Editing Rationality (section)

==== Practical ====
All forms of practical rationality are concerned with how we act. It pertains both to [[Action (philosophy)|actions]] directly as well as to mental states and events preceding actions, like [[intention]]s and [[Choice|decisions]]. There are various aspects of practical rationality, such as how to pick a goal to follow and how to choose the means for reaching this goal. Other issues include the coherence between different intentions as well as between beliefs and intentions.<ref name="Hampton1996"/><ref name="Wallace2020"/><ref name="Moser2006"/>

Some theorists define the rationality of actions in terms of beliefs and desires. In this view, an action to bring about a certain goal is rational if the agent has the desire to bring about this goal and the belief that their action will realize it. A stronger version of this view requires that the responsible beliefs and desires are rational themselves.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/> A very influential conception of the rationality of decisions comes from [[decision theory]]. In decisions, the agent is presented with a set of possible courses of action and has to choose one among them. Decision theory holds that the agent should choose the alternative that has the highest [[expected value]].<ref name="Hampton1996"/> Practical rationality includes the field of actions but not of behavior in general. The difference between the two is that actions are intentional behavior, i.e. they are performed for a purpose and guided by it. In this regard, intentional behavior like driving a car is either rational or irrational while non-intentional behavior like sneezing is outside the domain of rationality.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/><ref name="Wilson2002"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Mele |first1=Alfred R. |last2=Moser |first2=Paul K. |title=Intentional Action |journal=Noûs |date=1994 |volume=28 |issue=1 |pages=39–68 |doi=10.2307/2215919 |jstor=2215919 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2215919 |issn=0029-4624 |access-date=2022-08-14 |archive-date=2022-08-14 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220814154359/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2215919 |url-status=live }}</ref>

For various other practical phenomena, there is no clear consensus on whether they belong to this domain or not. For example, concerning the rationality of desires, two important theories are proceduralism and substantivism. According to proceduralism, there is an important distinction between [[Desire#Intrinsic and instrumental|instrumental and noninstrumental desires]]. A desire is instrumental if its fulfillment serves as a means to the fulfillment of another desire.<ref name="Brad2004"/><ref name="Harman2013"/><ref name="Knauff2021b"/> For example, Jack is sick and wants to take medicine to get healthy again. In this case, the desire to take the medicine is instrumental since it only serves as a means to Jack's noninstrumental desire to get healthy. Both proceduralism and substantivism usually agree that a person can be irrational if they lack an instrumental desire despite having the corresponding noninstrumental desire and being aware that it acts as a means. Proceduralists hold that this is the only way a desire can be irrational. Substantivists, on the other hand, allow that noninstrumental desires may also be irrational. In this regard, a substantivist could claim that it would be irrational for Jack to lack his noninstrumental desire to be healthy.<ref name="Mele2004a"/><ref name="Brad2004"/><ref name="Knauff2021b"/> Similar debates focus on the rationality of [[emotion]]s.<ref name="Knauff2021b"/>