Editing Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (section)

==== Objective spirit ====
[[File:King Frederick William III of Prussia.jpg|thumb|upright=0.8|left|[[King Frederick William III of Prussia]] (1797–1840) stifled the political reforms for which Hegel had hoped and advocated.{{sfn|Wood|1991|p=ix–x}}]]

In the broadest terms, Hegel's philosophy of objective spirit "is his social philosophy, his philosophy of how the human spirit objectifies itself in its social and historical activities and productions."{{sfn|Westphal|2013|p=157}} Or, put differently, it is an account of the institutionalization of freedom.{{sfn|Pippin|2008b}} Besier declares this a rare instance of unanimity in Hegel scholarship: "all scholars agree there is no more important concept in Hegel's political theory than freedom." This is because it is the foundation of right, the essence of spirit, and the ''telos'' of history.{{sfn|Beiser|2005|p=197}}

This part of Hegel's philosophy is presented first in his 1817 ''[[Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences|Encyclopedia]]'' (revised 1827 and 1830) and then at greater length in the 1821 ''[[Elements of the Philosophy of Right|Elements of the Philosophy of Right, or Natural Law and Political Science in Outline]]'' (like the ''Encyclopedia'', intended as a textbook), upon which he also frequently lectured. Its final part, the philosophy of world history, was additionally elaborated in [[Lectures on the Philosophy of History|Hegel's lectures on the subject]].{{sfn|Pinkard|2000|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=GHWJQhWRNy0C&pg=PA375&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false 375]}}{{sfn|Magee|2011|p=186}}

Hegel's ''Elements of the Philosophy of Right'' has been controversial from the date of its original publication.{{sfn|Wood|1991|pp=viii–x}}{{sfn|Pinkard|2000|pp=457–61}} It is not, however, a straightforward defense of the autocratic Prussian state, as some have alleged, but is rather a defense of "Prussia as it was to have become under [proposed] reform administrations."{{sfn|Wood|1991|p=x}}

The German [[Translating "law" to other European languages|''Recht'']] in Hegel's title does not have a direct English equivalent (though it does correspond to the Latin ''ius'' and the French ''droit''). As a first approximation, Michael Inwood distinguishes three senses:

*a right, claim or title
*justice (as in, e.g., 'to administer justice'...but not justice as a virtue...)
*'the law' as a principle, or 'the laws' collectively.{{sfn|Inwood|1992|p=259}}

Beiser observes that Hegel's theory is "his attempt to rehabilitate the [[natural law]] tradition while taking into account the criticisms of the historical school." He adds that "without a sound interpretation of Hegel's theory of natural law, we have very little understanding of the very foundation of his social and political thought."{{sfn|Beiser|2008|pp=13–14}}{{efn|Hegel himself acknowledges an ambiguity in the term "natural right" [''Naturrecht''] between meaning "a right that is present in an ''immediately natural way''" and a right that is "determined by the nature of the thing [''Sache''], i.e., by the ''concept''." His is the latter: "In fact right and all of its determinations are based on ''free personhood'' alone, a ''self-determination'', which is the very contrary of ''determination by nature''.{{sfn|Hegel|2010b|loc= §502R}}<p>

Probably his most direct discussion of the vocabulary of natural right is to be found in the Introduction to Hegel's 1817–1818 Heidelberg lectures; after this, he almost always speaks of right ''simplicitur'' or right as modified by his own distinct philosophical terms.{{sfn|Pöggeler|2012|loc= §II}}{{sfn|Hegel|2010c|loc=§§1–10}}}} Consistent with Beiser's position, scholar [[Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak|Adriaan T. Peperzak]] documents Hegel's arguments against [[social contract theory]] and stresses the metaphysical foundations of Hegel's philosophy of right.{{sfn|Peperzak|2001}}{{efn|Some commentators do not accept Hegel's own metaphysical self-understanding of his project. Allen W. Wood, for instance, declares, "Speculative thought is dead; but Hegel's thought is not": "The fact is rather that Hegel's great positive achievements as a philosopher do not lie where he thought they did." According to Wood, to read Hegel primarily as a social theorist is "admittedly, to read him in some measure against his own self-understanding; it is nevertheless the only way in which most of us, if we are honest with ourselves, can read him seriously at all."{{sfn|Wood|1991|pp=4–8}} Whether or not one accepts Wood's verdict on Hegel's overarching project, one must agree that to read Hegel as Wood proposes is to engage in a project of interpretive appropriation, not strictly textual or historical exegesis.}}

