Editing Trireme (section)

==Tactics==
{{See also|Oared vessel tactics}}
In the ancient world, naval combat relied on two methods: [[Boarding (attack)|boarding]] and [[ramming]]. Artillery in the form of [[ballista]]s and [[catapults]] was widespread, especially in later centuries, but its inherent technical limitations meant that it could not play a decisive role in combat. The method for boarding was to brush alongside the enemy ship, with oars drawn in, in order to break the enemy's oars and render the ship immobile (which disables the enemy ship from simply getting away), then to board the ship and engage in hand-to-hand combat.

Rams (''embola'') were fitted to the prows of warships, and were used to rupture the hull of the enemy ship. The preferred method of attack was to come in from astern, with the aim not of creating a single hole, but of rupturing as big a length of the enemy vessel as possible. The speed necessary for a successful impact depended on the angle of attack; the greater the angle, the lesser the speed required. At 60 degrees, {{convert|4|knots|km/h mph}} was enough to penetrate the hull, while it increased to {{convert|8|knots|km/h mph}} at 30 degrees. If the target for some reason was in motion in the direction of the attacker, even less speed was required, and especially if the hit came amidships.<ref>John Coates, "The Naval Architecture and Oar Systems of Ancient Galleys" in ''The Age of the Galley'', p. 133.</ref> The Athenians especially became masters in the art of ramming, using light, un-[[Deck (ship)|decked]] (''aphraktai'') triremes.

In either case, the masts and railings of the ship were taken down prior to engagement to reduce the opportunities for opponents' [[grappling hook]]s.

===On-board forces===
Unlike the naval warfare of other eras, boarding an enemy ship was not the primary offensive action of triremes. Triremes' small size allowed for a limited number of [[Marine (military)|marines]] to be carried aboard. During the 5th and 4th centuries, the trireme's strength was in its maneuverability and speed, not its armor or boarding force. That said, fleets less confident in their ability to ram were prone to load more marines onto their ships.

On the deck of a typical trireme in the Peloponnesian War there were 4 or 5 archers and 10 or so marines.<ref name="Hanson 2006, p. 242">Hanson (2006), p. 242</ref> These few troops were peripherally effective in an offensive sense, but critical in providing defense for the oarsmen. Should the crew of another trireme board, the marines were all that stood between the enemy troops and the slaughter of the men below. It has also been recorded that if a battle were to take place in the calmer water of a harbor, oarsmen would join the offensive and throw stones (from a stockpile aboard) to aid the marines in harassing/attacking other ships.<ref name="Hanson 2006, p. 242"/>

===Naval strategy in the Peloponnesian War===
[[File:Kyklos.jpg|thumb|A schematic view of what the circular ''kyklos'' formation would have looked like from above.]]
[[Squadron (naval)|Squadrons]] of triremes employed a variety of tactics. The ''periplous'' ([[Ancient Greek|Gk.]], "sailing around") involved outflanking or encircling the enemy so as to attack them in the vulnerable rear; the ''diekplous'' (Gk., "Sailing out through") involved a concentrated charge so as to break a hole in the enemy line, allowing galleys to break through and then wheel to attack the enemy line from behind; and the ''kyklos'' (Gk., "circle") and the ''mēnoeidēs kyklos'' (Gk. "half-circle"; literally, "moon-shaped (i.e. crescent-shaped) circle"), were defensive tactics to be employed against these manoeuvres. In all of these manoeuvres, the ability to accelerate faster, row faster, and turn more sharply than one's enemy was very important.

Athens' strength in the Peloponnesian War came from its navy, whereas Sparta's came from its land-based [[Hoplite]] army. As the war progressed however the Spartans came to realize that if they were to undermine [[Pericles]]' strategy of outlasting the Peloponnesians by remaining within the walls of Athens indefinitely (a strategy made possible by Athens' [[Long Walls]] and fortified port of Piraeus), they were going to have to do something about Athens superior naval force. Once Sparta gained Persia as an ally, they had the funds necessary to construct the new naval fleets necessary to combat the Athenians. Sparta was able to build fleet after fleet, eventually destroying the Athenian fleet at the [[Battle of Aegospotami]]. The Spartan General Brasidas summed up the difference in approach to naval warfare between the Spartans and the Athenians: "Athenians relied on speed and maneuverability on the open seas to ram at will clumsier ships; in contrast, a Peloponnesian armada might win only when it fought near land in calm and confined waters, had the greater number of ships in a local theater, and if its better-trained marines on deck and hoplites on shore could turn a sea battle into a contest of infantry."<ref>Hanson (2006), p. 255</ref> In addition, compared to the high-finesse of the Athenian navy (superior oarsmen who could outflank and ram enemy triremes from the side), the Spartans (as well as their allies and other enemies of Athens) would focus mainly on ramming Athenian triremes head on. It would be these tactics, in combination with those outlined by Brasidas, that led to the defeat of the Athenian fleet at the Second Battle of Syracuse during the [[Sicilian Expedition]].

===Casualties===
Once a naval battle was under way, for the men involved, there were numerous ways for them to meet their end. Drowning was perhaps the most common way for a crew member to perish. Once a trireme had been rammed, the ensuing panic that engulfed the men trapped below deck no doubt extended the amount of time it took the men to escape. Inclement weather would greatly decrease the crew's odds of survival, leading to a situation like that off Cape Athos in 411 (12 of 10,000 men were saved).<ref>Hanson (2006), pp. 246–247</ref> An estimated 40,000 Persians died in the [[Battle of Salamis]]. In the Peloponnesian War, after the [[Battle of Arginusae]], six Athenian generals were executed for failing to rescue several hundred of their men clinging to wreckage in the water.<ref>Hanson (2006), p. 246</ref>

If the men did not drown, they might be taken prisoner by the enemy. In the Peloponnesian War, "Sometimes captured crews were brought ashore and either cut down or maimed – often grotesquely, by cutting off the right hand or thumb to guarantee that they could never row again."<ref>Hanson (2006), pp. 247–248</ref> The image found on an early-5th-century [[Black-figure pottery|black-figure]], depicting prisoners bound and thrown into the sea being pushed and prodded under water with poles and spears, shows that enemy treatment of captured sailors in the Peloponnesian War was often brutal.<ref>Hanson (2006), p. 248</ref> Being speared amid the wreckage of destroyed ships was likely a common cause of death for sailors in the Peloponnesian War.

Naval battles were far more of a spectacle than the [[hoplite]] battles on land. Sometimes the battles raging at sea were watched by thousands of spectators on shore.<ref name="Hanson 2006, p. 254"/> Along with this greater spectacle, came greater consequences for the outcome of any given battle. Whereas the average percentage of fatalities from a land battle were between 10 and 15%, in a sea battle, the forces engaged ran the risk of losing their entire fleet. The number of ships and men in battles was sometimes very high. At the [[Battle of Arginusae]] for example, 263 ships were involved, making for a total of 55,000 men, and at the [[Battle of Aegospotami]] more than 300 ships and 60,000 seamen were involved.<ref name="Hanson 2006, p. 264">Hanson (2006), p. 264</ref> In [[Battle of Aegospotami]], the city-state of Athens lost what was left of its navy: the once 'invincible' [[thalassocracy]] lost 170 ships (costing some 400 talents), and the majority of the crews were either killed, captured or lost.<ref name="Hanson 2006, p. 264"/>