Editing Bombing of Dresden (section)

==Post-war debate==
[[File:Fotothek df ps 0000328 Kranzniederlegung anläßlich des 13. Februar 1945 mit Erin.jpg|thumb|Bombing of Dresden Memorial]]
The bombing of Dresden remains controversial and is subject to an ongoing debate by historians and scholars regarding the moral and military justifications surrounding the event.<ref name="USAFHD">{{harvnb|Angell|1953}}.</ref> British historian [[Frederick Taylor (historian)|Frederick Taylor]] wrote of the attacks: "The destruction of Dresden has an epically tragic quality to it. It was a wonderfully beautiful city and a symbol of baroque humanism and all that was best in Germany. It also contained all of the worst from Germany during the [[Nazi]] period. In that sense it is an absolutely exemplary tragedy for the horrors of 20th century warfare and a symbol of destruction".<ref name=Hawley>Hawley, Charles. [http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,341239,00.html "Dresden Bombing Is To Be Regretted Enormously"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110629145324/http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,341239,00.html|date=29 June 2011}}, interview with Frederick Taylor, ''Spiegel Online'', 11 February 2005.</ref>

Several factors have made the bombing a unique point of contention and debate. First among these are the Nazi government's exaggerated claims immediately afterwards.{{sfn|Bergander|1998|p=217}}{{sfn|Taylor|2004|p=370}}{{sfn|Atkinson|2013|p=535}} The fact that the attack was carried out in the final stages of the war, and the public perception that, unlike Hamburg, Dresden was not a major industrial centre and its contribution to the war effort was not so significant, fueled the flames of controversy.{{sfn|Levine|1992|p=180}}

===Legal considerations===
{{See also|Aerial bombardment and international law#International law up to 1945}}
The [[Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907)|Hague Conventions]], addressing the codes of wartime conduct on land and at sea, were adopted before the rise of air power. Despite repeated diplomatic attempts to update enacted [[international humanitarian law]] to include aerial warfare, it was not updated before the outbreak of World War II. The absence of specific international humanitarian law does not mean that the [[laws of war]] did not cover aerial warfare, but the existing laws remained open to interpretation.<ref name="Gómez">Gómez, Javier Guisández. [http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList200/42F64C9A4212EA07C1256B66005C0BF1 "The Law of Air Warfare"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100106232251/http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList200/42F64C9A4212EA07C1256B66005C0BF1|date=6 January 2010}}, ''[[International Review of the Red Cross]]'', nº 323, 20 June 1998, pp. 347–63.</ref> Specifically, whether the attack can be considered a war crime depends on whether the city was defended and whether resistance was offered against an approaching enemy. Allied arguments centre around the existence of a local air defence system and additional ground defences the Germans were constructing in anticipation of Soviet advances.<ref name="Gómez"/>

===Falsification of evidence===
[[Holocaust denial|Holocaust deniers]] and pro-Nazi polemicists—most notably British writer [[David Irving]]—use the bombing in an attempt to establish a moral equivalence between the war crimes committed by the Nazi government and the killing of German civilians by Allied bombing raids.{{sfn|Shermer|Grobman|2009|p=261}} As such, grossly inflated{{Sfn|Norwood|2013|p=237}} casualty figures have been promulgated over the years, many based on a figure of over 200,000 deaths quoted in a forged version of the casualty report, ''Tagesbefehl'' No. 47, that originated with [[Adolf Hitler|Hitler]]'s Reich Minister of Propaganda [[Joseph Goebbels]].<ref>{{harvnb|Evans|1996|loc="[http://www.hdot.org/en/trial/defense/evans/520e.html Chapter 3: Dresden and Holocaust Denial]}}.</ref><ref>{{cite book|title=Irving v. Lipstadt|last=Gray|first=Charles|chapter=Judgement: Whether Irving has bent of falsified or misrepresented evidence|chapter-url=http://www.hdot.org/en/trial/judgement/13-54.html|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131001164058/http://hdot.org/en/trial/judgement/13-54.html|archive-date=1 October 2013}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|title=Irving v. Lipstadt|last=Gray|first=Charles|chapter=Judgement: Irving's case as to the death toll and his use of TB47|chapter-url=http://www.hdot.org/en/trial/judgement/11-7.html|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140223032027/http://www.hdot.org/en/trial/judgement/11-7.html|archive-date=23 February 2014}}</ref> Irving himself grossly exaggerated the death toll in his book ''[[The Destruction of Dresden]]'', arguing that the allied bombing killed 135,000 inhabitants; these figures were initially widely accepted, but are now considered to be wildly inflated.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Evans |first=Richard J. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=qRvr_gkVG70C&q=David+Irving,+Hitler+and+Holocaust+Denial:+Electronic+Edition,+by+Richard+J.+Evans |title=Telling Lies about Hitler: The Holocaust, History and the David Irving Trial |date=2002 |publisher=Verso |isbn=978-1-85984-417-5 |page=258 |language=en}}</ref>

