Editing Truth (section)

===Pluralist===
{{Main|Pluralist theories of truth}}
Several of the major theories of truth hold that there is a particular property the having of which makes a belief or proposition true. Pluralist theories of truth assert that there may be more than one property that makes propositions true: ethical propositions might be true by virtue of coherence. Propositions about the physical world might be true by corresponding to the objects and properties they are about.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Lynch |first=Michael Patrick |title=Truth as one and many |date=2009 |publisher=Clarendon press |isbn=978-0-19-921873-8 |location=Oxford}}</ref>

Some of the pragmatic theories, such as those by [[Charles Sanders Peirce|Charles Peirce]] and [[William James]], included aspects of correspondence, coherence and constructivist theories.<ref name="Peirce Truth and Falsity"/><ref name=WJP/> [[Crispin Wright]] argued in his 1992 book ''Truth and Objectivity'' that any predicate which satisfied certain platitudes about truth qualified as a truth predicate. In some discourses, Wright argued, the role of the truth predicate might be played by the notion of superassertibility.<ref>Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992.</ref> [[Michael Lynch (philosopher)|Michael Lynch]], in a 2009 book ''Truth as One and Many'', argued that we should see truth as a functional property capable of being multiply manifested in distinct properties like correspondence or coherence.<ref>Truth as One and Many (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).</ref>