Editing Zhou Enlai (section)

==Activities during the Chinese Civil War==

===The Sixth Party Congress===
After the failure of the Nanchang Uprising, Zhou left China for the Soviet Union to attend the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) Sixth National Party Congress in Moscow, in June–July 1928.<ref>Whitson and Huang 39–40</ref> The Sixth Congress had to be held in Moscow because conditions in China were considered dangerous. KMT control was so tight that many Chinese delegates attending the Sixth Congress were forced to travel in disguise: Zhou himself was disguised as an antiquarian.<ref name="Barnouin and Yu 42">Barnouin and Yu 42</ref>

At the Sixth Congress, Zhou delivered a long speech insisting that conditions in China were unfavorable for immediate revolution, and that the main task of the CCP should be to develop revolutionary momentum by winning over the support of the masses in the countryside and establishing a Soviet regime in southern China, similar to the one that [[Mao Zedong]] and Zhu De were already establishing around Jiangxi. The Congress generally accepted Zhou's assessment as accurate. [[Xiang Zhongfa]] was made secretary general of the Party, but was soon found incapable of fulfilling his role, so Zhou emerged as the ''de facto'' leader of the CCP. Zhou was only thirty years old.<ref name="Barnouin and Yu 42"/>

During the Sixth Congress, Zhou was elected Director of the Central Committee Organization Department. His ally, Li Lisan, took over propaganda work. Zhou finally returned to China, after more than a year abroad, in 1929. At the Sixth Congress in Moscow, Zhou had given figures indicating that, by 1928, fewer than 32,000 union members remained who were loyal to the Communists, and that only ten percent of Party members were proletarians. By 1929, only three percent of the Party were proletarians.<ref>Spence 386</ref>

In early 1930, Zhou began to disagree with the timing of Li Lisan's strategy of favoring rich peasants and concentrating military forces for attacks on urban centers. Zhou did not openly break with these more orthodox notions, and even tried to implement them later, in 1931, in Jiangxi.<ref>Whitson and Huang 40</ref> When the Soviet agent [[Pavel Mif]] arrived in Shanghai to lead the Comintern in China in December 1930, Mif criticized Li's strategy as "left adventurism", and criticized Zhou for compromising with Li. Zhou "acknowledged" his mistakes in compromising with Li in January 1931 and offered to resign from the Politburo, but was retained while other senior CCP leaders, including Li Lisan and Qu Qiubai, were removed. As Mao later recognized, Mif understood that Zhou's services as Party leader were indispensable, and that Zhou would willingly cooperate with whoever was holding power.<ref>Barnouin and Yu 44</ref>

===Underground work: establishment===

After arriving back in Shanghai in 1929, Zhou began to work underground, establishing and overseeing a network of independent Communist cells. Zhou's greatest danger in his underground work was the threat of being discovered by the KMT secret police, which had been established in 1928 with the specific mission of identifying and eliminating Communists. In order to avoid detection, Zhou and his wife changed residences at least once a month and used a variety of aliases. Zhou often disguised himself as a businessman, sometimes wearing a beard. Zhou was careful that only two or three people ever knew his whereabouts. Zhou disguised all urban Party offices, made sure that CCP offices never shared the same buildings when in the same city, and required all Party members to use passwords to identify one another. Zhou restricted all of his meetings to either before 7&nbsp;am or after 7&nbsp;pm. Zhou never used public transportation and avoided being seen in public places.<ref>Barnouin and Yu 44–45</ref>

In November 1928, the CCP also established its own intelligence agency (the "Special Service section of the Central Committee", or ''"Zhongyang Teke"'' ({{lang-zh|c=中央特科}}), often abbreviated as ''"Teke"''), which Zhou subsequently came to control. Zhou's chief lieutenants were [[Gu Shunzhang]], who had strong ties to Chinese secret societies and became an alternate member of the Politburo, and [[Xiang Zhongfa]]. ''Teke'' had four operational sections: one for the protection and safety of Party members; one for intelligence gathering; one for facilitating internal communications; and one to conduct assassinations, a team that became known as the "Red Squad" ({{lang|zh-hans|红队}}).<ref>Barnouin and Yu 45</ref>