====Marshall inquiry====
An inquiry conducted at the behest of U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General [[George C. Marshall]], stated the raid was justified by the available intelligence. The inquiry declared the elimination of the German ability to reinforce a counter-attack against Marshal [[Ivan Konev]]'s extended line or, alternatively, to retreat and regroup using Dresden as a base of operations, were important military objectives. As Dresden had been largely untouched during the war due to its location, it was one of the few remaining functional rail and communications centres. A secondary objective was to disrupt the industrial use of Dresden for munitions manufacture, which American intelligence believed was the case. The shock to military planners and to the Allied civilian populations of the German counterattack known as the [[Battle of the Bulge]] had ended speculation that the war was almost over, and may have contributed to the decision to continue with the aerial bombardment of German cities.{{sfn|Taylor|2004|p=196}}

The inquiry concluded that by the presence of active German military units nearby, and the presence of fighters and anti-aircraft within an effective range, Dresden qualified as "defended".<ref name=USAFHD/><!--Probably for compliance with the Draft Convention for the Protection of Civilian Populations Against New Engines of War. Amsterdam, 1938. Art 2.  http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/0/910f79361f226492c125641e004057ed?OpenDocument --> By this stage in the war both the British and the Germans had integrated air defences at the national level; the tribunal argued that this meant no German city was undefended.{{citation needed|date=December 2021}}

Marshall's tribunal declared that no extraordinary decision was made to single out Dresden (for instance, to take advantage of a large number of refugees, or purposely terrorise the German populace), arguing that the area bombing was intended to disrupt communications and destroy industrial production. The American inquiry established that the Soviets, under allied agreements for the United States and the United Kingdom to provide air support for the Soviet offensive toward Berlin, had requested area bombing of Dresden to prevent a counterattack through Dresden, or the use of Dresden as a regrouping point following a German strategic retreat.<ref name="HABD_paragraph33-34">[[#References|USAF]], II. Section ANALYSIS: Dresden as a Military Target, ¶ 33, 34.</ref>

====U.S. Air Force Historical Division report====
{|class="wikitable floatright" style="text-align:right;"
|+align="bottom" style="caption-side:bottom; text-align:center; font-weight:normal;"|U.S. Air Force table showing tonnage of bombs dropped by the Allies on Germany's seven largest cities during the war;<ref name=USAFHD/> the final column shows that of the seven cities, the tonnage dropped on Dresden was the lowest per capita.
|-
!rowspan=2|City!!rowspan=2|Population<br />(1939)!!colspan=3|Tonnage!!rowspan="2"|Tonnage<br /> per 100,000<br /> inhabitants
|-
!American!!British!!Total
|-
|[[Berlin]]||4,339,000||22,090||45,517||67,607||1,558
|-
|[[Hamburg]]||1,129,000||17,104||22,583||39,687||3,515
|-
|[[Munich]]||841,000||11,471||7,858||19,329||2,298
|-
|[[Cologne]]||772,000||10,211||34,712||44,923||5,819
|-
|[[Leipzig]]||707,000||5,410||6,206||11,616||1,643
|-
|[[Essen]]||667,000||1,518||36,420||37,938||5,688
|-
|[[Dresden]]||642,000||4,441||2,659||7,100||1,106
|}

A report by the U.S. Air Force Historical Division (USAFHD) analysed the circumstances of the raid and concluded that it was militarily necessary and justified, based on the following points:<ref name=USAFHD/>
# The raid had [[Military necessity|legitimate military ends]], brought about by exigent military circumstances.
# Military units and anti-aircraft defences were sufficiently close that it was not valid to consider the city "undefended".
# The raid did not use extraordinary means but was comparable to other raids used against comparable targets.
# The raid was carried out through the normal chain of command, pursuant to directives and agreements then in force.
# The raid achieved the military objective, without excessive loss of civilian life.

