Editing Physicalism (section)

=== Argument from overdetermination ===
[[File:Figure1.gif|right|thumb|Figure demonstration how M1 and M2 are not reduced to P1 and P2.]]
[[Jaegwon Kim]] objects to non-reductive physicalism based on the problem of [[overdetermination]].<ref name="auto">(2005) ''Physicalism, or Something Near Enough'', Princeton University Press</ref> He proposes (using the chart on the right) that ''M1'' causes ''M2'' (these are mental events) and ''P1'' causes ''P2'' (these are physical events). ''M1'' has ''P1'' as its supervenience base (P1 realizes M1), and ''M2'' has ''P2'' as its supervenience base (P2 realizes M2). If ''P1'' causes ''P2'' and M1 causes M2, then we have a case of causal overdetermination. To avoid this causal overdetermination, either M1 or P1 must be eliminated as a cause of P2. Because of the principle of the [[causal closure]] of the physical, M1 is excluded. The non-reductive physicalist is then forced to choose between two unappealing options: accept overdetermination or embrace [[epiphenomenalism]]. Kim thus argues that mental causation can be preserved only by embracing a reductionist view, whereby mental properties are considered causally efficacious by being reduced to physical properties.<ref name="auto"/>