Editing Battle of Tsushima (section)

==Contributing factors==
===Commander and crew experience===
Admiral Rozhestvensky faced a more combat-experienced battleship admiral in [[Tōgō Heihachirō]]. Admiral Tōgō had already killed two Russian admirals: [[Stepan Makarov]] outside of Port Arthur in the battleship ''Petropavlovsk'' in April 1904, then [[Wilgelm Vitgeft]] in his battleship {{ship|Russian battleship|Tsesarevich||2}} in August of the same year. Before those two deaths, Tōgō had chased Admiral [[Oskar Starck]], also flying his flag in the ''Petropavlovsk'', off the battlefield.
Admiral Tōgō and his men had two battleship fleet action experiences, which amounted to over four hours of combat experience in battleship-to-battleship combat at [[Battle of Port Arthur|Port Arthur]] and the [[Battle of the Yellow Sea|Yellow Sea]].{{sfn|Forczyk|2009|pages=43, 73}}
The Japanese fleets had practiced gunnery extensively since the beginning of the war, using [[sub-caliber round|sub-calibre]] practice guns{{efn|Large calibre long barrel rifle with special mounts to be centered in the bore}}  mounted in their larger guns.{{efn|name=practice}}{{efn|name=subc|As an indication of unusually high level of gunnery training Tōgō applied to the fleet, the [[Maizuru Naval Arsenal]] requested an increase in 1905 fiscal year budget for additional 40,000 rounds of sub-calibre practice ammunition on 17 May 1905 for ''Mikasa'', 34,000 rounds for cruiser ''Nisshin'', 1,000 rounds per gun for destroyer ''Sazanami'', among others, as they depleted annual allocations merely one and a half months into the fiscal year (Fiscal years begin on 1 April).  These requests were all approved by the Fleet Management Dept. of the Naval Ministry for the entire fleet.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/listPhoto?LANG=default&BID=F2008012516051365589&ID=M2008012516051465594&REFCODE=C06091642400|title=Office of the Navy Minister, Record Nr. 1963, 1905 (in Japanese)|access-date=11 May 2022|archive-date=11 May 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220511124605/https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/listPhoto?LANG=default&BID=F2008012516051365589&ID=M2008012516051465594&REFCODE=C06091642400|url-status=live}}</ref>}}{{efn|The Russian 2nd Pacific Squadron departed Libau with small supply of sub-calibre practice ammunition.  The transport ''Irtysh'' was loaded with additional practice ammunition for the squadron, but was delayed in departure due to an accident, and was left behind at Libau for repair. The Russian Admiralty decided to unload the ammunition, send it via the Trans-Siberian railroad to Vladivostok, and reload the ship with coal, without notifying Rozhestvensky (who was promoted to rear admiral on the strength of founding the gunnery training school of the Baltic Fleet.{{sfn|Novikov-Priboy|1937|loc=Book 2, Chapter 3}}), who learned about the decision after reaching Madagascar. The squadron conducted four practice sessions each at Nosy Be and Cam Ranh Bay.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://vk-spy.ru/en/health-and-beauty/2-tihookeanskaya-eskadra-sostav-i-harakteristika-korablei/|title=Second pacific squadron composition and characteristics of ships. Command structure and tactical organization. Passage from Indochina to the Korea Strait|last=Bykov|first=((P.D., Captain 1st Rank))|language=ru}}</ref>}}

In contrast, {{ship|Russian battleship|Borodino|up=yes}} underwent [[sea trials]] from 23 August to 13 September 1904<ref name=rngs /> as a brand new ship upon her completion,{{sfn|McLaughlin|2003|pages=136–143}} and the new crew did not have much time for training before she set sail for the Pacific on 15 October 1904. ''Borodino''{{'}}s sister ship, {{ship|Russian battleship|Knyaz Suvorov||2}}, started trials on 9 August, {{ship|Russian battleship|Oryol||2}}{{efn|name=Oryol}} started trials the latest on 10 September 1904, leaving {{ship|Russian battleship|Imperator Aleksandr III||2}} (the trials finished in October 1903) as the only {{sclass|Borodino|battleship|0}} ship actually ready for deployment.<ref name=rngs />{{efn|See the articles on {{ship|Russian battleship|Knyaz Suvorov}}, {{ship|Russian battleship|Oryol}}, and {{ship|Russian battleship|Imperator Aleksandr III}}.}} As the Imperial Russian Navy planned on building 10 ''Borodino''-class battleships (5 were ultimately built) with the requirement for thousands of additional crewmen, the basic training, quality and experience of the crew and cadets were far lower<ref>{{cite web|title=Imperial Japanese Navy Records, Navy Office Intelligence Nr. 433|date=12 November 1904|page=0101|quote= quoted a telegram dated 10 November 1904 from Consul Mitsuhashi ([[:ja:三橋信方|Mitsuhashi Nobukata, later Mayor of Yokohama City]]) at [[Copenhagen]] and [[The Hague]], stating "Two Danish harbor pilots who went aboard the fleet flagship and ''Admiral Nakhimov'' in the Danish waters said the officers including the fleet commander seemed tense and irritable, while the crew appeared to be a bunch of fodders."|url=https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/image_C09050537400?IS_KIND=DetailSummary|language=ja|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201018184844/https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/image_C09050537400?IS_KIND=DetailSummary|archive-date=18 October 2020}}</ref> than those onboard the battleships in the seasoned Pacific Fleet.{{sfn|Forczyk|2009|p=36}}