The first point regarding the legitimacy of the raid depends on two claims: first, that the railyards subjected to American precision bombing were an important logistical target, and that the city was also an important industrial centre.<ref name=USAFHD/> Even after the main firebombing, there were two further raids on the Dresden railway yards by the USAAF. The first was on 2 March 1945, by 406 B-17s, which dropped 940 tons of high-explosive bombs and 141 tons of incendiaries. The second was on 17 April, when 580 B-17s dropped 1,554 tons of high-explosive bombs and 165 tons of incendiaries.<ref name=USAFHD/>

As far as Dresden being a militarily significant industrial centre, an official 1942 guide described the German city as "...{{nbsp}}one of the foremost industrial locations of the Reich," and in 1944, the [[German Army High Command]]'s Weapons Office listed 127 medium-to-large factories and workshops that supplied materiel to the military.{{sfn|Taylor|2005|p=169}} Dresden was the seventh largest German city, and by far the largest un-bombed built-up area left, and thus was contributing to the defence of Germany itself.<ref>{{harvnb|Taylor|2005|p=3}} quoting an RAF Group briefing paper.</ref>

According to the USAFHD, there were 110 factories and 50,000 workers supporting the German war effort in Dresden at the time of the raid.<ref name=USAFHD/> These factories manufactured fuses and bombsights (at Zeiss Ikon A.G.),{{sfn|Grant|2004}} aircraft components, [[88 mm gun|anti-aircraft guns]], [[field gun]]s, and [[small arms]], [[Chemical warfare|poison gas]], [[gear]]s and [[Differential (mechanical device)|differentials]], electrical and X-ray apparatus, electric gauges, [[WWII gas mask|gas mask]]s, [[Junkers (Aircraft)|Junkers]] aircraft engines, and [[Messerschmitt]] fighter cockpit parts.<ref name=USAFHD/>

The second of the five points addresses the prohibition in the [[Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907)|Hague Conventions]], of "attack or bombardment" of "undefended" towns. The USAFHD report states that Dresden was protected by anti-aircraft defences, antiaircraft guns, and searchlights, under the Combined Dresden (Corps Area IV) and Berlin (Corps Area III) [[Organization of the Luftwaffe (1933–45)#Operational level|Air Service Commands]].<ref name=USAFHD/>

The third and fourth points say that the size of the Dresden raid—in terms of numbers, types of bombs and the means of delivery—were commensurate with the military objective and similar to other Allied bombings. On 23 February 1945, the Allies [[Bombing of Pforzheim in World War II|bombed Pforzheim]] and caused an estimated 20,000 civilian fatalities. The most devastating raid on any city was on [[Bombing of Tokyo (10 March 1945)|Tokyo on 9–10 March]] (the ''Meetinghouse'' raid)<ref>Crane, Conrad C. "[https://www.pbs.org/thewar/detail_5229.htm The War: Firebombing (Germany & Japan)] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170602225435/http://www.pbs.org/thewar/detail_5229.htm|date=2 June 2017}}." [[PBS]]. Accessed 24 August 2014.</ref> which caused over 100,000 casualties, many civilian. The tonnage and types of bombs listed in the service records of the Dresden raid were comparable to (or less than) [[Throw-weight|throw weights]] of bombs dropped in other air attacks carried out in 1945. In the case of Dresden, as in many other similar attacks, the hour break in between the RAF raids was a deliberate ploy to attack the fire fighters, medical teams, and military units.{{sfn|Taylor|2005|p=8}}

In late July 1943, the city of [[Hamburg]] was bombed during [[Operation Gomorrah]] by combined RAF and USAAF strategic bomber forces. Four major raids were carried out in the span of 10 days, of which the most notable, on the night of 27–28 July, created a devastating [[firestorm]] effect similar to Dresden's, killing an estimated 18,474 people. The death toll for that night is included in the overall estimated total of 37,000 for the series of raids.{{sfn|Overy|2013|p=335}} Two-thirds of the remaining population reportedly fled the city after the raids.<ref>[http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/hamburg.html Hamburg, 28 July 1943] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090402052154/http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/hamburg.html|date=2 April 2009}} RAF Bomber Command. Retrieved 7 January 2007</ref>

