary Roberts, eds. ''World War I: Encyclopedia'' (2005) 1:426</ref> At a cabinet meeting on 25 April Foch spoke against the deal Clemenceau had brokered and pushed for a separate Rhineland. On 28 April Poincaré sent Clemenceau a long letter detailing why he thought allied occupation should continue until Germany had paid all her reparations. Clemenceau replied that the alliance with America and Britain was of more value than an isolated France that held onto the Rhineland: "In fifteen years I will be dead, but if you do me the honour of visiting my tomb, you will be able to say that the Germans have not fulfilled all the clauses of the treaty, and that we are still on the Rhine."<ref>Watson, pp. 351–352.</ref> Clemenceau said to Lloyd George in June, "We need a barrier behind which, in the years to come, our people can work in security to rebuild its ruins. The barrier is the Rhine. I must take national feelings into account. That does not mean that I am afraid of losing office. I am quite indifferent on that point. But I will not, by giving up the occupation, do something which will break the willpower of our people."<ref>Watson, p. 352.</ref> Later, he said to Jean Martel, "The policy of Foch and Poincaré was bad in principle. It was a policy no Frenchman, no republican Frenchman could accept for a moment, except in the hope of obtaining other guarantees, other advantages. We leave that sort of thing to [[Otto von Bismarck|Bismarck]]."<ref>Watson, p. 353.</ref><ref>"Marshal Ferdinand Foch versus Georges Clemenceau in 1919". pp 458-497</ref>

There was increasing discontent among Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Woodrow Wilson about slow progress and information leaks surrounding the Council of Ten. They began to meet in a smaller group, called the Council of Four, [[Vittorio Orlando]] of Italy being the fourth, although less weighty, member. This offered greater privacy and security and increased the efficiency of the decision-making process. Another major issue that the Council of Four discussed was the future of the German [[Saar (League of Nations)|Saar]] region. Clemenceau believed that France was entitled to the region and its coal mines after Germany deliberately damaged the coal mines in northern France. Wilson, however, resisted the French claim so firmly that Clemenceau accused him of being "pro-German". Lloyd George came to a compromise; the coal mines were given to France and the territory placed under French administration for 15 years, after which a vote would determine whether the region would rejoin Germany.<ref>Watson, pp. 349–350.</ref>

Although Clemenceau had little knowledge of the defunct Austrian-Hungarian empire, he supported the causes of its smaller ethnic groups and his adamant stance led to the stringent terms in the [[Treaty of Trianon]] that dismantled Hungary. Rather than recognizing territories of the Austrian-Hungarian empire solely within the principles of self-determination, Clemenceau sought to weaken Hungary, just as Germany was, and to remove the threat of such a large power within Central Europe. The entire Czechoslovakian state was seen a potential buffer from Communism and this encompassed majority Hungarian territories.