Editing Ethics (section)

==== Naturalism and non-naturalism ====
{{main|Ethical naturalism|Ethical non-naturalism|l1=Naturalism|l2=Non-naturalism}}

A central disagreement among moral realists is between naturalism and non-naturalism. Naturalism states that moral properties are [[Naturalism (philosophy)|natural]] properties accessible to [[Empirical evidence|empirical observation]]. They are similar to the natural properties investigated by the [[natural sciences]], like color and shape.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lutz|2023|loc=Lead section, § 1. What Is Moral Naturalism?}} | {{harvnb|DeLapp|loc=§ 4a. Moral Realisms}} }}</ref> Some moral naturalists hold that moral properties are a unique and basic type of natural property.{{efn|For example, [[natural law]] ethics, an influential position in [[Christian ethics]], says that morality is based on a natural law created by God.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Murphy|2019a|loc=§ 1. Key Features of Natural Law Theories}} | {{harvnb|Lisska|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Cgg1DQAAQBAJ&pg=PA635 635]}} | {{harvnb|DeNicola|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5uCGDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA66 66]}} }}</ref>}} Another view states that moral properties are real but not a fundamental part of reality and can be reduced to other natural properties, such as properties describing the causes of [[pleasure]] and [[pain]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lutz|2023|loc=§ 1. What Is Moral Naturalism?, § 2. Descriptivism and Reductivism}} | {{harvnb|DeLapp|loc=§ 4a. Moral Realisms}} }}</ref>

Non-naturalism argues that moral properties form part of reality and that moral features are not identical or reducible to natural properties. This view is usually motivated by the idea that moral properties are unique because they express what should be the case.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|FitzPatrick|2011|pp=[https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230294899_2 7–8]}} | {{harvnb|Ridge|2019|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> Proponents of this position often emphasize this uniqueness by claiming that it is a [[Naturalistic fallacy|fallacy to define ethics in terms of natural entities]] or to infer prescriptive from descriptive statements.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ridge|2019|loc=§ 1. The Naturalistic Fallacy}} | {{harvnb|Werner|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=rWjxDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA148 148]}} }}</ref>