Zhou's main concern in running ''Teke'' was to establish an effective anti-espionage network within the KMT secret police. Within a short amount of time the head of ''Teke'''s intelligence section, [[Chen Geng]], succeeded in planting a large network of moles inside the Investigation Section of the Central Operations Department in Nanjing, which was the center of KMT intelligence. The three most successful agents used by Zhou to infiltrate the KMT secret police were [[Qian Zhuangfei]], [[Li Kenong]], and [[Hu Di]], whom Zhou referred to as "the three most distinguished intelligence workers of the Party" in the 1930s. Agents planted within various KMT offices were later critical in the survival of the CCP, helping the Party escape Chiang's [[Encirclement Campaigns]].<ref>Barnouin and Yu 45–46</ref>

===KMT response to Zhou's intelligence work===
[[File:Zhou enlai 1930s.jpg|thumb|right|Zhou Enlai (1930s)]]
In late April 1931, Zhou's chief aide in security affairs, [[Gu Shunzhang]], was arrested by the KMT in Wuhan. Gu was a former labor organizer with strong mafia connections and weak commitments to the CCP. Under threat of heavy torture, Gu gave the KMT secret police detailed accounts of underground CCP organizations in Wuhan, leading to the arrest and executions of over ten senior CCP leaders in the city. Gu offered to provide the KMT with details of CCP activities in Shanghai, but only if he could give the information directly to Chiang Kai-shek.<ref>Barnouin and Yu 46</ref>

One of Zhou's agents working in Nanjing, [[Qian Zhuangfei]], intercepted a telegram requesting further instructions from Nanjing on how to proceed, and abandoned his cover to personally warn Zhou of the impending crackdown. The two days before Gu arrived in Nanjing to meet with Chiang gave Zhou time to evacuate Party members and to change the communication codes used by ''Teke'', all of which were known to Gu. After meeting briefly with Chiang in Nanjing, Gu arrived in Shanghai and assisted the KMT secret police in raiding CCP offices and residences, capturing members who could not be evacuated in time. The [[summary execution]]s of those suspected of Communist sympathies resulted in the largest death-toll since the [[Shanghai massacre of 1927]].<ref>Barnouin and Yu 47</ref>

Zhou's reaction to Gu's betrayal was extreme. More than fifteen members of Gu's family, some of whom worked for ''Teke'', were murdered by the Red Squad and buried in quiet residential areas of Shanghai. The Red Squad then assassinated Wang Bing, a leading member of the KMT secret police who was known for moving around Shanghai in rickshaws, without the protection of bodyguards. Most surviving CCP members were relocated to the Communist base in Jiangxi. Because most senior staff had become exposed by Gu, most of its best agents were also relocated. Zhou's most senior aide not yet under suspicion, [[Pan Hannian]], became ''Teke'''s director.<ref>Barnouin and Yu 47–48</ref>

The night before he was scheduled to leave Shanghai in June 1931, [[Xiang Zhongfa]], who was one of Zhou's most senior agents, decided to spend the night in a hotel with his mistress, ignoring Zhou's warnings about the danger. In the morning, a KMT informant who had been trailing Xiang spotted him as he was leaving the hotel. Xiang was immediately arrested and imprisoned within the [[French Concession]]. Zhou attempted to prevent Xiang's expected extradition to KMT-controlled China by having his agents bribe the chief of police in the French Concession, but the KMT authorities appealed directly to the authorities of the French Concession, ensuring that the chief of police could not intervene. Zhou's hopes that Xiang would be transferred to Nanjing, giving him an opportunity to kidnap Xiang, also came to naught. The French agreed to transfer Xiang to the Shanghai Garrison Headquarters, under the command of General [[Xiong Shihui]], who subjected Xiang to relentless torture and interrogation. Once he became convinced that Xiang had given his torturers all the information that they requested, Chiang Kai-shek ordered Xiang to be executed.<ref name="BY48">Barnouin and Yu 48</ref>