The fifth point is that the firebombing achieved the intended effect of disabling the industry in Dresden. It was estimated that at least 23 per cent of the city's industrial buildings were destroyed or severely damaged. The damage to other infrastructure and communications was immense, which would have severely limited the potential use of Dresden to stop the Soviet advance. The report concludes with: {{blockquote|The specific forces and means employed in the Dresden bombings were in keeping with the forces and means employed by the Allies in other aerial attacks on comparable targets in Germany. The Dresden bombings achieved the strategic objectives that underlay the attack and were of mutual importance to the Allies and the Russians.<ref name=USAFHD/>}}
<!-- Please provide page numbers from "Der Brand" -- the online references cited here do not seem to support these points, and in any case are not the book itself -- Also, if the position being advanced here is that the raid was militarily unnecessary, then we need to provide reliable mainstream published sources who specifically make that point for us. For example, if a source says the Luftwaffe was short on fuel or aircraft, using that to conclude the raid was unnecessary would be synthesis, per WP:SYNT –
Countering the claim Dresden was a significant military target, Friedrich's earlier book, ''Der Brand: Deutschland im Bombenkrieg 1940–1945'' focuses on evidence showing German forces were in full retreat by February 1945. He argues the impact on civilians was out of all proportion to the military goal, reiterating the argument Allied forces were aware of the destruction caused by incendiary bombs. Friedrich also argues that the Allies had known that future attacks were likely to cause ever-increasing numbers of civilian deaths.<ref>Douglas Peifer [http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/GENOCIDE/reviewsw159.htm A review of ''Der Brand''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050310082103/http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/GENOCIDE/reviewsw159.htm|date=10 March 2005}} Published in November 2003, by H-German, a member of [[H-Net]] Humanities & Social Sciences OnLine.</ref> The Allies were reportedly in complete control of the air,<ref name="OM"/> and Germany had committed all its fighters originally dedicated to air defence at the [[Battle of the Bulge]].{{sfn|Davis|2006|p=473}} -->

===Arguments against justification===
[[File:Dresden. Zwinger & Sophienkirche. - Detroit Publishing Co.jpg|thumb|The [[Zwinger Palace]] in 1900]]

====Military reasons====
The journalist [[Alexander McKee (author)|Alexander McKee]] cast doubt on the meaningfulness of the list of targets mentioned in the 1953 USAF report, pointing out that the military barracks listed as a target were a long way out of the city and were not targeted during the raid.{{sfn|McKee|1983|pp=61–62}} The "hutted camps" mentioned in the report as military targets were also not military but were camps for refugees.{{sfn|McKee|1983|pp=61–62}} It is also stated that the important Autobahn bridge to the west of the city was not targeted or attacked, and that no railway stations were on the British target maps, nor any bridges, such as the railway bridge spanning the Elbe River.{{sfn|McKee|1983|pp=62–63}} Commenting on this, McKee says: "The standard whitewash gambit, both British and American, is to mention that Dresden contained targets X, Y and Z, and to let the innocent reader assume that these targets were attacked, whereas in fact the bombing plan totally omitted them and thus, except for one or two mere accidents, they escaped".{{sfn|McKee|1983|p=61}} McKee further asserts "The bomber commanders were not really interested in any purely military or economic targets, which was just as well, for they knew very little about Dresden; the RAF even lacked proper maps of the city. What they were looking for was a big built-up area which they could burn, and that Dresden possessed in full measure."{{sfn|McKee|1983|p=63}}

According to historian [[Sönke Neitzel]], "it is difficult to find any evidence in German documents that the destruction of Dresden had any consequences worth mentioning on the Eastern Front. The industrial plants of Dresden played no significant role in German industry at this stage in the war".{{sfn|Addison|Crang|2006|loc=Chapter "The City under Attack" by Sonke Neitzel p. 76}} Wing Commander [[H. R. Allen]] said, "The final phase of Bomber Command's operations was far and away the worst. Traditional British [[chivalry]] and the use of minimum force in war was to become a mockery and the outrages perpetrated by the bombers will be remembered a thousand years hence".<ref>{{harvnb|McKee|1983|p=315}} quoting H. R. Allen (1972) ''The Legacy of Lord Trenchard''</ref>

[[File:Sandsteinmauerheidefriedhof.jpg|thumb|A memorial at Heidefriedhof cemetery in Dresden. It reads: "{{lang|de|Wieviele starben? Wer kennt die Zahl? An deinen Wunden sieht man die Qual der Namenlosen, die hier verbrannt, im Höllenfeuer aus Menschenhand.}}" ("How many died? Who knows the count? In your wounds one sees the agony of the nameless, who in here were conflagrated, in the hellfire made by hands of man.")]]