[[File:"The Hamburg- American Line" "Twin Screw Express Steamers" 1899 ad in The Mail and Express (New York City), from- A pictorial description of Broadway from The Mail and Express Advertisement 14 (cropped).jpg|frameless|upright=1.05|right]] [[File:"The Greatest Steamship Company in the World" "Twin Screw Express Service" 1899 ad in The Mail and Express (New York City), from- A pictorial description of Broadway from The Mail and Express Advertisement 14 (cropped).jpg|upright=1|right|thumb|1899 ad in The Mail and Express of New York]]
The [[Admiralty Board (Russian Empire)|Imperial Russian Admiralty Council]] (Адмиралтейств-совет) and the rest of the Admiralty were quite aware of this disadvantage, and opposed the September dispatch plan{{efn|The official departure date from Kronstadt was 11 September 1904.<ref>Lindsay, Captain A.B. (1907) for {{harvnb|Semenoff|1907|page=xxii in Translator's Preface}}.</ref>}} for the following reasons:
<blockquote>1. The Japanese navy has completed the battle preparations with all the crew having some combat experience.
2. The long voyage is mostly through extreme tropical weather, so a meaningful training is practically impossible on the way.
3. Therefore, the newly created Second Pacific Fleet should conduct training in the Baltic until the next spring while waiting for the [[Fitting out|rigging]] of another battleship, {{ship|Russian battleship|Slava||2}},{{efn|Launched on 29 August 1903. Commissioned in October 1905. The last of ''Borodino''-class ships.}} and the purchase of Chilean and Argentine warships.{{efn|See [[#British support]]}}<ref name=rngs /></blockquote>

However, at the council in the imperial presence on 23 August 1904 held at the [[Peterhof Grand Palace]], this opinion was overruled by Admiral Rozhestvensky (Commander in Chief of the Fleet), [[Theodor Avellan|Navy Minister Avellan]], and [[Nicholas II of Russia|Tsar Nicholas II]]; for it was deemed impossible to re-arrange the massive coaling for the long voyage if the navy broke the contract that was already signed with [[Hamburg America Line|Hamburg-American Steamship Line]] of Germany.<ref name=rngs />

===Salvo firing director system===
{{Further|Ship gun fire-control system#Pre-dreadnought control system}}

Up to the [[Battle of the Yellow Sea]] on 10 August 1904, naval guns were controlled locally by a [[gunnery officer]] assigned to that gun or a turret. He specified the elevation and deflection figures, gave the firing order while keeping his eyes on the [[inclinometer]]s indicating the rolling and pitching angles of the ship, received the fall of shot observation report from the spotter on the mast, calculated the new elevation and deflection to 'walk' the shots in on the target for the next round, without much means to discern or measure the movements of his own ship and the target. He typically had a view on the horizon, but with the new 12-inch gun's range extended to over {{convert|8|mi|km}}, his vantage point was lower than desired.<ref>{{cite journal|journal=Naval War College Review|issue=Spring 2005|volume=58, No.2|last=Koda|first=Yoji|title=The Russo-Japanese War: Primary Causes of Japanese Success|date=25 April 2024 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26394181|pages=KODA 34–35|jstor=26394181|access-date=19 April 2024}}</ref>{{efn|1=Approximate distance to horizon is calculated by sqrt(2 x ''h'' x ''R'') where ''R'' is the [[Earth radius]] and ''h'' is the observation height above the sealevel. (see [[horizon]] for details.) Using battleship ''Mikasa'' as the example, the height of gunsight on top of 12" main gun turret (technically they are barbettes with armoured covers that make them look like turrets) is about 10 to 11m from the waterline and the bridge height is about 16 to 18m from the waterline by estimating from the [[:File:Battleship Mikasa from JFS1906 Cropped.png|sideview plan]]. Using the globally-averaged earth radius of 6,371,000m<ref>{{cite web|title=Earth Fact Sheet|author=NASA|url=https://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/planetary/factsheet/earthfact.html}}</ref> for the ''R'', the distance observable from the turret is sqrt(2 x 11 x 6371000m) = 11.8km. The distance observable from the bridge is sqrt(2 x 16 x 6371000m) = 14.3km. Mikasa's main guns had a range of 14km. <small>(This explanatory note is provided for the benefit of the readers in accordance with [[WP:CALC]].)</small>}}

