Editing Sudanese Armed Forces (section)

== Foreign military assistance ==
Relations with the Soviets cooled in the late 1970s, and Sudan turned to China and Britain for training and equipment. In addition, Sudan received financing from Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, for the purchase of Western equipment.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}} Until 1985, however, Sudan's closest military ties were with Egypt, defined by a 25-year defense agreement signed in 1976.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}} The accord provided for shared planning and staffing; the Egyptians also supplied Sudan with ammunition and various types of weaponry, such as antitank missiles and armored personnel carriers.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}} Al-Bashir reaffirmed the pact after his 1989 coup, but the Egyptians declined to supply additional military aid after Sudan refused to condemn the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}}

U.S. military aid to Sudan initially consisted primarily of training a small number of Sudanese officers.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}} Between fiscal year (FY) 1979 and FY 1982, military sales credits rose from US$5 million to US$100 million.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}} Apart from aircraft, the United States provided Sudan with artillery, armored personnel carriers, Commando armored cars, and M–60 tanks.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}} U.S. grant aid reached a peak of US$101 million in FY 1982.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}} Sudan granted the United States naval facilities at [[Port Sudan]] and gave the [[United States Central Command]] some airport-prepositioning rights for military equipment for contingent use.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}} In 1981 and 1983, Sudanese and U.S. forces participated in the multi-national [[Exercise Bright Star]] maneuvers.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}}

The United States reduced military grants and credits when the Southern Sudanese civil war resumed in 1983.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}} After FY 1987, no assistance was extended with the exception of less than US$1 million annually for advanced training for SAF officers and maintenance for previously supplied equipment.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}} Washington suspended military aid in 1989 under a provision of the United States Foreign Assistance Act that prohibits assistance to countries in arrears on interest payments on previous loans.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}} In March 1990, the United States invoked a provision of the act barring aid to regimes that overthrow a democratic government.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}} The United States terminated arms sales to Sudan in late 1992, while the European Union instituted an arms embargo against Sudan in 1994.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}} These actions, however, had no impact on Sudan's ability to replenish its arsenals.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}}

According to the U.S. [[Arms Control and Disarmament Agency]], Sudan obtained about US$350 million in military arms and equipment between 1983 and 1988.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}} The United States was the largest supplier, accounting for US$120 million.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}} China and France each provided US$30 million and Britain, US$10 million.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}} About US$160 million came from unidentified sources, probably largely from Egypt and Libya, and as purchases from other Western suppliers financed by Arab countries.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}}

Various Middle East and Gulf countries, particularly Iran and Libya but also Egypt, provided more than US$2 billion in "economic aid" in the 1970s, much of which Khartoum used to buy weapons.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}} Additionally, each of Sudan's neighbors provided weapons and/or sanctuary to various anti-Khartoum rebel groups and militias.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}} Since the early 1990s, at least 34 countries have exported ammunition, light arms, and small arms to Sudan.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}} In more recent years, reliable sources have suggested that there were between 1.9 and 3.2 million small arms in Sudan.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}} About one-fifth of these weapons were held by the Sudanese government and/or pro-Khartoum militias.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}}

Sudan constituted one of Africa's major consumers of weapons in the early 2000s.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}} As was the case in earlier decades, Sudan continued to rely on an array of suppliers, among them Belarus, China, Egypt, Iran, Romania, Russia, Poland, and South Africa, for ammunition, armored vehicles, helicopters, howitzers, infantry fighting vehicles, attack and fighter aircraft, multiple rocket launchers, main battle tanks, and transport aircraft.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}} Additionally, China supervised arms assembly and assisted in the construction of weapons factories.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}}

Sudan manufactured at least a small amount of ammunition for light weapons in the early 1960s, but the country's capacity to produce arms greatly expanded with the opening of the GIAD industrial city south of Khartoum in October 2000.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}} Under the auspices of the Military Industry Corporation within the Ministry of Defense, engineering and industrial enterprises produced or imported a range of equipment and technology for ground and air forces.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}} Although information was limited, in the early 2000s this equipment included heavy and light artillery, antitank and antiaircraft guns, machine guns and small arms, tanks, and armored personnel carriers, as well as ammunition for these weapons; the country also had acquired the ability to assemble and maintain aircraft, including fighter and cargo airplanes and helicopters.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}}

The SPLM/A, under the late John Garang's leadership, regularly accused the SAF of using chemical weapons in South Sudan, but these allegations were never substantiated.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}} The same was true of the U.S. charge in 1998 that the al-Shifa Pharmaceuticals Industries factory in Khartoum North was developing chemical weapons or precursor chemicals, a claim that led to the United States bombing of the plant.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}} Similarly, news reports in 2004 that Sudanese and Syrian troops had tested chemical weapons against civilians in Darfur were never confirmed.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}} Some independent observers maintain that Garang on his part used the chemical-weapons issue as a disinformation campaign against Khartoum and Washington.{{sfn|Ofcansky|2015|pages=344–347}}

The [[UAE]] in recent years has supplied arms to both the [[Rapid Support Forces|RSF]] and the SAF, which has created clashes in Sudan. Since 2014, The UAE supplied arms and also trained RSF members for using heavy weapons. On 25 April 2023, footage emerged of thermobaric shells captured by Sudanese army, which shows its manufacturing in [[Serbia]] in the year 2020, then supplied through the UAE to Sudan. Sudanese military received training by Egyptian forces. On the contrary Egypt also mediated the ceasefire as per the Egyptian source.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.military.africa/2023/04/the-uae-sold-arms-to-both-warring-parties-in-sudan/?amp=1|title=The UAE sold arms to both warring parties in Sudan|accessdate=25 April 2023|website=Military Africa|date=22 April 2023 }}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url= https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/04/18/sudan-war-news-uae-arming-rebels-thermobaric-bombs/|title= Day-long ceasefire agreed in Sudan amid civil war fears|accessdate=18 April 2023|website=Telegraph|date= 18 April 2023|last1= MacDiarmid|first1= Campbell}}</ref>