Editing Consciousness (section)

===Measurement via verbal report===
[[File:Necker cube.svg|thumb|upright|The [[Necker cube]], an ambiguous image]]

Experimental research on consciousness presents special difficulties, due to the lack of a universally accepted [[operational definition]]. In the majority of experiments that are specifically about consciousness, the subjects are human, and the criterion used is verbal report: in other words, subjects are asked to describe their experiences, and their descriptions are treated as observations of the contents of consciousness.<ref>{{cite book|author=Bernard Baars|title=A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness|year=1993|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-0-521-42743-2| pages=15–18|author-link=Bernard Baars}}</ref>

For example, subjects who stare continuously at a [[Necker cube]] usually report that they experience it "flipping" between two 3D configurations, even though the stimulus itself remains the same.<ref>{{cite book|title=Perception: Theory, Development, and Organization|author=Paul Rooks|author2=Jane Wilson|year=2000|publisher=Psychology Press|isbn=978-0-415-19094-7|pages=25–26}}</ref> The objective is to understand the relationship between the conscious awareness of stimuli (as indicated by verbal report) and the effects the stimuli have on brain activity and behavior. In several paradigms, such as the technique of [[response priming]], the behavior of subjects is clearly influenced by stimuli for which they report no awareness, and suitable experimental manipulations can lead to increasing priming effects despite decreasing prime identification (double dissociation).<ref name="Schmidt">{{cite journal|author=Thomas Schmidt|author2=Dirk Vorberg|title=Criteria for unconscious cognition: Three types of dissociation|journal=Perception and Psychophysics|volume=68|year=2006|pages=489–504|doi=10.3758/bf03193692|pmid=16900839|issue=3|doi-access=free}}</ref>

Verbal report is widely considered to be the most reliable indicator of consciousness, but it raises a number of issues.<ref name="Destrebecqz" /> For one thing, if verbal reports are treated as observations, akin to observations in other branches of science, then the possibility arises that they may contain errors—but it is difficult to make sense of the idea that subjects could be wrong about their own experiences, and even more difficult to see how such an error could be detected.<ref>{{cite book|chapter=Quining qualia|author=Daniel Dennett|title=Consciousness in Modern Science|editor=A. Marcel|editor2=E. Bisiach|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=1992|chapter-url=http://cogprints.org/254/|access-date=2011-10-31|isbn=978-0-19-852237-9|author-link=Daniel Dennett|archive-date=2011-10-28|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111028195212/http://cogprints.org/254/|url-status=live}}</ref> Daniel Dennett has argued for an approach he calls [[heterophenomenology]], which means treating verbal reports as stories that may or may not be true, but his ideas about how to do this have not been widely adopted.<ref>{{cite journal|author=Daniel Dennett|year=2003|title=Who's on first? Heterophenomenology explained|journal=Journal of Consciousness Studies|volume=10|pages=19–30|author-link=Daniel Dennett}}</ref> Another issue with verbal report as a criterion is that it restricts the field of study to humans who have language: this approach cannot be used to study consciousness in other species, pre-linguistic children, or people with types of brain damage that impair language. As a third issue, philosophers who dispute the validity of the [[Turing test]] may feel that it is possible, at least in principle, for verbal report to be dissociated from consciousness entirely: a philosophical zombie may give detailed verbal reports of awareness in the absence of any genuine awareness.<ref>{{cite book|author=David Chalmers|title=The Conscious Mind|chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/consciousmindins00chal|chapter-url-access=registration|year=1996|chapter=Ch. 3: Can consciousness be reductively explained?|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-511789-9|author-link=David Chalmers}}</ref>