Observing that "analyzing the structure of Hegel's argument in the ''Philosophy of Right'' shows that achieving political autonomy is fundamental to Hegel's analysis of the state and government," philosopher Kenneth R. Westphal provides this brief outline:

*{{"'}}Abstract Right,' treats principles governing property, its transfer, and wrongs against property."
*{{"'}}Morality,' treats the rights of moral subjects, responsibility for one's actions, and [[a priori]] theories of right."
*{{"'}}[[Sittlichkeit|Ethical Life' (''Sittlichkeit'')]], analyzes the principles and institutions governing central aspects of rational social life, including the family, [[civil society]], and the [[nation state|state]] as a whole, including the government."{{sfn|Westphal|1993|p=246}}

Hegel describes the state of his time, a [[constitutional monarchy]], as rationally embodying three cooperative and mutually inclusive elements. These elements are "democracy (rule of the many, who are involved in legislation), [[aristocracy]] (rule of the few, who apply, concretize, and execute the laws), and monarchy (rule of the one, who heads and encompasses all power)."{{sfn|Peperzak|2001|p=523}}{{sfn|Hegel|1991a|loc=§286R}} It is what Aristotle called a "mixed" form of government, which is designed to include what is best of each of the three classical forms.{{sfn|Beiser|2005|p=252}} The division of powers "prevents an single power from dominating others."{{sfn|Beiser|2005|p=253}} Hegel is particularly concerned to bind the monarch to the constitution, limiting his authority so that he can do little more than to declare of what his ministers have already decided that it is to be so.{{sfn|Beiser|2005|pp=254–55}}

The relation of Hegel's philosophy of right to modern liberalism is complex. He sees liberalism as a valuable and characteristic expression of the modern world. However, it carries the danger within itself to undermine its own values. This self-destructive tendency may be avoided by measuring "the subjective goals of individuals by a larger objective and collective good." Moral values, then, have only a "limited place in the total scheme of things."{{sfn|Wood|1991|p=xi}} Yet, although it is not without reason that Hegel is widely regarded as a major proponent of what [[Isaiah Berlin]] would later term [[positive liberty]], he was just as "unwavering and unequivocal" in his defense of [[negative liberty]].{{sfn|Beiser|2005|pp=202–05}}

If Hegel's ideal sovereign is much weaker than was typical in monarchies his time, so too is his democratic element much weaker than is typical in democracies of modern times. Although he insists upon the importance of public participation, Hegel severely limits suffrage and follows the English [[Bicameralism|bicameral]] model, in which only members of the lower house, that of commoners and [[bourgeoisie]], are elected officials. Nobles in the upper house, like the monarch, inherit their positions.{{sfn|Beiser|2005|pp=254–58}}

The final part of the Philosophy of Objective Spirit is entitled "World History." In this section, Hegel argues that "this immanent principle [the [[Stoicism|Stoic]] ''[[logos]]''] produces with logical inevitability an expansion of the species' capacities for self determination ('freedom') and a deepening of its self understanding ('self-knowing')."{{sfn|de Laurentiis|2010|p=207}} In Hegel's own words: "World history is progress in the consciousness of freedom – a progress that we must comprehend conceptually."{{sfn|de Laurentiis|2010|loc=207 (quoting Hegel, her translation)}}