Editing Philip III of Spain (section)

=== Policy in Asia ===
{{copy edit section|date=February 2025}}
Philip III's global policy prioritized affairs in the East Indies over the West Indies, largely because he controlled the colonial possessions of the Portuguese Empire. His empire was engaged in both the [[Ottoman–Portuguese confrontations]] and the [[Eighty Years' War]] with the Dutch in the East Indies. Under mounting pressure, Philip sought to integrate the Indo-Mediterranean trade routes by securing the Spanish-Portuguese positions along the coasts of Africa and Asia. This strategy aimed to block the arrival and expansion of Dutch and English forces, which threatened the monopoly established by the Treaty of Tordesillas. Philip pursued the spread of missionaries such as the [[Jesuits]] and other [[Mendicant orders]] in order to spread [[Catholic Church|Catholicism]] to the [[Eastern civilization|Eastern Civilizations]]. To strengthen the Iberian Union against hostile nations such as the [[Dutch colonial empire|Dutch]], [[British Empire|British]] and [[Ottoman Empire|Ottoman]] Empires, Philip oversaw the economic interests of the [[Portuguese Empire]] and bolstered Iberian collaboration in overseas trade. Under Philip, the Iberian Union developed alliances with [[Safavid Iran]] and [[Mughal India]].<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal |last=de Guzmán Centenero de Arce |first=Domingo |date=December 2019 |title=La política asiática de Felipe III: Los intereses cruzados de los socorros a Filipinas (1610-1624) |journal=Historia (Santiago) |volume=52 |issue=2 |pages=409–438 |doi=10.4067/S0717-71942019000200409 |issn=0717-7194|doi-access=free }}</ref> The secondary objectives of Philip's reign was to uphold the Portuguese commercial monopoly in the [[Indian Ocean]]. However, the Spanish court deemed such a monopoly unviable after the [[Twelve Years' Truce]] and instead sought to maintain Iberian superiority over economic competition from the East India Company, the Dutch East India Company, and other European newcomers, such as the [[Danish East India Company]] and the [[Swedish West India Company]].<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal |last=Rubiés |first=Joan-Pau |date=2018-11-15 |title=1622 y la crisis de Ormuz |url=https://journals.openedition.org/mcv/9047 |journal=Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez |series=Nouvelle série |language=es |issue=48–2 |pages=121–151 |doi=10.4000/mcv.9047 |issn=0076-230X|doi-access=free }}</ref>