In the months before the battle, the Chief Gunnery Officer of ''Asahi'', Lieutenant Commander [[Kanji Kato|Katō Hiroharu]], aided by a Royal Navy advisor who introduced him to the use of the early mechanical computer [[Dumaresq]] in fire control, introduced a system for centrally issuing the gun-laying{{efn|What ship to target, and the distance to the target were specified on the bridge. Each gun/turret aimed the target to determine the deflection, and used a distance-to-elevation conversion table for the gun to set the elevation.}} and salvo-firing orders by voice.{{efn|All the gunnery personnel on ''Mikasa'' was given a lecture on telephone systems at 17:20 on 18 April 1905 in Chinhae Bay.<ref>{{cite web|editor=Navy General Staff|date=18 April 1905|title=Battleship Mikasa Wartime Daily Log 3(7)|url=https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/listPhoto?LANG=default&BID=F2009052815372931381&ID=M2009052815373031389&REFCODE=C09050340000|page=0339|access-date=16 April 2024|language=ja}}</ref>}} Using a central system allowed the spotter to identify a salvo of distant shell splashes much more effectively than trying to identify a single splash among the many in the confusion of fleet-to-fleet combat. Further, the spotter needed to keep track of just one firing at a time as opposed to multiple shots on multiple stopwatches, in addition to having to report to just one officer on the bridge. The 'director' officer on the bridge had the advantage of having a higher vantage point than in the gun turrets, in addition to being steps away from the ship commander giving orders to change the course and the speed in response to the incoming reports on target movements.<ref name=salvo>{{cite web|editor=Navy General Staff|date=17 April 1905|title=Battleship Mikasa Wartime Daily Log 3(7)|url=https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/listPhoto?LANG=default&BID=F2009052815372931381&ID=M2009052815373031389&REFCODE=C09050340000|pages=0336–0337|access-date=16 April 2024|language=ja}}</ref>

This fire control director system was introduced to other ships in the fleet, and the training and practice on this system were carried out in the months waiting for the arrival of the Baltic Fleet{{efn|name=subc}}{{efn|name=practice|During the 11 days from 28 March to 7 April 1905, ''Mikasa'' had 5 days with gunnery training sessions.  In these 5 days, ''Mikasa'' fired 9,066 rounds of practice ammunition.}} while its progress was reported by the British intelligence from their naval stations at [[Gibraltar]], [[Mediterranean Fleet|Malta]], [[Aden Colony|Aden]] ([[Yemen]]), [[Naval Base Simon's Town|Cape of Good Hope]], [[East Indies Station|Trincomalee]] ([[Sri Lanka|Ceylon]]), [[China Station|Singapore]] and [[British Forces Overseas Hong Kong|Hong Kong]], among other locations.{{sfn|British Assistance|1980}}

As a result, Japanese fire was more accurate in the far range ({{convert|3|to|8|mi|km|disp=or|0}}),{{efn|On 6-7 April 1905, ''Mikasa'' conducted the second sub-calibre gunnery training competition against ''Shikishima''. ''Mikasa'' scored 285 hits / 927 shots (30.7%), ''Shikishima'' scored 258/974 (26.5% hitrate) on opposite course; ''Mikasa'' scored 894/1703 (52.5%), ''Shikishima'' scored 1085/1672 (64.9%) on the same course with the target at the distance of 280–720 m at 6 knots, with towed target by torpedo-boat at 6 knots.<ref>{{cite web|editor=Navy General Staff|date=7 April 1905|title=Battleship Mikasa Wartime Daily Log 3(6)|url=https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/listPhoto?LANG=default&BID=F2009052815372931381&ID=M2009052815373031388&REFCODE=C09050339900|pages=0289–0296|access-date=15 April 2024|language=ja}}</ref>}} on top of the advantage they held in the shorter distances using the latest 1903 issue [[Barr and Stroud]] FA3 [[coincidence rangefinder]]s of baselength {{cvt|5|ft|m}},{{efn|Baselength is the distance between the left and the right lens or mirror facing the target, which largely determines the effective range of a rangefinder.}}  which had a range of {{convert|6000|yd|m}}, while the Russian battleships were equipped with ''Lugeol'' [[Stadiametric rangefinding|stadiametric rangefinders]] from the 1880s (except battleships ''Oslyabya'' and ''Navarin'', which had the Barr and Stroud 1895 issue FA2 of baselength {{cvt|4.5|ft|m}} retrofitted), which only had a range of about {{convert|4000|m|yd|order=flip}}.{{sfn|Forczyk|2009|pages=56–57}}

===Wireless telegraphy===
The [[wireless telegraph]] (radio) had been invented during the last half of the 1890s, and by the turn of the century, nearly all major navies were adopting this improved communications technology. Tsushima was "the first major sea battle in which wireless played any role whatsoever".{{sfn|Busch|1969|pages=137–138}}{{sfn|Evans|Peattie|1997|p=84}}