Zhou Enlai later succeeded in secretly purchasing a copy of Xiang's interrogation records. The records showed that Xiang had disclosed everything to the KMT authorities before his execution, including the location of Zhou's residence. Another round of arrests and executions followed Xiang's capture, but Zhou and his wife were able to escape capture because they had abandoned their apartment on the morning of Xiang's arrest. After establishing a new Politburo Standing Committee in Shanghai, Zhou and his wife relocated to the Communist base in Jiangxi near the end of 1931.<ref name="BY48" /> By the time Zhou left Shanghai, he was one of the most wanted men in China.<ref>Barnouin and Yu 52</ref>

===The Jiangxi Soviet===
{{Main|Jiangxi–Fujian Soviet}}
Following the failed Nanchang and Autumn Harvest Uprisings of 1927, the Communists began to focus on establishing a series of rural bases of operation in southern China. Even before moving to Jiangxi, Zhou had become involved in the politics of these bases. Mao, claiming the need to eliminate counterrevolutionaries and Anti-Bolsheviks operating within the CCP, began an ideological purge of the populace inside the Jiangxi Soviet. Zhou, perhaps due to his own success planting moles within various levels of the KMT, agreed that an organized campaign to uncover subversion was justified, and supported the campaign as de facto leader of the CCP.<ref>Barnouin and Yu 49</ref>

Mao's efforts soon developed into a ruthless campaign driven by paranoia and aimed not only at KMT spies, but at anyone with an ideological outlook different from Mao's. Suspects were commonly tortured until they confessed to their crimes and accused others of crimes, and wives and relatives who inquired of those being tortured were themselves arrested and tortured even more severely. Mao's attempts to purge the Red Army of those who might potentially oppose him led Mao to accuse [[Chen Yi (communist)|Chen Yi]], the commander and political commissar of the Jiangxi Military Region, as a counterrevolutionary, provoking a violent reaction against Mao's persecutions that became known as the "Futian Incident" in January 1931. Mao was eventually successful in subduing the Red Army, reducing its numbers from forty thousand to less than ten thousand. The campaign continued throughout 1930 and 1931. Historians estimate the total number who died due to Mao's persecution in all base areas to be approximately one hundred thousand.<ref>Barnouin and Yu 49–51</ref>

The entire campaign occurred while Zhou was still in Shanghai. Although he had supported the elimination of counterrevolutionaries, Zhou actively suppressed the campaign when he arrived in Jiangxi in December 1931, criticizing the "excess, the panic, and the oversimplification" practiced by local officials. After investigating those accused of anti-Bolshevism, and those persecuting them, Zhou submitted a report criticizing the campaign for focusing on the narrow persecution of anti-Maoists as anti-Bolsheviks, exaggerating the threat to the Party, and condemning the use of torture as an investigative technique. Zhou's resolution was passed and adopted on 7 January 1932, and the campaign gradually subsided.<ref>Barnouin and Yu 51–52</ref>

Zhou moved to the [[Jiangxi]] base area and shook up the propaganda-oriented approach to revolution by demanding that the armed forces under Communist control actually be used to expand the base, rather than just to control and defend it. In December 1931, Zhou replaced [[Mao Zedong]] as Secretary of the First Front Army with [[Xiang Ying]], and made himself political commissar of the Red Army, in place of Mao. Liu Bocheng, Lin Biao and [[Peng Dehuai]] all criticized Mao's tactics at the October 1932 [[Ningdu Conference]].<ref>Whitson and Huang 57–58</ref><ref name=wortzel1999>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=rfu-hR8msh4C&pg=PA190|title=Dictionary of Contemporary Chinese Military History|isbn=9780313293375|last1=Wortzel|first1=Larry M|last2=Higham|first2=Robin D. S|year=1999|publisher=Bloomsbury Academic }}</ref>