====As an immoral act, but not a war crime====
{{blockquote|... ever since the deliberate mass bombing of civilians in the second world war, and as a direct response to it, the international community has outlawed the practice. It first tried to do so in the [[Fourth Geneva Convention]] of 1949, but the UK and the US would not agree, since to do so would have been an admission of guilt for their systematic "area bombing" of German and Japanese civilians.|[[A.C. Grayling]].{{sfn|Grayling|2006b}} }}

[[Frederick Taylor (historian)|Frederick Taylor]] told ''[[Der Spiegel]]'', "I personally find the attack on Dresden horrific. It was overdone, it was excessive and is to be regretted enormously," but, "A [[war crime]] is a very specific thing which international lawyers argue about all the time and I would not be prepared to commit myself nor do I see why I should. I'm a historian."<ref name=Hawley/> Similarly, British philosopher [[A. C. Grayling]] has described RAF area bombardment as an "immoral act" and "moral crime" because "destroying everything... contravenes every moral and humanitarian principle debated in connection with [[Just war|the just conduct of war]]", though Grayling insisted that it "is not strictly correct to describe area bombing as a 'war crime'."{{sfn|Grayling|2006a|pp=245–246; 272–275}}

====As a war crime====
{{See also|British war crimes|United States war crimes}}
According to [[Gregory Stanton]], lawyer and president of [[Genocide Watch]]:
{{blockquote|... every human being having the capacity for both good and evil. The Nazi Holocaust was among the most evil genocides in history. But the Allies' firebombing of Dresden and nuclear destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were also war crimes – and as [[Leo Kuper]] and [[Eric Markusen]] have argued, also acts of genocide. We are all capable of evil and must be restrained by law from committing it.<ref name="Stanton-1">{{Cite web|url=http://www.genocidewatch.org/HOWWECANPREVENTGENOCIDE.htm|title=How Can We Prevent Genocide: Building An International Campaign to End Genocide|last=Stanton|first=Gregory|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070927005226/http://www.genocidewatch.org/HOWWECANPREVENTGENOCIDE.htm|archive-date=27 September 2007}}</ref>}}

Historian [[Donald Bloxham]] states, "The bombing of Dresden on 13–14 February 1945 was a war crime".{{sfn|Addison|Crang|2006|p=180}} He further argues there was a strong ''[[prima facie]]'' case for trying Winston Churchill among others and a theoretical case Churchill could have been found guilty. "This should be a sobering thought. If, however it is also a startling one, this is probably less the result of widespread understanding of the nuance of international law and more because in the popular mind 'war criminal', like 'paedophile' or 'terrorist', has developed into a moral rather than a legal categorisation".{{sfn|Addison|Crang|2006|p=180}}

German author [[Günter Grass]] is one of several intellectuals and commentators who have also called the bombing a war crime.<ref name=Elliott>Elliott, Michael. [http://www.time.com/time/europe/etan/story.html Europe: Then And Now] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090907171902/http://www.time.com/time/europe/etan/story.html|date=7 September 2009}}, ''[[Time (magazine)|Time]]'' Europe, 10 August 2003. Retrieved 26 February 2005.</ref>

Proponents of this position argue that the devastation from firebombing was greater than anything that could be justified by [[military necessity]] alone, and this establishes a ''[[prima facie]]'' case. The Allies were aware of the effects of firebombing, as British cities had been subject to them during [[the Blitz]].{{efn|Longmate describes a 22 September 1941 memorandum prepared by the British Air Ministry's Directorate of Bombing Operations that puts numbers to this analysis {{harv|Longmate|1983|p=122}}.}} Proponents disagree that Dresden had a military garrison and claim that most of the industry was in the outskirts and not in the targeted city centre,<ref name=GG20051026>Gerda Gericke (lucas) [http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,1265990,00.html The Destruction of Dresden's Frauenkirche] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081216141745/http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,1265990,00.html|date=16 December 2008}} ''[[Deutsche Welle]]'', 26 October 2005.</ref> and that the cultural significance of the city should have precluded the Allies from bombing it.