Lieutenant [[Akiyama Saneyuki]] (who was the key staff to Admiral Tōgō in formulating plans and directives before and during the battle as a Commander, who also went aboard ''Nikolai I'' to accompany Admiral Nebogatov to ''Mikasa'' for a formal meeting with Tōgō) had been sent to the United States as a [[naval attaché]] in 1897. He witnessed the capabilities of wireless telegraphy firsthand during the [[Spanish–American War]], and sent several memos to the [[Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff|Navy General Staff]] urging that they push ahead as rapidly as possible to acquire the new technology.{{sfn|Evans|Peattie|1997|p=84}} The IJN command became heavily interested in the technology; however, it found the [[Marconi wireless]] system, which was then operating with the Royal Navy, to be exceedingly expensive.
[[File:Imperial Japanese Navy Radio Telegraph Research Committee.png|thumb|right|[[:ja:木村駿吉|Kimura Shunkichi]] (in plain clothes on the front row) and the members of Imperial Japanese Navy Wireless Telegraph Research Committee in 1900.]]
The Japanese therefore decided to create their own radio sets by setting up a wireless research committee under Professor [[Kimura Shunkichi]],{{efn|(1866–1938) Graduated from [[Tokyo University]], Physics Dept.; studied at [[Lawrence Scientific School]] (Harvard) and [[Sheffield Scientific School]] (Yale) from 1893 to 1896. [[:ja:木村駿吉]]}} which eventually produced an acceptable system. In 1901, having attained radio transmissions of up to {{convert|60|mi}} with the Type 34 (34th year of Meiji = 1901) set, the Navy formally adopted wireless telegraphy. Two years later, a laboratory, a factory, and the wireless telegraphy curriculum were set up at [[:ja:海軍水雷術練習所|Imperial Japanese Navy Mines Training School]] in Yokosuka to produce the Type 36 (1903) wireless sets,{{efn|See a picture of faithful replica set onboard battleship ''Mikasa'' in [[Yokosuka]]. {{cite web|author=Mikasa Preservation Committee|title=Type 36 wireless set registered as Essential Historical Material for Science and Technology in 2008|url=https://www.kinenkan-mikasa.or.jp/2017_type36_telegraph.html|language=ja}}}} and these were quickly installed on every major warship in the [[Combined Fleet]] by the time the war started.{{sfn|Evans|Peattie|1997|p=84}}

[[Alexander Stepanovich Popov]] of the Naval Warfare Institute had built and demonstrated a wireless telegraphy set in 1900.  However, technology improvement and production in the Russian empire lagged those of Germany, and "System Slaby-Arco",{{efn|See [[Adolf Slaby]] and [[Georg von Arco]].}}<ref>{{cite web|title=AEG Radio receiver in the style of the Slaby Arco System|url=https://artsandculture.google.com/asset/radio-receiver-in-the-style-of-the-slaby-arco-system-allgemeine-elektricit%C3%A4ts-gesellschaft-aeg-1887-1967/uwFwjRep9295iA?hl=en|access-date=24 April 2022|archive-date=24 April 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220424142915/https://artsandculture.google.com/asset/radio-receiver-in-the-style-of-the-slaby-arco-system-allgemeine-elektricit%C3%A4ts-gesellschaft-aeg-1887-1967/uwFwjRep9295iA?hl=en|url-status=live}}</ref> originally made by [[AEG (German company)|Allgemeine Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft]] (AEG) and then produced in volume by its successor wireless-set maker [[Telefunken]] in Germany (by 1904, this system was in wide use by [[Kaiserliche Marine]]) was adopted by the Imperial Russian Navy. Although both sides had early wireless telegraphy, the Russians were using German sets tuned and maintained by German technicians half-way into the voyage,{{sfn|Novikov-Priboy|1937}} while the Japanese had the advantage of using their own equipment maintained and operated by their own navy specialists trained at the Yokosuka school.{{efn|For background information on the usage of wireless telegraphy at the time, and how tuning and maintenance were essential (just like drivers being required to be mechanics at the outset of automobiles), see: {{cite web|title=The Work of a Wireless Telegraph Man|last=Packard|first=Winthrop|publisher=The World's Work|date=February 1904|url=https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015009214399&seq=439}}}}