{{Blockquote|text=The Crown paid close attention to these proposals of the Sevillian elites, since this was an opportunity to improve the Royal Treasury and its position in Asia. However, as I have indicated in the introduction, this meant stopping the expedition of extraordinary armadas from Lisbon in order to try: first, to replace them with the sending of aid to Manila; second, to achieve collaboration in Asia with the forces of the Iberian Union; third, to prevent the arrival of Dutch and English forces through the reinforcement of the Iberian position on the coasts of Africa and fourth, to aspire to an alliance with the Safavid Empire in search of a better position in the Mediterranean, which translated into conflicts with the Portuguese Crown, which was reluctant to this policy.|author=[[Domingo de Guzmán Centenero de Arce]] (historian)}}
[[File:16th century Portuguese Spanish trade routes.png|thumb|324x324px|Trade Routes of the [[Iberian Union]] around the world]]
To realize these objectives, Philip III first sent military [[Armada of Spain|Armadas]] to the [[Portuguese India]] (from 1605 to 1608), and then military relief to the [[Spanish Philippines|Philippines]] (from 1610 to 1624) to reinforce Iberian military forts in the [[Far East]]. At the same time, he also developed [[diplomatic mission]]s with Asia (such as [[Persian embassy to Europe (1599–1602)|1st Persian embassy to Europe]], [[Antonio de Gouvea]]-[[Don Garcia de Silva Figueroa]]'s mission to Iran, [[Hasekura Tsunenaga#The 1613 embassy project|2nd Japanese embassy to Europe]], [[Sebastián Vizcaíno]]'s mission to Japan).
[[File:Embajada Keichō.jpg|left|thumb|Keichō Embassy in Spain, a [[Japan–Spain relations|Japan–Spain]] diplomatic mission to develop the economical [[Japan–Mexico relations]].<ref>https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/161457422.pdf</ref>]]
Similarly, he found an alternative trade route to [[Spanish East Indies]] (connecting directly [[Seville]] to [[Manila]]), a part of the ''[[Galeon de Manila]]'' (which needed to go through [[Acapulco]] and [[Veracruz (city)|Veracruz]] as intermediaries), to increase profits of [[Peninsular Spain]], while also managing more efficiently the European distribution from [[Spain]] of products from [[China]], [[India]] and [[Indonesia]]. To finance these projects, the section of the [[Sephardic Jews|Sephardic]] [[Marrano|Jewish minority converted to Christianity]], who still resided in Portugal and were [[Court Jew]]s, were pardoned (in order to control the [[Atlantic slave trade|Brazil-Angola slave trade]]). Moreover, investors from allied [[Italian states]] were invited and asked during various royal audiences for support (as was also the case of the [[Viceroyalty of Peru]], who offered to extend the route for a direct connection between [[Manila]] and [[Callao]], and from Callao to Spain or Angola). Improvements to the Asian fortifications were financed specifically through trade trips to Japan. Also, any powerful, non-cooperative elites were dismissed, mostly Novohispanas (who preferred to develop a triangular trade relationship between Mexico, the Philippines and [[Japan]] or [[Maluku Islands|Maluku]]), the [[Council of Portugal|Portuguese]] (who did not want [[Crown of Castile|Castilian]] presence on [[Indian Ocean]], so maintaining an strict separation of [[Portuguese Empire]] from [[Spanish Empire]]), and [[Jesuits]] (who feared the expansion of Spanish [[Patronato real]] against [[Papal primacy]]) to improve economic and political control over the non-European areas, which lead to the creation of Castilian Pepper ''Estanco'' (1605–1684) and the Conselho da India (1604–1614), respectively. Furthermore, the [[Crown of Castile]] began negotiations with the [[Papal States]] to allow its missionaries (mostly [[mendicant orders]]) to pass from the Philippines to Japan and China, abolishing the monopoly of the Portuguese Jesuits.<ref name=":0" /> Also, the [[Shah Abbas I|Shah Abbas I the Great]] and his ambassador [[Hossein Ali Beg Bayat]] offered in 1601 a complementary project that consisted of diverting the Persian raw silk trade by means of the [[Cape Route|Cape maritime route]], instead of the land route through the [[Ottoman Empire]] (harming the common enemy Turkey and incidentally the [[Republic of Venice|Venetians]], pressuring them to join the [[Habsburg–Persian alliance]]) which would have been making the Spanish Asian project more profitable and giving [[Iberian Union]] a commercial monopoly to distribute [[Persian Gulf]] products in Europe, and in turn making the direct route to Manila more attractive for Sevillians that doubted of not crossing Mexico.<ref name=":1" />

{{Blockquote|text="It is in the service of His Majesty that the said contract between New Spain and the Philippine Islands cease, and that it be done from Spain, since the Dutch and foreigners do it very easily, as is well known."|source=Archivo de Indias}}

However, the appearance of [[Technological]] problems, such as the lack of [[Crown of Castile|Castilian]] expert [[Marine Pilots]] or of interested personnel to travel to unknown destinies (and to survive the hostility from Anglo-Dutch [[Piracy]]), along the resistance from the proper [[Spanish Philippines]]' elite whom preferred the [[Manila galleon]], and of the [[Portuguese Kingdom]]'s who were reluctant to collaborate with their territories, caused the failure of this geopolitical project, which had a resounding end with the enmity against [[Abbas the Great|Abbas the Great's]] Persia and [[Sakoku]] Japan, and the theatres of war against [[Protestantism|Protestant]] Great Powers that were opened by the [[Thirty Years' War]].<ref name=":0" />

