Editing Thirty Years' War (section)

== Human and financial cost of the war ==
{{See also|Second plague pandemic}}
The Thirty Years' War is part of what historians sometimes call "[[The General Crisis]]" of the mid-17th century, a period of sustained conflict and unrest in areas ranging from [[Ming China]] to the [[British Isles]], [[Tsardom of Russia|Tsarist Russia]] and the Holy Roman Empire. In each of these, fighting combined with [[famine]] and disease to inflict severe losses on local civilian populations.{{Sfn|Parker|2008|p=1053}} While the war certainly ranks as one of the worst of these events, 19th century [[German nationalism|German nationalists]] often exaggerated its impact to illustrate the dangers of a divided Germany.{{Sfn|Wedgwood|1938|p=510}}

[[File:Bevölkerkungsrückgang im HRRDN nach dem Dreißigjährigen Krieg.PNG|thumb|left|upright=1.0|[[Population decline]] within Germany, 1618 to 1648 <br /> '''Note''': ''Decline'' includes factors such as emigration from rural to more secure urban areas and does not equate to ''deaths''  {{Legend|#ECC790|33–66%}} {{Legend|#B36567|>66%}}]]

Claims of up to 12 million deaths from a population of 18 million are no longer considered realistic, while upper estimates of material losses are not supported by contemporary evidence, or in some cases exceed prewar tax records.{{Sfn|Parker|1997|pp=188–189}} Regardless, modern commentators agree the war was a man-made mortality disaster previously unknown in Europe. Estimates of total deaths range from 4.5 to 8 million, most incurred after 1630 when Sweden entered the war, the vast majority being civilians.{{Sfn|Outram|2001|pp=156–159}}

Battles generally featured armies of around 13,000 to 20,000 each, one of the largest being Alte Veste in 1632 with a combined 70,000 to 85,000. Estimates of the total deployed by both sides within Germany range from an average of 80,000 to 100,000 from 1618 to 1626, peaking at 250,000 in 1632 and falling to under 160,000 by 1648.{{Sfn|Clodfelter|2008|p=40}}

Casualty rates for those who served in the military could be extremely high. Of 230 men conscripted from the Swedish village of [[Bygdeå]] between 1621 and 1639, 215 are recorded as dead or missing, while another 5 returned home crippled.{{Sfn|Parker|1997|p=173}} Historian Peter Wilson puts those killed or wounded in action at around 450,000. Research shows disease increased that number by a factor of between two and three, which suggests total military casualties ranged from 1.3 to 1.8 million.{{Sfn|Wilson|2009|p=791}} [[Sociologist]] [[Pitirim Sorokin]] calculates an upper limit of 2,071,000 military casualties, although his methodology has been disputed.{{Sfn|Levy|1983|pp=88–91}}

Local returns show only 3% of civilian deaths were caused by military action, the major causes being starvation (12%), [[bubonic plague]] (64%), [[typhus]] (4%), and [[dysentery]] (5%).{{Sfn|Outram|2001|pp=160–161}} Poor harvests throughout the 1630s and repeated plundering of the same areas led to widespread famine, with reports of people eating grass, too weak to accept [[alms]], or resorting to [[cannibalism]].{{Sfn|Wilson|2009|p=345}} Although regular outbreaks of disease were common prior to 1618, their spread was accelerated by the influx of foreign soldiers, the shifting locations of battle fronts, and displacement of rural populations into already crowded cities.{{Sfn|Outram|2002|p=250}} Soldiers transferred from Germany allegedly sparked the [[1629–1631 Italian plague]], described as the "worst mortality crisis to affect Italy during the [[early modern period]]".{{Sfn|Alfani|Percoco|2019|p=1175}} This resulted in some 280,000 deaths, with estimates of up to a million.{{Sfn|Hays|2005|p=103}}

Modern historians generally agree the Holy Roman Empire experienced an overall [[population decline]] from 18 and 20 million in 1600, to between 11 and 13 million in 1650, and did not regain pre-war levels until 1750.{{Sfn|Parker|2008|p=1058}} Nearly 50% of these losses were incurred during the first period of Swedish intervention from 1630 to 1635. The high mortality rate was partly due to the reliance of all sides on foreign mercenaries, often unpaid and required to live off the land.{{Sfn|Parker|1997|p=122}} Lack of a sense of 'shared community' resulted in atrocities such as the destruction of Magdeburg, in turn creating large numbers of refugees who were extremely susceptible to sickness and hunger. While flight saved lives in the short-term, in the long run it often proved catastrophic.{{Sfn|Outram|2002|pp=245–246}}

[[File:Vrancx Soldiers Plundering.jpg|thumb|right|upright=1.2|Soldiers plundering a farm]]

In 1940, agrarian historian [[Günther Franz]] published an analysis of data from across Germany covering the period from 1618 to 1648. Broadly confirmed by more recent work, he concluded about 40% of the civilian rural population became casualties, and 33% of the urban.{{Sfn|Outram|2002|p=248}} These figures need to be read with care, since Franz calculated the ''absolute decline'' in pre and post-war populations, or 'total demographic loss'. They therefore include factors unrelated to death or disease, such as permanent migration to areas outside the Empire or lower birthrates, a common but less obvious impact of extended warfare.{{Sfn|Outram|2001|p=152}}{{efn|For example, the population of [[Augsburg]] fell from 48,000 in 1620 to 21,000 in 1650, which Franz portrays as a demographic loss of 27,000; however, many of these were not dead, but emigrated due to decline in trade}} There were also wide regional variations, with areas of northwest Germany experiencing minimal loss of population, while those of Mecklenburg, [[Pomerania]] and [[Duchy of Württemberg|Württemberg]] fell by nearly 50%.{{Sfn|Parker|1997|pp=188–189}}

Although some towns may have overstated their losses to avoid taxes, individual records confirm serious declines; from 1620 to 1650, the population of [[Munich]] fell from 22,000 to 17,000, that of [[Augsburg]] from 48,000 to 21,000.{{Sfn|Wedgwood|1938|p=512}} The financial impact is less clear; while the war caused short-term economic dislocation, especially in the period [[Kipper und Wipper|1618 to 1623]], overall it accelerated existing changes in trading patterns. It does not appear to have reversed ongoing macro-economic trends, such as the reduction of price differentials between regional markets, and a greater degree of market integration across Europe.{{Sfn|Schulze| Volckart|2019|p=30}} The death toll may have improved living standards for the survivors; one study shows wages in Germany increased by 40% in real terms between 1603 and 1652.{{Sfn|Pfister|Riedel|Uebele|2012|p=18}}