===British support===
[[File:Vote for the Conservatives Who Gave You the Alliance. (22487157297).jpg|thumb|left|Illustration by E.Huskinson for the [[Conservative Party (UK)|Conservative Party]] c. 1905–1910.]]
The [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland|United Kingdom]] assisted Japan by manufacturing guns{{efn|IJN almost exclusively used [[Elswick Ordnance Company|Armstrong]] guns on its heavier ships of the time. Cruisers {{ship|Japanese cruiser|Chitose||2}} and {{ship|Japanese cruiser|Kasagi||2}} were built in the US, but their main guns were Armstrong.  Cruisers {{ship|Japanese cruiser|Kasuga||2}} and {{ship|Japanese cruiser|Nisshin||2}} were built in Italy with Armstrong guns (Sir W.G. Armstrong & Company had a factory, [[:it:Stabilimenti meccanici di Pozzuoli|Stabilimenti meccanici di Pozzuoli]], in Italy). IJN licensed the design of [[EOC 8 inch 45 caliber|Armstrong 8"]] guns and had started producing it in 1902.}} and building battleships for the IJN.{{sfn|Brook|1999}}  As the ally in the [[Anglo-Japanese Alliance]], the UK also assisted Japan in intelligence, finance, technology, training and other aspects of the war against Russia. At the time, Britain owned and controlled more harbour facilities around the world – specifically shipyards and [[coaling station]]s – than Russia and its allies (France,{{efn|See [[Franco-Russian Alliance]] for details.}} and to some extent Germany) combined. The UK also obstructed, where possible, Russian attempts to purchase ships and coal.{{sfn|British Assistance|1980}} France openly allowed the Baltic Fleet warships into [[Cherbourg]] and [[Tangier]] ports before and after the [[Dogger Bank Incident]];{{sfn|Corbett|2015b|pp=36-40}} and the UK formally protested in the post-Dogger Bank negotiations, pointing out that the neutral countries could not accept warships of the fighting countries into their ports without enforcing internment,{{efn|The time was in between [[Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907]], and international agreements were not formalised on naval warfare yet (except on hospital ships). This argument made by Great Britain, based on Section IV "On the Internment of belligerents and the care of the wounded in neutral countries," (Article 57) of the 1899 agreement (which says "A neutral State which receives in its territory troops belonging to the belligerent armies shall intern them"<ref>{{cite web|title=Laws of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II); July 29, 1899|url=https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/hague02.asp}}</ref>), may have been acceptable to most governments in the world at the time. However, as it was incorporated into the 1907 Convention, it said  "Belligerents are forbidden to use neutral ports and waters as a base of naval operations against their adversaries (Article 5)" with further articles permitting up to 24-hour stay (Article 12) for the maximum of three warships of a belligerent at war in any neutral port (Article 15) if the neutral power permitted.<ref>{{cite web|title=Laws of War: Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War (Hague XIII); October 18, 1907|url=https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hague13.asp}}</ref>}} and if France is no longer neutral in the war, the UK is obligated to commence military action in support of Japan as required in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.{{efn|The alliance required both countries to join the war if one of them faces "more than one" countries as the adversary. The Franco-Russian Alliance had a similar requirement, but in wars against Germany only. The French government had to accept the logic, as France did not wish to risk going into war against the UK, nor wish to give any excuse for the [[Royal Navy]] to attack the Russian warships with or without declaring war.}} As a result, the rendezvous point for Rozestvensky and Fölkersahm squadrons was changed from the port of [[Antsiranana|Diego Suarez]] to the waters around remote islands of [[Nosy Boraha|Île Sainte-Marie]] and [[Nosy Be]] in Madagascar,{{sfn|Novikov-Priboy|1937|loc=Book 1, Part 3, Chapter 1}} and free access to the ports including [[Saigon]] and [[Cam Ranh Bay#Ba Ngoi Port|Ba Ngoi port in Cam Ranh Bay]] was denied for the fleet in [[French Indochina]].{{efn|When the Rozestvensky squadron reached [[Dakar]] after leaving Tangier, the ships were allowed into the port and carry out coaling, but upon exchanges of telegram messages with Paris by the local authorities, they were banned from the port.{{sfn|Novikov-Priboy|1937|loc=Book 1, Chapter 2}} The German government, who had interned {{ship|Russian battleship|Tsesarevich}} at [[Kiautschou Bay Leased Territory|Qingdao]] on 11 August 1904, took a lenient stance towards the squadron as a neutral power in the war. After the Dakar stop, the Rozestvensky squadron reached [[Lüderitz Bay|Angra Pequena Bay]] in [[German South West Africa]] on 15 November 1904 (Gregorian), and the local [[Lüderitz]] authorities, busy in the [[Herero and Namaqua genocide]], did not object to the mooring and coaling in the port until their departure on 21 November 1904.{{sfn|Novikov-Priboy|1937|loc=Book 1, Chapter 2}}}}

This support created a major logistics problem for around the world deployment of the Baltic Fleet to the Pacific in procuring coal and supplies on the way.{{sfn|Corbett|2015b|pp=142, 161, 193}}<ref>{{cite web |last=Gray |first=Steven |publisher=University of Portsmouth |title=Fuelling mobility: coal and Britain's naval power, c. 1870–1914|url=https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/83937265.pdf|access-date=26 October 2020|archive-date=27 December 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211227192443/https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/83937265.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> At [[Nosy Be]] in [[Madagascar]] and at [[Camranh Bay]], [[French Indochina]], the fleet was forced to be anchored for about two months each, seriously degrading morale of the crew. By the time it reached the [[Sea of Japan]], the hulls of all the ships in the fleet were heavily [[Biofouling|fouled]] in addition to carrying the extra coal otherwise not required on deck.{{sfn|Horne|2015|p=74}}{{efn|name=refusal|The [[Hamburg America Line|Hamburg-American Steamship Line]] refused to provide coaling beyond French Indochina.<ref name=rngs />}}