==== Ormus Crisis ====
{{See also|Anglo-Persian capture of Qeshm|Anglo-Persian capture of Hormuz|Portuguese–Safavid wars}}
Despite the attempt to develop the [[Spain-Iran relations]], the [[Portuguese–Safavid wars]] increased to a critical point during his late reign, influenced by the increasing authority of [[Abbas the Great]] which provoked a systematic increase in military and strategic pressure over (who definitively put an end to any Iberian aspiration to control the arrival point of the caravans in the Persian Gulf), and also the entry of the [[English East India Company]] in the [[Persian Gulf]] menacing the naval superiority of [[Portuguese India]] in the region. The Portuguese authorities of the conquered [[Kingdom of Ormus]] considered the Mocarrarias (tributes of the Arab [[Chieftain]] to the [[Persian shah]]) from the Alfandega were merely to ensure the transit of the caravans or ships passing through the continental territories of the [[Safavids]], but the Safavid considered that Ormuz was a vassal to the Persian king and that Portuguese didn't have any superior [[Right of conquest]] over those territories under Iranian [[Suzerainty]]. That issue about the tributes were allowed to pass by both sides depending on the degree of military power to make it effective (when Persia was perceived as threatening, they were paid, when Portugal was more powerful, they were avoided or paid incompletely), Portuguese authorities were confident in their naval superiority to be able to evade any Persian pressure, but the arrival of the English forced them to give priority to securing the sea routes against the corsairs and also to fear that this naval superiority would be lost, which would violate Portuguese sovereignty in the face of Persian aspirations that increased with Abbas. So, the fate of Hormuz during Philip III's reign was tied to the possibility of a [[Habsburg–Persian alliance|Habsburg–Persian]] military alliance offered by Abbas against [[Ottoman Empire]] (there was an [[Ottoman–Safavid war (1603–1612)|Ottoman–Safavid war since 1603]]), but at this point the Spanish-Ottoman Wars have been concluded and Philip III wanted to avoid new military conflicts in the short-term and take advantage of the moments of peace. Despite it, Don [[García de Silva Figueroa|García de Silva]] meet Abbas the Great on 1618–1619 to discuss the proposal of alliance, although the reclamations over the [[Capture of Cambarão]] make difficult the negotiations as Abbas considered that Iberians demanded too much to him (like freeze his relationships with the [[English East India Company]] to have the Spanish recognition of Persian suzerainty over former Portuguese possessions in the Persian Gulf) without definitive commitments to a direct Spanish offensive against the Turks (such as the proposal for a blockade of the [[Red Sea]]), and also there were inner conflicts between Portuguese and Castilians about how to deal with the issue, as the first wanted to priorize a geopolitic over [[Indian Ocean]] (who hindered the approachment with the Persians to avoid concessions that endanger [[Portuguese India]] prestige) while the second ones priorized a geopolitic over [[Mediterranean Sea]] (wanting to gain time and distract Persians against Ottomans to strength Iberian projection of power in Europe and also keep [[Ormus|Ormuz]] safe as a secondary achievement). After failing the diplomatic negotiations, Philip III sent an armada leaded by Ruy Freire in 1619 to expel the English navies and also strengthen Portuguese position over Persians, but ultimately failed in that objective and instead provocated an alliance between English and Persians, that then joined Dutch and [[Omani Sultanate|Omanis]], to expel Iberians from the [[Persian Gulf]], leading to the [[Anglo-Persian capture of Qeshm]], [[Anglo-Persian capture of Hormuz|Hormuz]] and the [[Battle off Hormuz (1625)]].<ref name=":1" /><ref>{{Cite web |title=Las Fortalezas Ibéricas en la Península Arábiga (1507-1650) |url=https://seguridadinternacional.es/resi/html/las-fortalezas-ibericas-en-la-peninsula-arabiga-1507-1650/ |access-date=2025-03-07 |website=Revista de Estudios en Seguridad Internacional |language=es}}</ref>