After moving to Jiangxi, Zhou met Mao for the first time since 1927, and began his long relationship with Mao as his superior. In the Ningdu conference, Mao was demoted to being a figurehead in the Soviet government. Zhou, who had come to appreciate Mao's strategies after the series of military failures waged by other Party leaders since 1927, defended Mao, but was unsuccessful. After achieving power, Mao later purged or demoted those who had opposed him in 1932, but remembered Zhou's defense of his policies.<ref>Barnouin and Yu 52–55</ref>

===Chiang's Encirclement Campaigns===
{{main|Encirclement campaigns}}
In early 1933, [[Bo Gu]] arrived with the German Comintern advisor [[Otto Braun (communist)|Otto Braun]] and took control of party affairs. Zhou at this time, apparently with strong support from Party and military colleagues, reorganized and standardized the Red Army. Under Zhou, Bo, and Braun, the Red Army defeated [[Encirclement Campaigns|four attacks]] by Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist troops.<ref>Wilson 51</ref> The military structure that led the Communists to victory was:

:{| class="wikitable"
!Leaders
!Unit Designation
|-
|Lin Biao, Nie Rongzhen
|1st Corps
|-
|Peng Dehuai, Yang Shangkun
|3rd Corps
|-
|Xiao Jinguang
|7th Corps
|-
|Xiao Ke
|8th Corps
|-
|Luo Binghui
|9th Corps
|-
|Fang Zhimin
|10th Corps
|}

Chiang's fifth campaign, launched in September 1933, was much more difficult to contain. Chiang's new use of "blockhouse tactics" and larger numbers of troops allowed his army to advance steadily into Communist territory, and they succeeded in seizing several major Communist strongholds. Bo Gu and [[Otto Braun (communist)|Otto Braun]] adopted orthodox tactics to respond to Chiang, and Zhou, although personally opposed to them, directed these. Following their subsequent defeat, he and other military leaders were blamed.<ref>Barnouin and Yu 56</ref>

Although Zhou's subsequently cautious military approach was distrusted by hardliners, he was again appointed to the position of vice chairman of the Military Commission. Zhou was accepted as leader largely because of his organizational talent and devotion to work, and because he had never shown any overt ambition to pursue supreme power within the Party. Within months, the continuing orthodox tactics of Bo and Braun led to a serious defeat for the Red Army, and forced the leaders of the CCP to seriously consider abandoning their bases in Jiangxi.<ref>Barnouin and Yu 57</ref>

===The Long March===
{{Main|Long March}}
[[File:Zhou enlai and Mao Zedong.jpg|thumb|right|256px|Zhou (far left) with [[Mao Zedong]] (center-left) and [[Bo Gu]] (far right) in [[Yan'an]] (1935)]]
After the decision to abandon Jiangxi was announced, Zhou was placed in charge of organizing and supervising the logistics of the Communist withdrawal. Making his plans in absolute secrecy and waiting till the last moment to inform even senior leaders of the group's movements, Zhou's objective was to break through the enemy encirclement with as few casualties as possible, and before Chiang's forces were able to completely occupy all Communist bases. It is not known what criteria were used to determine who would stay and who would go, but 16,000 troops and some of the Communists' most notable commanders at the time (including [[Xiang Ying]], [[Chen Yi (communist)|Chen Yi]], [[Tan Zhenlin]], and [[Qu Qiubai]]) were left to form a rear guard to divert the main force of Nationalist troops from noticing the Communists' general withdrawal.<ref>Barnouin and Yu 57–58</ref>

The withdrawal of 84,000 soldiers and civilians began in early October 1934. Zhou's intelligence agents were successful in identifying a large section of Chiang's blockhouse lines that were manned by troops under General [[Chen Jitang]], a [[Guangdong]] warlord who Zhou identified as being likely to prefer preserving the strength of his troops over fighting. Zhou sent [[Pan Hannian]] to negotiate for safe passage with General Chen, who subsequently allowed the Red Army to pass through the territory that he controlled without fighting.<ref name="Fiftyeight1">Barnouin and Yu 58</ref>

