Editing Approval voting (section)

==== Approval threshold ====

Another way to deal with multiple sincere votes is to augment the ordinal preference model with an approval or acceptance threshold. An approval threshold divides all of the candidates into two sets, those the voter approves of and those the voter does not approve of. A voter can approve of more than one candidate and still prefer one approved candidate to another approved candidate. Acceptance thresholds are similar. With such a threshold, a voter simply votes for every candidate that meets or exceeds the threshold.<ref name=probstrat/>

With threshold voting, it is still possible to not elect the Condorcet winner and instead elect the Condorcet loser when they both exist. However, according to Steven Brams, this represents a strength rather than a weakness of approval. Without providing specifics, he argues that the pragmatic judgments of voters about which candidates are acceptable should take precedence over the [[Condorcet criterion]] and other social choice criteria.<ref name=critstrats>{{Cite journal |last1=Brams |first1=S. J.  |author2=Remzi Sanver, M. | year = 2005 | title = Critical strategies under approval voting: Who gets ruled in and ruled out | doi = 10.1016/j.electstud.2005.05.007 | journal = Electoral Studies | volume = 25 | issue = 2| pages = 287–305 }}</ref>