Editing Richard Helms (section)

===Vietnamization===
Nixon pursued what he called "peace with honor", yet critics called its aim a "[[decent interval]]".<ref>[[Tran Ngoc Chau]], ''Vietnam Labyrinth'' (2013) pp. 328–329. "On the face of it, the premise for Vietnamization appeared plausible," according to this Vietnamese politician. Yet he then "believed the Nixon administration's primary interest would be to contain the Vietnam military and political situation long enough (the "decent interval") to withdraw without the appearance of having been defeated."</ref> The policy was called [[Vietnamization]].<ref>Tucker, ed., ''The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War'', pp. 474–475: article "Vietnamization".</ref><ref>Buttinger, ''Vietnam: The Unforgettable Tragedy'' (1977) 107–112, at 111: "the failure of Vietnamization was [due to] the corruption among the army leadership" of [[Army of the Republic of Viet Nam|ARVN]].</ref> To end the war favorably he focused on the peace negotiations in Paris. There Henry Kissinger played the major role in bargaining with the North Vietnamese. Achieving peace proved difficult; in the meantime, casualties mounted. Although withdrawing great numbers of American troops, Nixon simultaneously escalated the air war. He increased the [[Operation Linebacker|heavy bombing]] of Vietnam, also of Laos and Cambodia, and widened the scope of the conflict by [[Cambodian Campaign|invading Cambodia]]. While these actions sought to gain bargaining power at the Paris conference table, they also drew a "firestorm" of college protests in America.<ref>David Halberstam, ''The Best and the Brightest'' (New York: Random House 1972; reprint Penguin 1983) pp. 806–807.</ref><ref>Tucker, ed., ''The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War'' at 306–307, quote at 307.</ref> Kissinger describes a debate over the [[naval mines|mining]] of [[Haiphong]] harbor, in which he criticizes Helms at CIA for his disapproval of the plan. In Kissinger's telling, here Helms' opposition reflected the bias of CIA analysts, "the most liberal school of thought in the government."<ref>Kissinger, ''The White House Years'' (1997) pp. 1180–1181, 1181 (quote).</ref>

When contemplating his administration's inheritance of the Vietnam War, Nixon understood the struggle in the context of the [[Cold War (1962–79)|cold war]]. He viewed Vietnam as critically important. Helms recalled him as saying, "There's only one number one problem hereabouts and that's Vietnam—get on with it."<ref>Helms (2003) p. 309.</ref> Nixon saw that the ongoing [[Sino-Soviet split]] presented America with an opportunity to triangulate [[History of the Soviet Union (1964–1982)|Soviet Russia]] by opening relations with the [[History of the People's Republic of China (1949–1976)|People's Republic of China]]. It might also drive a wedge between the two major supporters of [[North Vietnam]].<ref>Henry Kissinger, ''The White House Years'' (Boston: Little, Brown 1997) pp. 1049–1096 (Nixon's trip to China). Vietnam discussed at 1086, 1987, cf., 694–697. Nixon also went to the ''détente'' [[Moscow Summit (1972)|summit in Moscow]] the following May (pp. 1202–1275).</ref> While here appreciating the CIA reports Helms supplied him on China, Nixon nonetheless kept his diplomatic travel preparations within the White House and under wraps.<ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 505 (Helms' reports), p. 540 (within White House).</ref> To prepare for [[1972 Nixon visit to China|Nixon's 1972 trip to China]], Kissinger ordered that CIA covert operations there, including [[Protests and uprisings in Tibet since 1950|Tibet]],<ref>Cf., Marchetti and Marks (1974, 1980) pp. 101–104.</ref> come to a halt.<ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 301–302.</ref>

In the meantime, ''Vietnamization'' signified the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, while the brunt of the fighting was shifted to [[ARVN|South Vietnamese armed forces]]. This affected all CIA operations across the political-military landscape. Accordingly, DCI Helms wound down many CIA activities, e.g., civic projects and paramilitary operations in Vietnam, and the "secret war" in Laos. The ''Phoenix'' program once under Colby (1967–1971) was also turned over to Vietnamese direction and control.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 261–262 (Laos), 338 (Phoenix).</ref><ref>Colby (1978) pp. 240, 290.</ref> The 1973 [[Paris Peace Accords]], however, came after Helms had left the CIA.

To sustain the existence of the South Vietnam regime, Nixon massively increased American military aid. In 1975, the [[Fall of Saigon|regime's army quickly collapsed]] when regular army units of the [[People's Army of Vietnam|Communist forces]] attacked.<ref>Tucker, ed., ''The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War'', p. 450 re article "Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 1954–1975"; p. 475 re "Vietnamization": as a result of American refusal to provide further support to the south, "the accomplishments of Vietnamization were squandered."</ref> "Moral disintegration alone can explain why an army three times the size and possessing more than five times the equipment of the enemy could be as rapidly defeated as the [[Army of the Republic of Viet Nam|ARVN]] was between March 10 and April 30, 1975," commented [[Joseph Buttinger]].<ref>Buttinger, ''Vietnam. The unforgettable tragedy'' (1977) pp. 112–116, 136–137, 148–152; quote at 148.</ref> American military deaths from the war were over 47,000, with 153,000 wounded. South Vietnamese military losses (using low figures) were about 110,000 killed and 500,000 wounded. Communist Vietnamese military losses were later announced: 1,100,000 killed and 600,000 wounded. Hanoi also estimated that total civilian deaths from the war, 1954 to 1975, were 2,000,000. According to [[Spencer C. Tucker]], "The number of civilians killed in the war will never be known with any accuracy; estimates vary widely, but the lowest figure given is 415,000."<ref>Tucker, ed., ''The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War'', p. 64 (with quote): article "Casualties" by Tucker.</ref>