The Japanese ships, on the other hand, were well maintained in the ample time given by the intelligence.  For example, battleship {{ship|Japanese battleship|Asahi||2}} was under repair from November 1904 to April 1905 at [[Sasebo Naval Arsenal]] for two 12-inch guns lost and serious damage to the hull from striking a mine.  They were divided into battle divisions of as much uniform speed and gun range so that a fleet would not suffer a bottleneck in speed, and the range of guns would not render some ships useless within a group in extended-range combat.{{sfn|Mahan|1906|pages=314–315}}{{efn|name=order}}

At the end of the [[Argentine–Chilean naval arms race]] in 1903, two Chilean-ordered and British-built battleships (then called ''Constitución'' and ''Libertad'') and two Argentine-ordered, Italian-built cruisers (then called ''Bernardino Rivadavia'' and ''Mariano Moreno'') were offered to Russia and the purchase was about to be finalized.<ref name=Arg-Chile>Imperial Japanese Navy Records, Navy General Office Intelligence, 1904 Nr. 418 on p. 4 (p. 58 in the original) (in Japanese) https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/das/image/C09050537400?IS_KIND=DetailSummary {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220625040208/https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/das/image/C09050537400?IS_KIND=DetailSummary|date=25 June 2022}}</ref> Britain stepped in as the mediator of [[Pacts of May]] that ended the race, bought the Chilean battleships (which became {{HMS|Swiftsure|1903|6}} and {{HMS|Triumph|1903|6}}), and brokered the sale of Argentine cruisers to Japan.{{efn|The Imperial Russia also tried to purchase Argentine cruisers [[ARA General Belgrano (1896)|''General Belgrano'']] and [[ARA Pueyrredón|''Pueyrredón'']], and Chilean cruisers [[Chilean cruiser Esmeralda (1883)|''Esmeralda'']] and [[Chilean cruiser Chacabuco (1898)|''Chacabuco'']], all of which were also blocked by Great Britain.{{sfn|British Assistance|1980|pages=49–51}}<ref name=Arg-Chile />}} This support not only limited the growth of the Imperial Russian Navy but also helped IJN in obtaining the Italian-built cruisers (IJN {{ship|Japanese cruiser|Kasuga||2}} and {{ship|Japanese cruiser|Nisshin||2}}) with a strong armour design{{Efn|Being in the [[Giuseppe Garibaldi-class cruiser|Giuseppe Garibaldi class]] of armoured cruisers, and ordered by Argentina with the likelihood of facing the Chilean battleships in mind, they were the forerunners of the later [[battlecruiser]]s. The design prioritised on heavy armour at the expense of speed and cruise range which were important for other designs for [[commerce raiding]]/protection. The [[Regia Marina|Royal Italian Navy]] ranked this class of warships as 2nd-class battleships.{{sfn|Brook|1999|p=100}}}} that enabled IJN to use them on the main line of battle along with the heavier-armoured battleships.{{sfn|García|1998}}{{efn|Effectively replacing the two battleships previously lost in the war, the {{ship|Japanese battleship|Hatsuse||2}} and {{ship|Japanese battleship|Yashima||2}}.}}