Although verbal report is in practice the "gold standard" for ascribing consciousness, it is not the only possible criterion.<ref name="Destrebecqz">{{cite book|title=The Boundaries of Consciousness: Neurobiology and Neuropathology|chapter=Methods for studying unconscious learning|author=Arnaud Destrebecqz|author2=Philippe Peigneux|editor=Steven Laureys|year=2006|publisher=Elsevier|isbn=978-0-444-52876-6|pages=69–80}}</ref> In medicine, consciousness is assessed as a combination of verbal behavior, arousal, brain activity, and purposeful movement. The last three of these can be used as indicators of consciousness when verbal behavior is absent.<ref name="Giacino" /><ref>{{cite journal|title=How to Make a Consciousness Meter|date=October 2017|journal=Scientific American|volume=317|issue=5|pages=28–33|doi=10.1038/scientificamerican1117-28|author=Christof Koch|pmid=29565878|bibcode=2017SciAm.317e..28K}}</ref> The [[scientific literature]] regarding the neural bases of arousal and purposeful movement is very extensive. Their reliability as indicators of consciousness is disputed, however, due to numerous studies showing that alert human subjects can be induced to behave purposefully in a variety of ways in spite of reporting a complete lack of awareness.<ref name="Schmidt" /> Studies related to the [[neuroscience of free will]] have also shown that the influence consciousness has on decision-making is not always straightforward.<ref>{{cite journal|title=Human volition: towards a neuroscience of will|author=Patrick Haggard|journal=Nature Reviews Neuroscience|year=2008|volume=9|pages=934–946|pmid=19020512|doi=10.1038/nrn2497|issue=12|s2cid=1495720}}</ref>

==== Mirror test and contingency awareness ====
{{Also see|Mirror test}}

[[File:Mirror Test on Octopus vulgaris.jpg|thumb|[[Mirror test]] subjected on a [[common octopus]]]]

Another approach applies specifically to the study of [[self-awareness]], that is, the ability to distinguish oneself from others. In the 1970s [[Gordon G. Gallup|Gordon Gallup]] developed an operational test for self-awareness, known as the [[mirror test]]. The test examines whether animals are able to differentiate between seeing themselves in a mirror versus seeing other animals. The classic example involves placing a spot of coloring on the skin or fur near the individual's forehead and seeing if they attempt to remove it or at least touch the spot, thus indicating that they recognize that the individual they are seeing in the mirror is themselves.<ref>{{cite journal|author=Gordon Gallup|title=Chimpanzees: Self recognition|journal=Science|volume=167|pages=86–87|year=1970|doi=10.1126/science.167.3914.86|pmid=4982211|issue=3914|bibcode=1970Sci...167...86G|s2cid=145295899|author-link=Gordon G. Gallup}}</ref> Humans (older than 18 months) and other [[Hominidae|great apes]], [[bottlenose dolphin]]s, [[orca]]s, [[Columbidae|pigeons]], [[Eurasian magpie|European magpies]] and [[elephants]] have all been observed to pass this test.<ref>{{cite journal |author=David Edelman |author2=Anil Seth |year=2009 |title=Animal consciousness: a synthetic approach |journal=Trends in Neurosciences |volume=32 |issue=9 |pages=476–484 |doi=10.1016/j.tins.2009.05.008 |pmid=19716185 |s2cid=13323524}}</ref> While some other animals like [[pig]]s have been shown to find food by looking into the mirror.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Broom |first1=Donald M. |last2=Sena |first2=Hilana |last3=Moynihan |first3=Kiera L. |date= 2009|title=Pigs learn what a mirror image represents and use it to obtain information |url=https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0003347209003571 |journal=Animal Behaviour |language=en |volume=78 |issue=5 |pages=1037–1041 |doi=10.1016/j.anbehav.2009.07.027}}</ref>

Contingency awareness is another such approach, which is basically the conscious understanding of one's actions and its effects on one's environment.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Contingency Awareness - TalkSense |url=https://talksense.weebly.com/contingency-awareness.html#:~:text=Contingency%20Awareness%20(often%20referred%20to,actions%20elicit%20in%20the%20environment. |access-date=8 October 2024 |website=Weebly}}</ref> It is recognized as a factor in self-recognition. The brain processes during contingency awareness and learning is believed to rely on an intact [[medial temporal lobe]] and age. A study done in 2020 involving [[Transcranial direct-current stimulation|transcranial direct current stimulation]], [[Magnetic resonance imaging]] (MRI) and eyeblink classical conditioning supported the idea that the [[Parietal lobe|parietal cortex]] serves as a substrate for contingency awareness and that age-related disruption of this region is sufficient to impair awareness.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Cheng |first1=Dominic T. |last2=Katzenelson |first2=Alyssa M. |last3=Faulkner |first3=Monica L. |last4=Disterhoft |first4=John F. |last5=Power |first5=John M. |last6=Desmond |first6=John E. |date=4 March 2020 |title=Contingency awareness, aging, and the parietal lobe |journal=Neurobiology of Aging |language=en |volume=91 |pages=125–135 |doi=10.1016/j.neurobiolaging.2020.02.024 |pmc=7953809 |pmid=32241582}}</ref>