Editing Epistemology (section)

=== Internalism and externalism ===
{{main|Internalism and externalism#Epistemology|l1=Internalism and externalism (epistemology)}}
[[File:Alvin Goldman 1966.jpg|thumb|alt=Black and white photo of a bearded man wearing a suit and a tie|[[Alvin Goldman]] was an influential defender of externalism.{{sfn|BonJour|2016}}]]
The disagreement between internalism and externalism is about the sources of justification.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pappas|2023|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|pp=159–160}} | {{harvnb|Fumerton|2011|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref>{{efn|The internalist-externalist debate in epistemology is different from the internalism-externalism debate in [[philosophy of mind]], which asks whether mental states depend only on the individual or also on their environment.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bernecker|2013|loc=Note 1}} | {{harvnb|Wilson|2023}} }}</ref>}} Internalists say that justification depends only on factors within the individual, such as perceptual experience, memories, and other beliefs. This view emphasizes the importance of the cognitive perspective of the individual in the form of their mental states. It is commonly associated with the idea that the relevant factors are accessible, meaning that the individual can become aware of their reasons for holding a justified belief through introspection and reflection.<ref name="auto4">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pappas|2023|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Poston|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|pp=159–160}} }}</ref>

[[Evidentialism]] is an influential internalist view, asserting that justification depends on the possession of [[evidence]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|pp=99, 298}} | {{harvnb|Carter|Littlejohn|2021|loc=§ 9.3.3 An Evidentialist Argument}} | {{harvnb|Mittag|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> In this context, evidence for a belief is any information in the individual's mind that supports the belief. For example, the perceptual experience of rain is evidence for the belief that it is raining. Evidentialists suggest various other forms of evidence, including memories, intuitions, and other beliefs.<ref>{{harvnb|Mittag|loc=§ 2b. Evidence}}</ref> According to evidentialism, a belief is justified if the individual's evidence supports it and they hold the belief on the basis of this evidence.<ref>{{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|pp=99, 298}}</ref>

Externalism, by contrast, asserts that at least some relevant factors of knowledge are external to the individual.<ref name="auto4"/> For instance, when considering the belief that a cup of coffee stands on the table, externalists are not primarily interested in the subjective perceptual experience that led to this belief. Instead, they focus on objective factors, like the quality of the person's eyesight, their ability to differentiate coffee from other beverages, and the circumstances under which they observed the cup.<ref>{{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|p=160}}</ref> A key motivation of many forms of externalism is that justification makes it more likely that a belief is true. Based on this view, justification is external to the extent that some factors contributing to this likelihood are not part of the believer's cognitive perspective.<ref name="auto4"/>

[[Reliabilism]] is an externalist theory asserting that a reliable connection between belief and truth is required for justification.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|pp=83, 301}} | {{harvnb|Olsson|2016}} }}</ref> Some reliabilists explain this in terms of reliable processes. According to this view, a belief is justified if it is produced by a reliable process, like perception. A belief-formation process is deemed reliable if most of the beliefs it generates are true. An alternative view focuses on beliefs rather than belief-formation processes, saying that a belief is justified if it is a reliable indicator of the fact it presents. This means that the belief tracks the fact: the person believes it because it is true but would not believe it otherwise.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|p=84}} | {{harvnb|Lyons|2016|pp=160–162}} | {{harvnb|Olsson|2016}} }}</ref>

[[Virtue epistemology]], another type of externalism, asserts that a belief is justified if it manifests intellectual virtues. Intellectual virtues are capacities or traits that perform cognitive functions and help people form true beliefs. Suggested examples include faculties, like vision, memory, and introspection, and [[character trait]]s, like open-mindedness.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crumley II|2009|pp=175–176}} | {{harvnb|Baehr, "''Virtue Epistemology''"|ref=Baehr, "''Virtue Epistemology''"|loc=Lead section, § 1. Introduction to Virtue Epistemology}} }}</ref>