===High explosive and cordite===
The Japanese used mostly [[high-explosive]] shells filled with [[Shimose powder]], which was a pure [[picric acid]] (as opposed to the French [[Picric acid|Melinite]] or the British [[Lyddite]], which were picric acid mixed with [[collodion]] (French) or with [[dinitrobenzene]] and [[vaseline]] (British) for stability).<ref name=koike /> Engineer Shimose Masachika (1860–1911) solved the instability problem of picric acid on contact with iron and other heavy metals by coating the inside of a shell with unpigmented [[Toxicodendron vernicifluum#Lacquer|Japanese lacquer]] and further sealing with wax.<ref name=shimose>[[:ja:下瀬火薬|Shimose Powder (in Japanese)]]</ref> Because it was undiluted, Shimose powder had a stronger power in terms of detonation velocity and temperature than other high explosives at the time.<ref name=koike>{{cite journal|last=Koike|first=Shigeki|title=The Russo-Japanese War and the system of SHIMOSE gunpowder |publisher=Takasaki City University of Economics|journal=Bulletin of Papers|issue=49|volume=1|date=2006|language=ja|url=http://www1.tcue.ac.jp/home1/k-gakkai/ronsyuu/ronsyuukeisai/49_1/koike.pdf |access-date=18 September 2020|archive-date=5 March 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160305093421/http://www1.tcue.ac.jp/home1/k-gakkai/ronsyuu/ronsyuukeisai/49_1/koike.pdf |url-status=live}}</ref>  These shells had a sensitive Ijuin fuse<ref name=Ijuin>[[:ja:伊集院信管|Ijuin Fuse (in Japanese)]]</ref> (named after Vice Admiral [[Ijuin Gorō]]{{efn|He was credited with this invention as he spearheaded its development program as one of the leaders of IJN (as a senior member of [[Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff|Navy General Staff]]), with support and approval from Navy Minister (Admiral) [[Yamamoto Gonnohyōe]] who appointed [[Tōgō Heihachirō]] to the Commander in Chief of the [[Combined Fleet]] disregarding seniority ranking within IJN.  Ijuin was a major proponent of [[Anglo-Japanese Alliance]] after having attended the [[Royal Naval College, Greenwich|Greenwich Naval Academy]] for a period, and was the key figure in IJN's tight relationship with [[Armstrong Whitworth|Armstrong Mitchell & Company]].}}) at the base as opposed to the tip of a shell that armed itself when the shell was spun by the rifling. These fuses were designed to explode on contact and wreck the upper structure of ships.{{efn|After hitting {{ship|Russian battleship|Peresvet|up=yes}} 13 times with 12" and 15 more times with 6" or 8" shells;<ref>[[:ru:Пересвет (броненосец)#Бой в Жёлтом море]]</ref> hitting {{ship|Russian battleship|Retvizan||2}} 18 times, {{ship|Russian battleship|Tsesarevich||2}} 15 times,<ref>[[:ru:Цесаревич (броненосец)#Сражение в Жёлтом море]],</ref> {{ship|Russian battleship|Poltava||2}} 12–14 times, and {{ship|Russian battleship|Pobeda||2}} 11 times with 8" and larger armour-piercing shells with delayed detonation fuze without being able to sink any of them (likewise none of the Japanese battleships was sunk despite receiving many hits) in the [[Battle of the Yellow Sea]], the Japanese tactical priority shifted from sinking to the destruction of [[superstructure]]. This concept of high explosive incendiary shells (the first example of what is called the HEI-BF "High Explosive Incendiary – Base Fuze" shells today) was not used by any navy in the world at the time. The Russian Navy used what is known as [[Armour-piercing ammunition#History|Makarov tip]] on its shells to improve penetrating performance upon hitting the target at an angle, without the experience of [[Armour-piercing ammunition#Projectile composition and construction|high explosive armour-piercing shells]] not being effective enough against the Harvey / Krupp armour and [[Compartment (ship)|compartmented hull]] used on the battleships.}}{{sfn|Semenoff|1907|page=63}} The Japanese Navy imported [[cordite]] from Great Britain as the smokeless propellant for these Shimose shells,<ref name=koike /> so that the smoke off the muzzle would not impede the visibility for the spotters.

In the early 1890s, Vice Admiral [[Stepan Makarov|Stepan O. Makarov]], then the Chief Inspector of Russian naval artillery, proposed a new 12-inch gun design, and assigned a junior officer, Semyon V. Panpushko, to research the use of picric acid as the explosive in the shell.  However, Panpushko died in an accidental explosion in experiment due to the instability.{{efn|Shimose Masachika also experienced an accidental explosion in 1887 and had lost dexterity on the left fingers. [[:ja:下瀬雅允]]}}  Consequently, high explosive shells remained unreachable for the Russian Navy at the time of the Russo-Japanese War, and the navy continued to use the older armour-piercing rounds with [[guncotton]] (Nitrocellulose, Pyroxylin) bursting charges and the insensitive delayed-detonation fuses.  They mostly used [[brown powder]] or [[black powder]] as the propellant, except ''Sissoi Veliky'' and the four ''Borodino''-class ships that used smokeless gunpowder for the main 12-inch guns.{{sfn|Forczyk|2009|page=15}}

As a result, Japanese hits caused more damage to Russian ships than Russian hits on Japanese ships. Shimose blasts often set the superstructure, the paintwork and the large quantities of coal stored on the decks on fire,{{sfn|Corbett|2015b|pp=142, 161, 193}} and the sight of the spotters on Russian ships was hindered by the large amount of smoke generated by the propellant on each uncoordinated firing.{{efn|On Christmas day on Julian Calendar in 1904 off Madagascar, Alexey Novikov-Priboy onboard battleship ''Oryol'' wrote: "At noon, the ocean expanse was filled with the thunder of guns. Each ship fired a salute of thirty-one shots. The squadron was enveloped in black powder smoke."{{sfn|Novikov-Priboy|1937|loc=Book 1, Part 3, Chapter 2}}}} Moreover, the sensitivity difference of the fuse caused the Japanese off-the-target shells to explode upon falling on the water creating a much larger splash that sent destabilizing waves to Russian [[inclinometer]]s,{{efn|12" shells creating an "incomparably larger splash than the enemy's on the water"{{sfn|Tsukamoto|1907|p=75}}}}{{efn|"Japanese shells exploded even when they hit the water."{{sfn|Novikov-Priboy|1937|loc=Book 2, Chapter 1}}}} as opposed to the Russian shells not detonating upon falling on the water.{{efn|12" shells creating a "tall splash of 10–20&nbsp;m"{{sfn|Tsukamoto|1907|p=74}}}}  This made an additional difference in the [[#Salvo firing director system|aforementioned shot accuracy]] by aiding the Japanese spotters to make an easier identification in fall of shot observation.