British historian [[Antony Beevor]] wrote that Dresden was considered relatively safe, having been spared previous RAF night attacks, and that at the time of the raids there were up to 300,000 refugees in the area [[Flight and evacuation of German civilians during the end of World War II|seeking sanctuary]] from the advancing [[Red Army]] from the [[Eastern Front (WWII)|Eastern Front]].{{sfn|Beevor|2002|p=83}}

====As of concealed purpose====
A [[Historical revisionism|revisionist]] story, persisting into the 21st century, was that the bombing was done, at least in part, to give the Soviets a signal demonstration–a warning–of the destructive power of the Allied bomber forces (the Soviets were expected to occupy Dresden presently).<ref>{{cite book |last=McKee |first=Alexander |authorlink=Alexander McKee (author) |title=Dresden 1945: The Devil's Tinderbox |year=1984 |publisher=Dutton |location=New York |isbn=0525242627 |page=277}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Clark |first1=Robert S. |date=Winter 1986 |title=Letter from Dresden |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3851544 |journal=Hudson Review |volume=38 |issue=4 |page=536 |doi=10.2307/3851544 |jstor=3851544 |s2cid=165271293 |access-date=June 10, 2023}}</ref>

====Political response in Germany====
[[File:Antideutsche rassisten.jpg|thumb|Anti-German banner expressing support for Air Chief Marshal [[Arthur Harris (RAF officer)|Arthur Harris]] who is associated with the [[Area bombing directive|area bombing of German cities]]]]
[[Far-right]] politicians in Germany have sparked a great deal of controversy by promoting the term "{{lang|de|Bombenholocaust}}" ("holocaust by bomb") to describe the raids.<ref name=Volkery >Volkery, Carsten. [http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,339833,00.html "War of Words"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070909140816/http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,339833,00.html|date=9 September 2007}}, ''Der Spiegel'', 2 February 2005;
[https://www.theguardian.com/secondworldwar/story/0,,1411436,00.html Casualties of total war] Leading article, ''[[The Guardian]]'', 12 February 2005.</ref> {{Lang|de|[[Der Spiegel]]}} writes that, for decades, the Communist government of East Germany promoted the bombing as an example of "Anglo-American terror", and now the same rhetoric is being used by the far right.<ref name=Volkery/> An example can be found in the extremist nationalist party ''[[National Democratic Party of Germany|Die Heimat]]''. A party's representative, [[Jürgen Gansel]], described the Dresden raids as "mass murder", and "Dresden's holocaust of bombs".<ref name="Bernstein-2005-02-12">[https://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/12/international/europe/12germany.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print&position=&oref=slogin Germany Seeks Tighter Curbs on Protests by Neo-Nazi Party] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140309115229/http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/12/international/europe/12germany.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print&position=&oref=slogin|date=9 March 2014}}, ''[[The New York Times]]'', 12 February 2005.</ref> This provoked an outrage in the German parliament and triggered responses from the media. Prosecutors said that it was legal to call the bombing a holocaust.<ref name=Cleaver>Cleaver, Hannah. [https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/1487678/German-ruling-says-Dresden-was-a-holocaust.html "German ruling says Dresden was a holocaust"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090427084437/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/1487678/German-ruling-says-Dresden-was-a-holocaust.html|date=27 April 2009}}, ''[[The Daily Telegraph]]'', 12 April 2005.</ref> In 2010 groups opposing the far-right [[2010 Dresden anti-fascist blockade|blocked a demonstration of far-right organisations]].

[[Phrase]]s like "Bomber-Harris, do it again!", "Bomber-Harris Superstar – Thanks from the red [[Antifaschistische Aktion|Antifa]]", and "{{lang|de|Deutsche Täter sind keine Opfer!}}" ("German perpetrators are no victims!") are popular [[slogan]]s among the so-called "[[Anti-Germans (political current)|Anti-Germans]]"—a small radical left-wing political movement in Germany and Austria.<ref>[http://www.revolution.de.com/zeitung/zeitung09/bomber.htm Bomber Harris, Superstar] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121107063442/http://www.revolution.de.com/zeitung/zeitung09/bomber.htm|date=7 November 2012}} (German)</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.im.nrw.de/sch/doks/vs/antideutsche.pdf|title=Die Antideutschen – kein vorübergehendes Phänomen" – Verfassungsschutz des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen Im Oktober 2006|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110524085018/http://www.im.nrw.de/sch/doks/vs/antideutsche.pdf|archive-date=24 May 2011|url-status=dead}}</ref> In 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the bombing, Anti-Germans praised the bombing on the grounds that so many of the city's civilians had supported Nazism. Similar rallies take place every year.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,2145701,00.html|title=Strange Bedfellows: Radical Leftists for Bush &#124; Germany &#124; DW.DE &#124; 25.08.2006|publisher=Dw-world.de|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110415034958/http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,2145701,00.html|archive-date=15 April 2011|url-status=live}}</ref>