After passing through three of the four blockhouse fortifications needed to escape Chiang's encirclement, the Red Army was finally intercepted by regular Nationalist troops, and suffered heavy casualties. Of the 86,000 Communists who attempted to break out of Jiangxi, only 36,000 successfully escaped. This loss demoralized some Communist leaders (particularly [[Bo Gu]] and Otto Braun), but Zhou remained calm and retained his command.<ref name="Fiftyeight1" />

During the Communists' subsequent [[Long March]], there were numerous high-level disputes over the direction that the Communists should take, and on the causes of the Red Army's defeats. During the power struggles that ensued, Zhou consistently backed [[Mao Zedong]] against the interests of Bo Gu and Otto Braun. Bo and Braun were later blamed for the Red Army's defeats, and were eventually removed from their positions of leadership.<ref>Barnouin and Yu 59</ref> The Communists eventually succeeded in re-establishing a base in northern [[Shaanxi]] on 20 October 1935, arriving with only 8,000–9,000 remaining members.<ref>Spence 402</ref>

Zhou's position within the CCP changed numerous times throughout the Long March. By the early 1930s, Zhou was recognized as the ''de facto'' leader of the CCP, and exercised superior influence over other members of the CCP even when sharing power with Bo and Braun.<ref>Barnouin and Yu 49–52</ref> In the months following the January 1935 [[Zunyi Conference]], in which Bo and Braun were removed from senior positions, Zhou mostly retained his position because he displayed a willingness to display responsibility, because his tactics in defeating Chiang's Fourth Encirclement Campaign were recognized as being successful, and because he supported Mao Zedong, who was gaining influence inside the Party: after the Zunyi Conference, Mao became Zhou's assistant.<ref>Barnouin and Yu 59–60</ref> After the Communists reached Shaanxi and completed the Long March, Mao officially took over Zhou Enlai's leading position in the CCP, while Zhou took a secondary position as vice-chairman. Mao and Zhou would retain their positions within the CCP until their deaths in 1976.<ref>Barnouin and Yu 62</ref>

===The Xi'an Incident===
{{Main|Xi'an Incident}}
[[File:Ye Jianying, Zhang Chong, Zhou Enlai.jpg|thumb|Zhou with Communist general [[Ye Jianying]] (left) and Kuomintang official Zhang Zhong (center) in Xi'an 1937, illustrating the alliance between the two parties which was the outcome of the Xi'an Incident]]

During the seventh congress of the [[Communist International|Comintern]], held in August 1936, Wang Ming issued an anti-Fascist manifesto, indicating that the CCP's previous policy of "opposing Chiang Kai-shek and resisting Japan" was to be replaced by a policy of "uniting with Chiang Kai-shek to resist Japan". Zhou was instrumental in carrying out this policy. Zhou made contact with one of the most senior KMT commanders in the northwest, [[Zhang Xueliang]]. By 1935, Zhang was well known for his [[anti-Japanese sentiment]]s and his doubts about Chiang's willingness to oppose the Japanese. Zhang's disposition made him easily influenced by Zhou's indications that the CCP would cooperate to fight against the Japanese.<ref>Barnouin and Yu (64–65)</ref>

Zhou established a "northeast working committee" for the purpose of promoting cooperation with Zhang. The committee worked to persuade Zhang's Northeast Army to unite with the Red Army to fight Japan and retake [[Manchuria]]. The committee also created new patriotic slogans, including "Chinese must not fight Chinese", to promote Zhou's goals. Using his network of secret contacts, Zhou arranged a meeting with Zhang in [[Yan'an]], then controlled by Zhang's "Northeast Army".<ref name="BY65">Barnouin and Yu 65</ref>

The first meeting between Zhou and Zhang occurred inside a church on 7 April 1936. Zhang showed a great interest in ending the civil war, uniting the country, and fighting the Japanese, but warned that Chiang was firmly in control of the national government, and that these goals would be difficult to pursue without Chiang's cooperation. Both parties ended their meeting with an agreement to find a way to secretly work together. At the same time that Zhou was establishing secret contacts with Zhang, Chiang was growing suspicious of Zhang, and became increasingly dissatisfied with Zhang's inaction against the Communists. In order to deceive Chiang, Zhou and Zhang deployed mock military units in order to give the impression that the Northeast Army and the Red Army were engaged in battle.<ref name="BY65" />

