Editing Yuri Andropov (section)

===Foreign policy===
[[File:Anti kernwapendemonstratie in Den Haag ( 550 duizend deelnemers ) overzichten m, Bestanddeelnr 253-8819.jpg|thumb|Protest against the [[nuclear arms race]] between the U.S./NATO and the Soviet Union, [[The Hague]], Netherlands, 1983]]
Andropov faced a series of foreign policy crises: the [[Soviet–Afghan War#Impact|hopeless situation of the Soviet army in Afghanistan]], [[Martial law in Poland|threatened revolt in Poland]], [[Sino-Soviet relations (1969–1991)|growing animosity with China]], the [[International aid to combatants in the Iran–Iraq War|polarization threat of war in the Middle East]], and [[Ethiopian Civil War|civil strife in Ethiopia]] and [[Internal resistance to apartheid|South Africa]]. The most critical threat was the "[[Cold War (1979–1985)|Second Cold War]]" U.S. President [[Ronald Reagan]] launched, and the specific attack on rolling back what he called the "[[Evil Empire speech|Evil Empire]]". Reagan used American economic power and Soviet economic weakness to escalate massive spending on the [[Cold War]], emphasizing technology that Moscow lacked.<ref>Lawrence T. Caldwell, and Robert Legvold, "Reagan through Soviet eyes." ''Foreign Policy'' 52 (1983): 3–21 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/1148230 Online].</ref> The main response was to raise the Soviet military budget to 70% of the total budget and supply billions of dollars of military aid to [[Syria]], [[Ba'athist Iraq|Iraq]], [[Libyan Arab Jamahiriya|Libya]], [[South Yemen]], the [[Palestine Liberation Organization]], [[Cuba]], and [[North Korea]]. That included tanks and armored troop carriers, hundreds of fighter planes, anti-aircraft systems, artillery systems, and other high-tech equipment of which the USSR was its allies' main supplier. Andropov's main goal was to avoid an open war.<ref>Dimitri Volkogonov, ''Autopsy for an empire''  (1998) pp 358–360.</ref><ref>Taylor Downing, ''Reagan, Andropov, and a World on the Brink'' (2018) pp. 34–50.</ref><ref>{{cite book|author=Jonathan Steele|title=Soviet Power|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dYqQYs8lnWQC&pg=PA4|year=1984|publisher=Simon and Schuster|pages=4–5|isbn=9780671528133}}</ref>

In foreign policy, the [[Soviet–Afghan War|conflict in Afghanistan]] continued even though Andropov, who now felt the invasion was a mistake, half-heartedly explored options for a negotiated withdrawal. Andropov's rule was also marked by deterioration of relations with the [[United States]]. During a much-publicized "walk in the woods" with Soviet dignitary Yuli Kvitsinsky, American diplomat [[Paul Nitze]] suggested a compromise for reducing nuclear missiles in Europe on both sides that the Politburo ignored.<ref>{{cite book |last=Matlock | first=Jack F. Jr. |title=Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended |publisher=[[Random House]] |year=2005|location=New York |pages=41–46 |isbn=978-0-8129-7489-8}}</ref> Kvitsinsky later wrote that, despite his efforts, the Soviet leadership was not interested in compromise, instead calculating that peace movements in the West would force the Americans to capitulate.<ref>{{cite book |last=Kwizinskij|first=Julij A. |title=Vor dem Sturm: Erinnerungen eines Diplomaten |publisher=Siedler Verlag |year=1993 |location=Berlin |isbn=978-3-88680-464-1}}</ref> On 8 March 1983, Reagan called the Soviet Union an "[[Evil Empire speech|evil empire]]". On 23 March, he announced the [[Strategic Defense Initiative]]. Reagan claimed this research program into ballistic missile defense was "consistent with our obligations under the [[Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty|ABM Treaty]]". Andropov dismissed this claim, saying, "It is time they [Washington] stopped ... search[ing] for the best ways of unleashing [[Nuclear warfare|nuclear war]]. ... Engaging in this is not just irresponsible. It is insane".<ref>''[[Pravda]]'', 27 March 1983.</ref>
[[File:1981-09-15 12-00-00 United States Hawaii Aliamanu 2 (cropped).jpg|thumb|left|A photograph of Korean Air Lines HL7442, the airliner shot down by Soviet aircraft after drifting into [[prohibited airspace]] during the [[Korean Air Lines Flight 007|KAL 007 Flight]].]]

In August 1983, Andropov made an announcement that the USSR would stop all work on [[Space weapon|space-based weapons]]. One of his most notable acts as leader of the Soviet Union was in response to a letter from a 10-year-old American child, [[Samantha Smith]], inviting her to the Soviet Union. She came, but he was too ill to meet with her, thus revealing his grave condition to the world. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union suspended talks with the U.S. on intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe in November 1983, and by the end of the year the Soviets had broken off all arms control negotiations.<ref>{{cite news|last=Church|first=George J.|title=Person of the Year 1983: Ronald Reagan and Yuri Andropov|newspaper=[[Time (magazine)|TIME]]|date=1 January 1984 |url=http://www.time.com/time/subscriber/personoftheyear/archive/stories/1983.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070109235052/http://www.time.com/time/subscriber/personoftheyear/archive/stories/1983.html|url-status=dead|archive-date=9 January 2007|access-date=2 January 2008}}</ref>

Massive bad publicity worldwide came when Soviet fighters shot down a civilian jet liner, [[Korean Air Flight KAL-007]], which carried 269 passengers and crew. It had strayed over the Soviet Union on 1 September 1983 on its scheduled route from [[Anchorage, Alaska|Anchorage]], [[Alaska]], to [[Seoul]], [[South Korea]]. Andropov kept secret that the Soviet Union held in its possession the [[Flight recorder|black box]] from KAL 007 that proved the pilot had made a typographical error when entering data in the automatic pilot. The [[Soviet Air Defence Forces|Soviet air defence system]] was unprepared to deal with a civilian airliner, and the shooting down was a matter of following orders without question.<ref>Jonathan Haslam,  "The KAL shootdown (1983) and the state of Soviet air defence." ''Intelligence and National Security'' 3.4 (1988): 128–133.</ref> Instead of admitting an accident, Soviet media proclaimed a brave decision to meet a Western provocation. Together with the low credibility created by the poor explanation of the [[Chernobyl disaster|1986 Chernobyl disaster]], the episode demonstrated an inability to deal with [[public relations]] crises; the propaganda system was useful only for people and states aligned with the Soviet Union. Both crises were escalated by technological and organizational failures, compounded by human error.<ref>Gail Warshofsky Lapidus, "KAL 007 and Chernobyl: The Soviet management of crises." Survival 29.3 (1987): 215–223.</ref>