Editing Space Shuttle Columbia disaster (section)

=== Organizational culture ===
The CAIB was critical of NASA organizational culture, and compared its current state to that of NASA leading up to the ''Challenger'' disaster.{{r|caib_report|p=99}} It concluded that NASA was experiencing budget constraints while still expecting to keep a high level of launches and operations.{{r|caib_report|p=100}} Program operating costs were lowered by 21% from 1991 to 1994,{{r|caib_report|p=107}} despite a planned increase in the yearly flight rate for assembly of the International Space Station.{{r|caib_report|p=114}} Despite a history of foam strike events, NASA management did not consider the potential risk to the astronauts as a safety-of-flight issue.{{r|caib_report|p=126}} The CAIB found that a lack of a safety program led to the lack of concern over foam strikes.{{r|caib_report|p=177}} The board determined that NASA lacked the appropriate communication and integration channels to allow problems to be discussed and effectively routed and addressed.{{r|caib_report|p=187}} This risk was further compounded by pressure to adhere to a launch schedule for construction of the ISS.{{r|caib_report|p=198}}