Editing Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg (section)

==== 1914: early reactions ====
Bethmann Hollweg remained largely unaffected by the patriotic enthusiasm in Germany in August 1914 (the so-called "[[spirit of 1914]]").{{Sfn|von Vietsch|1969|p=201}} A letter he sent to his friend Wolfgang von Oettingen on 30 August 1914 bears witness: "Work and hope have been sundered in my hands. But I feel innocent of the rivers of blood that now flow. Our people [{{Lang|de|Volk}}] is glorious and cannot perish."<ref>{{Cite book |last=von Oettingen |first=Wolfgang |title=Tagebücher. Eintrag vom August 1914 |language=de |trans-title=Diaries. Entry of August 1914}}</ref>

In what would later be called the [[Septemberprogramm|September Program]], the Empire formulated concrete war aims for the first time. The program contained demands for territory in Europe directed primarily against Russia, as well as the creation of a European customs union that would smooth the way for German economic interests in neighboring countries and secure German supremacy in central Europe.<ref>{{Cite web |title=The September Memorandum (September 9, 1914) |url=https://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=980 |website=German History in Documents and Images (GHDI)}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Zechlin    |first=Egmont |date=1964 |title=Deutschland zwischen Kabinettskrieg und Wirtschaftskrieg. Politik und Kriegführung in den ersten Monaten des Weltkrieges 1914 |trans-title=Germany between Cabinet War and Economic War. Politics and Warfare in the First Months of the World War 1914 |journal=Historische Zeitschrift |language=de |volume=199 |pages=405 ff|doi=10.1524/hzhz.1964.199.jg.347 |s2cid=164254042 }}</ref> Whether or not the plans originated with Bethmann Hollweg cannot be proven. His associate [[Kurt Riezler]] is generally considered to have been the author.{{Sfn|von Vietsch|1969|p=265}} Riezler wrote on 20 September 1914 that the Chancellor would "never do more than listen on the issue of war aims."<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Erdmann |first=Karl Dietrich |date=1964 |title=Zur Beurteilung Bethmann Hollwegs (mit Tagebuchauszügen Kurt Riezlers) |trans-title=On the Assessment of Bethmann Hollweg (with Diary Excerpts of Kurt Riezler) |journal=Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht |language=de |volume=15 |pages=538 |issn=0016-9056}}</ref> Nevertheless, Bethmann Hollweg signed the September Program.

Bethmann Hollweg admitted in 1918 that demanding the restoration of Belgium would probably have been the best thing to do. But under the enormous pressure coming from the military, which was clamoring for annexations ("That cursed sentiment at Headquarters"), it was not possible at the time, he said, and politics, as [[Otto von Bismarck]] had remarked, was the art of the possible.

Instead the Chancellor spoke of a "pledge" ({{Lang|de|Faustpfand}}) to Belgium and France. For him the formulation had the advantage that it did not lead to a premature commitment, since the question of redeeming the pledge would arise only at the end of the war. It was thus a rhetorical weapon against annexationist claims. Bethmann Hollweg probably never retracted his 4 August 1914 statement admitting guilt for the "injustice to Belgium", although some historians think he did.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Ritter |first=Gerhard |title=Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk: Das Problem des "Militarismus" in Deutschland |publisher=Oldenbourg |year=1964 |location=Munich |pages=47, Vol. 3 |language=de |trans-title=Statecraft and Warcraft: The Problem of "Militarism" in Germany}}</ref> In May 1917 he told his friend [[Karl von Weizsäcker]] that he had wanted to bind the Social Democrats to the Empire with both formulations ("pledge" and "injustice to Belgium").{{Sfn|Erdmann|1964|pp=529 f.}} Before the [[Weimar National Assembly]]'s [[Reichstag inquiry into guilt for World War I|committee of inquiry on the question of war guilt]] in 1919, he stressed that he had never revoked the confession of wrongdoing.<ref>{{Cite book |title=Stenographischen Berichte über die öffentlichen Verhandlungen des 15. Untersuchungsausschusses der Verfassungsgebenden Nationalversammlung nebst Beilagen |publisher=Die Deutsche Nationalversammlung im Jahre 1919/20 |year=1920 |volume=1 |location=Berlin |pages=234 f |language=de |trans-title=Stenographic Reports on the Public Proceedings of the 15th Committee of Inquiry of the Constituent National Assembly together with Supplements}}</ref>