In December 1936, [[Chiang Kai-shek]] flew to the Nationalist headquarters in Xi'an in order to test the loyalty of local KMT military forces under Marshal Zhang Xueliang, and to personally lead these forces in a final attack on Communist bases in Shaanxi, which Zhang had been ordered to destroy. Determined to force Chiang to direct China's forces against the Japanese (who had taken Zhang's territory of [[Manchuria]] and were preparing a broader invasion), on 12 December Zhang and his followers stormed Chiang's headquarters, killed most of his bodyguards, and seized the Generalissimo in what became known as the [[Xi'an Incident]].<ref>Spence 407</ref>

Reactions to Chiang's kidnapping in [[Yan'an]] were mixed. Some, including [[Mao Zedong]] and [[Zhu De]], viewed it as an opportunity to have Chiang killed. Others, including Zhou Enlai and [[Zhang Wentian]], saw it as an opportunity to achieve a united-front policy against the Japanese, which would strengthen the overall position of the CCP.<ref name="sixtyseven1">Barnouin and Yu 67</ref> Debate within Yan'an ended when a long telegram from [[Joseph Stalin]] arrived, urging the CCP to work towards Chiang's release, explaining that a united front was the best position from which to resist the Japanese, and that only Chiang had the prestige and authority to carry out such a plan.<ref>Spence 408</ref>

After initial communications with Zhang on the fate of Chiang, Zhou Enlai reached Xi'an on 16 December, on a plane specifically sent for him by Zhang Xueliang, as the chief Communist negotiator. At first, Chiang was opposed to negotiating with a CCP delegate, but withdrew his opposition when it became clear that his life and freedom were largely dependent on Communist goodwill towards him. On 24 December, Chiang received Zhou for a meeting, the first time that the two had seen each other since Zhou had left [[Huangpu District, Guangzhou|Whampoa]] over ten years earlier. Zhou began the conversation by saying, "In the ten years since we have met, you seem to have aged very little." Chiang nodded and said: "Enlai, you were my subordinate. You should do what I say." Zhou replied that if Chiang would halt the civil war and resist the Japanese instead, the Red Army would willingly accept Chiang's command. By the end of this meeting, Chiang promised to end the civil war, to resist the Japanese together, and to invite Zhou to Nanjing for further talks.<ref name="sixtyseven1" />

On 25 December 1936, Zhang released Chiang and accompanied him to Nanjing. Subsequently, Zhang was court-martialed and sentenced to house arrest, and most of the officers who participated in the Xi'an Incident were executed. Although the KMT formally rejected collaboration with the CCP, Chiang ended active military activity against Communist bases in Yan'nan, implying that he had implicitly given his word to change the direction of his policies. Following the end of KMT attacks, the CCP was able to consolidate its territories and to prepare to resist the Japanese.<ref name="Neg1">Spence 409</ref>

After news arrived that Zhang had been betrayed and arrested by Chiang, Zhang's old officer corps became very agitated, and some of them murdered a Nationalist general, Wang Yizhe, who was seen as largely responsible for the military's lack of response. While Zhou was still in Xi'an, he himself was surrounded in his office by a number of Zhang's officers, who accused the Communists of instigating the Xi'an Incident and of betraying Zhang by convincing the general to travel to Nanjing. At gunpoint, they threatened to kill Zhou. Ever the diplomat, Zhou maintained his composure and eloquently defended his position. In the end, Zhou succeeded in calming the officers, and they departed, leaving him unharmed.

In a series of negotiations with the KMT that lasted until June 1937 (when the [[Marco Polo Bridge Incident]] occurred), Zhou attempted to gain Zhang's release, but failed.<ref>Barnouin and Yu 68</ref>