=== Gun range and rate of fire ===
The Makarov proposal resulted in [[Russian 12-inch 40-caliber naval gun|Model 1895 12-inch gun]] that extended the range of the previous Model 1886 12-inch Krupp guns (installed on ''Imperator Nikolai I'' and ''Navarin'') from 5–6&nbsp;km to 11&nbsp;km (at 15-degrees elevation) at the expense of significantly limited amount of explosives that can be contained in the {{cvt|332|kg|lb}} shell.{{sfn|Friedman|2008|p=253}}{{efn|These shells held 5.3&nbsp;kg<ref>{{cite web|author=Tony DiGiulian |url=http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNRussian_12-40_m1895.php |title=Russia / USSR 12"/40 (30.5 cm) Pattern 1895 |publisher=NavWeaps |date= |accessdate=20 August 2022}}</ref> of [[guncotton]], compared to 19.3&nbsp;kg of Shimose powder for the Armstrong 12".<ref>{{cite web|author=Tony DiGiulian|url=http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNJAP_12-40_EOC.php |title=Japan 12"/40 (30.5 cm) EOC |publisher=NavWeaps |date= |accessdate=20 August 2022}}</ref>}}  Reload time was also improved from 2–4 minutes previously to a rated 90 seconds, but in reality, it was 2.5–3 minutes.{{sfn|McLaughlin|2003|p=81}}  These guns were installed to ''Sissoi Veliky'' and the four ''Borodino''-class ships.{{sfn|Forczyk|2009|page=15}}

The four Japanese battleships, ''Mikasa'', ''Shikishima'', ''Fuji'' and ''Asahi'', had the latest [[Armstrong Whitworth 12-inch 40-calibre naval gun|Armstrong 12-inch 40-calibre naval gun]] designed and manufactured by [[Elswick Ordnance Company|Sir W.G. Armstrong & Company]] ahead of its acceptance by the Royal Navy in the UK.  These British-built 12-inch guns had a range of 15,000 yards (14&nbsp;km) at 15-degrees elevation and the rate of fire at 60 seconds with a heavier {{cvt|850|lb|kg}} shell.{{efn|See [[Armstrong Whitworth 12-inch 40-calibre naval gun]] for details.}}  One of the reasons for the Royal Navy's late adoption of this type of gun was the accidental shell explosions in the barrel Japanese battleships experienced up to the [[Battle of the Yellow Sea]] in August 1904, which were diagnosed and almost rectified{{efn|Battleship ''Shikishima'' still experienced this problem and lost a gun in the battle.}} by the Japanese Navy with the use of aforementioned Ijuin Fuse<ref name=Ijuin /> by the time of this battle.

The Russian fleet had 20 of the 1895-issue longer-range 12" guns on five battleships compared to 16 of the Armstrong 12" guns on four battleships for the Japanese. Statistically, this 20% advantage in the number of guns was much more than offset by the 60% disadvantage in the rate of fire difference of one shot in 2.5 minutes versus one minute.  The range difference of 11&nbsp;km versus 14&nbsp;km translated into a flatter trajectory (smaller elevation and fall angle) for the Japanese shells, which resulted in a better hit rate for the Japanese shots{{efn|When the trajectory is nearly flat, the shot hits the target even with a large range dispersion (+-100m or more at 10km range) because the height of the target ship effectively enlarges the target size. There is no such effect for the fall angles closer to 90 degrees no matter how tall the target is.}} when both sides had an equal distance facing each other in 11&nbsp;km and shorter range.{{efn|After the Nebogatov surrender, the Second in Command of battleship ''Oryol'', Captain 2nd Rank K.L. Schwede, who was in charge of the ship at the surrender (the ship commander Captain 1st Rank [[Nikolay Yung|N. Yung]] was seriously wounded and unconscious) was interviewed by Captain T. Nomoto{{efn|[[Nomoto Tsunaakira]] (1858–1922) Commander of ''Asahi''. Later Admiral. He had 3 tours of duty in Russia before the battle; once on an Imperial Russian Navy cruiser {{ship|Russian cruiser|Admiral Nakhimov|1885|2}},{{sfn|Tsukamoto|1907|p=80}} twice as a military attaché to [[Japanese consulate]] in Russia.{{cite web|title=Naval Academy class of 7th|url=http://admiral31.world.coocan.jp/px07.htm#v005|language=ja}}}} on battleship ''Asahi''. It turned out they knew each other from previous assignments of Nomoto in Russia. Schwede desperately wanted to know why the Japanese shots had so much better hit rates in the battle.  Nomoto did not (or could not) explain and just boasted "Our guns are meant and made to hit the target."{{sfn|Tsukamoto|1907|pp=134-135}}}}