At all times Bethmann Hollweg emphasized the defensive character he believed the war had. He always spoke of "securing" the Reich and, in the event of victory, of a "stronger Germany" – but never of a "larger one", as a member of the [[Pan-German League]] remarked disapprovingly.<ref>{{Cite book |last=von Liebig |first=Hans |url=https://archive.org/details/diepolitikvonbet01liebuoft/page/280/mode/2up |title=Die Politik Bethmann Hollwegs |publisher=J.F. Lehmann |year=1919 |volume=1 |location=Munich |pages=280 |language=de}}</ref> Although Bethmann Hollweg spoke at Headquarters in March 1915 of the liberation of Belgium,<ref>{{Cite book |title=Admiral Gustav Bachmann: Lebenserinnerungen und Tagebuch 1915 |publisher=Brill |year=2022 |isbn=9783506795427 |editor-last=Bachmann |editor-first=Gustav |location=Paderborn |pages=92 |language=de |trans-title=Admiral Gustav Bachmann: Memoirs and Diary 1915 |editor-last2=Franken |editor-first2=Klaus}}</ref> he could not meet the demands of the left, which was insisting on a statement of total renunciation, and still continue to be sure of the goodwill of Wilhelm II.
[[File:Erich von Falkenhayn.jpg|left|thumb|[[Erich von Falkenhayn]]]]
Another problem proved to be informing the people of the military situation. As early as September 1914, Chief of the General Staff [[Erich von Falkenhayn]] had called for systematic public education about the unfavorable military situation resulting from the [[First Battle of the Marne]]. On the advice of the Foreign Office, which feared unpredictable consequences abroad, and of several business associations, Bethmann Hollweg refused to allow the government to disseminate the military truth.{{Sfn|von Vietsch|1969|pp=210 ff.}} In spite of all self-deception, he said, education could happen "only gradually through events themselves". Confidence in victory was, after all, a "moral factor of tremendous importance".{{Sfn|von Vietsch|1969|p=212}}

While the [[National Liberal Party (Germany)|National Liberals]], unaware of the true situation on the front, moved more and more to the right and indulged in ideas of annexations, Bethmann Hollweg noted that partisanship for major territorial demands largely coincided with opposition to suffrage reform in Prussia.<ref>{{Cite book |last=von Bethmann Hollweg |first=Theobald |url=https://archive.org/details/BehmannHollwegTheobaldVon-BetrachtungenZumWeltkriege-Band2/page/n53/mode/2up?view=theater |title=Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege |publisher=Hobbing |year=1919–1921 |volume=2 |location=Berlin |pages=31 |language=de |trans-title=Reflections on the World War}}</ref> Foreign policy issues had an internal political side, something that was to prove a decisive, deep-seated problem for the Chancellor and the Empire.{{Sfn|von Vietsch|1969|p=213}}

From the beginning of the war, the Reichstag operated under ''[[Burgfriedenspolitik]]'', a political truce between the parties and the government. It was based in large part on the work of the Chancellor. He had rejected the plan of leading military officers such as Admiral Tirpitz to arrest the SPD executive committee at the start of the war and to dissolve the party.{{Sfn|Rathenau|1967|p=40}} Bethmann Hollweg had in fact openly approached the Social Democrats in order to win them over to the Emperor and the Empire for the long term.

When he asked the SPD on 29 July 1914 what its position would be in the war, he was assured that he would not have to assume that there would be either sabotage or general strikes. After he had presented the SPD executive committee's letter to the Emperor, Wilhelm spoke in the Reichstag on 4 August, using words that were to become famous: "I no longer know any parties or denominations; today we are all German brothers and only German brothers."<ref>{{Cite web |date=1 September 2014 |title=Der "Burgfrieden" 1914 |url=https://www.dhm.de/lemo/kapitel/erster-weltkrieg/innenpolitik/burgfrieden.html |website=Deutsches Historisches Museum}}</ref>

In retrospect, Bethmann Hollweg saw the day the war began as one of the greatest in German history. On 4 August, he thought, the internal barriers that had prevented the country from growing together into a true nation-state had fallen.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Patemann |first=Reinhard |title=Der Kampf um die preußische Wahlreform |publisher=Droste |year=1964 |location=Düsseldorf |pages=19 |language=de |trans-title=The Struggle for Prussian Electoral Reform}}</ref> At the beginning of October 1914 he said, "The barriers must fall, a new era will begin after the war. The differences of class have receded as never before."{{Sfn|Ritter|1964|p=32 ff., Vol. 2}} Only in the following weeks did he begin to realize that the conservatives, "sitting there so icily", did not want to join the new community that spanned all world views.