Editing Gaius Marius (section)

==Legacy==
[[File:Marius Glyptothek Munich 319.jpg|thumb|Bust formerly identified as Marius, likely depicting instead [[Scipio Asiaticus]].{{sfn|Etcheto|2012|loc=p. 278. "Pour sa part, F. Coarelli propose de reconnaître Scipion l’Africain sous les traits du 'Sylla' de Copenhague tandis que le 'Marius' de Munich serait l’effigie de son frère l’Asiatique, ce qui reste certainement la solution la plus vraisemblable"}}]]
Marius was an extremely successful Roman general and politician.{{Sfn|Evans|1995|p=169}} In ancient sources, he has been repeatedly characterised as having unending ambition and [[opportunism]].{{Efn|This is especially the case of Marius's characterisation in the narratives of both Sallust and Plutarch. Plutarch especially, as he relied partially on Sulla's (now lost) memoirs as a source.{{Sfn|Evans|1995|p=165}}}} Plutarch says of him:

<blockquote>if Marius could have been persuaded to sacrifice to the Greek Muses and Graces, he would not have put the ugliest possible crown upon a most illustrious career in field and forum, nor have been driven by the blasts of passion, ill-timed ambition, and insatiable greed upon the shore of a most cruel and savage old age.{{sfn|Plut. ''Mar.''|p=467}}</blockquote>

According to Evans this characterisation is not entirely fair,{{Sfn|Evans|1995|p=169}} because Marius's attempts to win the consulship and for self-aggrandisement were not out of the norm for politicians of the middle to late Republic.{{Sfn|Evans|1995|p=114}} Marius's legacy is heavily defined by his example: his five successive consulships, while seen at the time as necessary for the survival of Roman civilisation, gave unprecedented power into the hands of a single man over a never-before-seen length of time.{{Sfn|Evans|1995|p=211}}

However, that Marius died "so hated by contemporaries is really rather unremarkable, because to his unrealistic, even senile, dreams of further triumphs may be laid the prime cause for the disastrous civil war of 87&nbsp;[BC]... His unquenchable ''ambitio'' overcame an unusually astute sense of judgement; the result, the beginning of the Roman revolution".{{Sfn|Evans|1995|pp=168, 169}} Broadly, "traditional republican culture had been based on the principles of equality between colleagues in office and short terms of office holding... the inherited republic could not survive Marius and his ambitions".{{sfn|Flower|2010|p=158}}

=== Supposed reforms to the legions ===
In the narratives of Plutarch and Sallust, Marius's reforms to the recruitment process for the Roman legions are roundly criticised for creating a soldiery wholly loyal to their generals and beholden to their beneficence or ability to secure payment from the state.{{Sfn|Evans|1995|p=91}} However, Evans argues this development did not emerge from Marius, and it was likely initially envisioned as nothing more than a temporary measure to meet the extraordinary threats of Numidia and the Cimbrian tribes.{{Sfn|Evans|1995|p=211}} Moreover, the armies in the late republic were broadly similar to those of the middle republic.{{sfn|Gruen|1995|p=xvii}}{{sfn|Brunt|1962}}

The willingness of the soldiers to kill fellow Romans changed after the Social War: "if Sulla's army had been unwilling to march on Rome... then the outcome would obviously have been completely different, no matter how power-hungry Marius or Sulla were".{{sfn|Flower|2010|pp=158–9}} The Social War had the related effect of breaking down the Roman government's legitimacy.{{sfn|Gruen|1995|p=373}} Lintott, in the ''Cambridge Ancient History'', similarly writes that "Roman armies were only to be used for civil war after their scruples had been drowned in a blood-bath of fighting with their own Italian allies... it may as well be argued that civil war created the self-seeking unprincipled soldier".{{sfn|Lintott|1994|p=92}}

There were political effects, however, to the promise of land after service: the decision to call up the {{Lang|la|proletarii}} would not be fully felt until the time to draw down the troops. As the spoils of war became increasingly inadequate as compensation for the soldiers – the spoils of war do not guarantee a long term stream of income – it became common practice to allocate land (generally abroad) for the foundation of veterans' colonies.{{Sfn|Evans|1995|p=212}} Political unrest over veterans' land bonuses in the first century BC, however, is exaggerated:{{by whom|date=August 2023}} soldiers both in the Marian and post-Marian periods largely went home peacefully when land demands were not immediately met. Moreover, through the post-Marian period, land distributions were sporadic and volunteers were taken on with no promises or reasonable expectations of land at discharge.{{sfnm|Gauthier|2015|1p=101|Keaveney|2007|2p=62}} It was only by the second half of the last century&nbsp;BC that veteran demands for land had become an expectation, later fulfilled by the [[Second Triumvirate]].{{sfn|Keaveney|2007|pp=63–64}}

=== Assemblies and foreign affairs ===
Marius's repeated use of the Assemblies to overturn Senatorial commands had significant negative effects on the stability of the state.{{Sfn|Evans|1995|p=93}} The senate generally used sortition to choose generals for command posts, removing the conflict of interest between consuls.{{Sfn|Evans|1995|p=93}} Marius's use of the Assemblies to remove Metellus from command in Numidia spelled an end to collective governance in foreign affairs.{{Sfn|Evans|1995|p=91}} In later years, use of {{Lang|la|plebiscita}} became the main means by which commands were granted to other generals, adding to personal rivalries and diminishing the ability to govern the state.{{Sfn|Evans|1995|p=210}} The size of the rewards gained from manipulating the Assemblies was irresistible to future generations of ambitious politicians.{{Sfn|Evans|1995|p=211}}

The similar use of the Assemblies in an attempt to replace Sulla with Marius for the Mithridatic War was unprecedented, as never before had laws been passed to confer commands on someone lacking any official title in the state.{{Sfn|Evans|1995|p=163}} Marius's legal strategy misfired disastrously because he failed to predict Sulla's reaction of marching on the city to protect his command:{{Sfn|Evans|1995|p=168}}

<blockquote>It was plainly expected that Sulpicius's bill and the sanctity of the law, even if much abused, would be obeyed without question... Sulla's unforeseen rejection of the 'popular' will, which he must surely have believed to have been of equivocal legality, was made from a position of great strength since he had the means and the opportunity to impose his will on the situation.{{Sfn|Evans|1995|pp=168–9}}</blockquote>

=== Political violence ===
While political violence had been increasingly normalised throughout the middle and late Republic, starting with the murder of the Gracchi brothers, the passage of the {{Lang|la|senatus consultum ultimum}} against Saturninus and Glaucia in Marius's sixth consulship normalised the use of force not only against private citizens, but also "against properly elected magistrates in order to preserve [the Senate's] own position".{{Sfn|Evans|1995|p=212}} 

Moreover, Marius's attempts to undermine Sulla's command at the start of the First Mithridatic War massively expanded the scope of that violence. No longer would only mobs clash in the streets of Rome. No longer would personal grudges be pursued by mere political prosecutions in the courts:{{Efn|E.g., the extortion and treason courts set up by Saturninus and Gaius Mamilius's [[Mamilian commission]].}} political enemies would be killed.{{Sfn|Evans|1995|p=169}}{{Efn|See both Sulla's and Marius's purges{{when|date=August 2023}} of the city after they captured it under arms.}} The use of the Assemblies eroded senatorial control which, along with Sulla's decision to march on Rome, created significant and prolonged instability, only resolved by the destruction of the Republican form of government and the transition to [[Roman Empire|Empire]].{{Sfn|Evans|1995|pp=167–8}}