Editing Erich von Manstein (section)

===Retreat to the Dnieper===
{{See also|Belgorod-Khar'kov Offensive Operation}}
Manstein regarded the Battle of Kursk as something of a German victory, as he believed that he had destroyed much of the Red Army's offensive capacity for the rest of 1943. This assessment turned out to be incorrect, as the Red Army was able to recover much faster than Manstein expected. Manstein moved his panzer reserves to the [[Mius River]] and the lower Dnieper, not realising the Soviet activities there were a diversion. A Soviet offensive that began on 3 August put Army Group South under heavy pressure. After two days of heavy fighting, the Soviet troops broke through the German lines and retook [[Belgorod]], punching a {{convert|56|km|abbr=on}} wide hole between the Fourth Panzer Army and the [[Army Detachment Kempf]], tasked with holding Kharkov. In response to Manstein's demands for reinforcements, Hitler sent the [[Panzer-Grenadier-Division Großdeutschland|''Großdeutschland'']], [[7th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|7th Panzer]], [[2nd SS Division Das Reich|SS 2nd ''Das Reich'']], and [[3rd SS Division Totenkopf|SS 3rd ''Totenkopf'']] Divisions.{{sfn|Murray|Millett|2000|pp=390–391}}{{sfn|Forczyk|2010|pp=41–47}}{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=384–385}}

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-705-0262-06, Ukraine, von Manstein und Speidel.jpg|thumb|left|Manstein (right) with ''Generalmajor'' [[Hans Speidel]] on the [[Dnieper]], September 1943]]

Construction began of defensive positions along the Dnieper, but Hitler refused requests to pull back, insisting that Kharkov be held. With reinforcements trickling in, Manstein waged a series of counterattacks and armoured battles near [[Bohodukhiv]] and [[Okhtyrka]] between 13 and 17 August, which resulted in heavy casualties as they ran into prepared Soviet lines. On 20 August he informed the OKH that his forces in the Donets river area were holding a too-wide front with insufficient numbers, and that he needed to either withdraw to the [[Dnieper River]] or receive reinforcements. Continuous pressure from the Soviet forces had separated Army Group Centre from Army Group South and severely threatened Manstein's northern flank. When the Red Army threw their main reserves behind a drive to retake Kharkov on 21–22 August, Manstein took advantage of this to close the gap between the 4th Panzer and 8th Armies and reestablish a defensive line. Hitler finally allowed Manstein to withdraw back across the Dnieper on 15 September.{{sfn|Forczyk|2010|pp=41–47}}{{sfn|Murray|Millett|2000|pp=391–392}}{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=386–394}} During the withdrawal, Manstein ordered [[scorched earth]] actions to be taken in a zone {{convert|20|to|30|km}} from the river, and later faced charges at his war crimes trial for issuing this order.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=396, 471}} Soviet losses in July and August included over 1.6 million casualties, 10,000 tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces, and 4,200 aircraft. German losses, while only one-tenth that of the Soviet losses, were much more difficult to sustain, as there were no further reserves of men and materiel to draw on.{{sfn|Evans|2008|pp=489–490}} In a series of four meetings that September, Manstein tried unsuccessfully to convince Hitler to reorganise the high command and let his generals make more of the military decisions.{{sfn|Melvin|2010|pp=387–392}}