Editing Battle of Chosin Reservoir (section)

===Wider effect on the war===
The battle ended the UN force's expectation of total victory, including the capture of North Korea and the reunification of the peninsula.{{sfn|Stewart|2000|p=33}} By the end of 1950, PVA/KPA forces had recaptured North Korea and pushed UN forces back south of the 38th parallel. Serious consideration was given to the evacuation of all US forces from the Korean peninsula and US military leaders made secret contingency plans to do so.{{sfn|Brown|2001|pp=1–2}} The disregard by [[Far East Command (United States)|Far Eastern Command]] under MacArthur of the initial warnings and diplomatic hints by the PVA almost led the entire UN army to disaster at Ch'ongch'on River and Chosin Reservoir and only after the formation and stabilization of a coherent UN defensive line under Lieutenant General [[Matthew Ridgway]] did the "period of headlong retreats from an attacking, unsuspected foe" cease.{{sfn|Stewart|2000|p=33}}

On the other hand, the battle affected the PVA in two ways, both of which had the result of helping the UN Command to secure its position in South Korea, while losing North Korea. First, according to historian Shu Guang Zhang, PVA commanders were persuaded by their victories at Chosin and Ch'ongch'on that they could "defeat American armed forces", and this led to "unrealistic expectations that the CPV [PVA] would work miracles."{{sfn|Zhang|1995|pp=118-119}}{{sfn|Halberstam|2007|pp= 624–5}} Second, the heavy casualties caused by sub-zero temperatures and combat, plus poor logistical support weakened the PVA's eight elite divisions of the 20th and 27th Corps. Of those eight divisions, two were forced to disband.{{sfn|Guang|2007|p=114}} With the absence of 12 out of 30 of Chinese divisions in Korea in early 1951, Roe says that the heavy Chinese losses at Chosin enabled the UN forces to maintain a foothold in Korea.{{sfn|Roe|2000|p=412}}