Editing Nihilism (section)

== History ==
{{main|History of nihilism}}
Although nihilism is primarily associated with [[modernity]], some of its origins trace back to [[ancient philosophy]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 1. Origins}} | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|pp=1, 5}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|p=13}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|pp=671–672}} }}</ref> [[Socrates]]'s ({{circa|470–399 BCE}}) method of [[Socratic_method#Questioning_methods|radical questioning]] is a precursor that challenges established beliefs, values, and practices, often with the goal of exposing their lack of a solid foundation.<ref>{{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=13–17}}</ref>{{efn|For example, he suggested in the [[Allegory of the cave]] that commonly held beliefs about reality are just a shadow of a higher unperceived reality.<ref>{{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=14–15}}</ref>}} Some [[Sophists]], like [[Protagoras]] ({{circa|490–420 BCE}}), disputed the existence of objective truth, arguing for a relativistic nihilism according to which "man is the measure of all things".<ref>{{harvnb|Iannone|2013|p=235}}</ref> [[Pyrrho]] ({{circa|360–270 BCE}}) formulated a broad version of epistemological nihilism in his attempt to show that knowledge is impossible.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|pp=1, 5}} | {{harvnb|Iannone|2013|p=496}} }}</ref>

Various negative attitudes towards objective knowledge and the world are also found in [[ancient Indian philosophy]]. However, it is controversial to what extent they constitute forms of nihilism in a strict sense and some interpreters limit nihilism to the Western tradition.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Toribio Vazquez|2021|pp=1199–1200}} | {{harvnb|Morrison|2002|pp=3–6, 34, 50}} | {{harvnb|Westerhoff|2016|pp=337–338}} | {{harvnb|Diken|2008|p=3}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=672}} }}</ref> In the 6th century BCE, the school of [[Ajñana]] developed a radical skepticism, questioning the possibility and usefulness of knowledge.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Fountoulakis|2021|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=xGtREAAAQBAJ&pg=PA23 23]}} | {{harvnb|Warder|1998|pp=43–44}} | {{harvnb|Fletcher|Romero|Talbot|Warburton|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=drX4DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA46 46]}} }}</ref> [[Buddhist]] thought, starting in the 6th and 5th centuries BCE, focuses on the pervasiveness of [[dukkha|suffering]], identifying it as a fundamental [[three marks of existence|aspect of existence]]. It teaches [[renunciation]] of worldly desires to achieve liberation from suffering in the state of [[nirvana]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Morrison|2002|pp=24–25, 31–34}} | {{harvnb|Gómez|2007|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sQULdfIlBIYC&pg=PA110 110]}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|pp=192, 208, 226, 289}} | {{harvnb|Braak|2011|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oVFuqMvr7D4C&pg=PA38 38–39]}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|p=72}} }}</ref> According to a common interpretation, the school of [[Mādhyamaka]], which emerged in the 2nd century CE, defends a type of metaphysical nihilism, rejecting the existence of an ultimate foundation or absolute reality underlying the multiplicity of experienced phenomena.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Frazier|2024|loc=§ 3. The Critique of 'Things': Madhyamaka Metaphysical Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Westerhoff|2016|pp=337–338}} | {{harvnb|Arnold|loc=§ 1. Nāgārjuna and the Paradoxical “Perfection of Wisdom” Literature, § 2c. Ethics and the Charge of Nihilism}} }}</ref>

In the [[early modern period]], [[secularization]] and the [[scientific revolution]] undermined established religious beliefs and values prevalent in the Western world during the [[medieval period]], preparing the emergence of nihilism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=38–39, 200–203}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=671}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|p=xxii}} }}</ref> [[René Descartes]] (1596–1650) considered an extreme form of epistemological nihilism in his quest for absolute certainty. He suggested that humans cannot trust even their most fundamental beliefs unless they can rule out that a malevolent God-like being is constantly deceiving them.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=18–22}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=206–207, 209–210, 217}} }}</ref> [[Immanuel Kant]] (1724–1804) drew a sharp distinction between [[Phenomenon|appearances]] and [[Thing-in-itself|things underlying those appearances]]. By limiting knowledge to the sphere of appearances, he prepared a type of existential nihilism, making the deeper meaning of things in themselves inaccessible.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=28–34}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 1. Historical Background}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=248–249}} }}</ref> In criticizing the [[rationalism]] of the [[Kantianism|Kantian]] philosopher [[Johann Gottlieb Fichte]] (1762–1814), [[Friedrich Jacobi]] (1743–1819) was the first to coin the philosophical concept of nihilism to describe a tendency in philosophical thought that leads to a denial of existence and meaning.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|p=32}} | {{harvnb|Livieri|di Giovanni|2023|loc=Lead section, § 1. Life and Intellectual Career, § 3.5 The Open Letter to Fichte (1799)}} | {{harvnb|Crowe|2021|pp=157–158, 167–168}} | {{harvnb|Toribio Vazquez|2021|pp=1200–1201}} }}</ref>

[[File:Turgenev by Repin.jpg|thumb|alt=Oil painting of bearded man with white hair, seated in an armchair and dressed in a dark coat|In 19th-century Russia, [[Ivan Turgenev]] was responsible for popularizing the term ''nihilism''.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=672}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|p=xix}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 1. Historical Background}} | {{harvnb|Lovell|1998|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref>]]

In Russia, the term ''nihilism'' gained popularity through [[Ivan Turgenev]]'s (1818–1883) portrayal of a nihilist character in his novel ''[[Fathers and Sons (novel)|Fathers and Sons]]''.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=672}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|p=xix}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 1. Historical Background}} | {{harvnb|Lovell|1998|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> Starting in the second half of the 19th century, the [[Russian nihilist movement]] was a form of political nihilism, characterized by a radical rejection of traditional social, political, and aesthetic norms.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 1. Origins}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|p=xix}} | {{harvnb|Lovell|1998|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> Meanwhile in Western Europe, the nihilistic [[egoism]] of [[Max Stirner]] (1806–1856) reduced other people to their usefulness without respect for their [[personhood]]. Stirner also formulated a cosmic nihilism that sees the universe as an unintelligible, metaphysical chaos.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 1. Origins}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=15, 27}} | {{harvnb|Holbrook|1977|pp=382–383}} }}</ref> [[Søren Kierkegaard]] (1813–1855) explored different lifestyles or "spheres of existence" through which people seek meaning in their lives. He warned against an aesthetic lifestyle of pursuing sensory pleasures without ulterior goals, arguing that it leads to a nihilistic outlook marked by meaninglessness. Instead, he recommended a [[leap of faith]] that trusts in God as a higher source of meaning.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lippitt|Evans|2024|loc=§ 3. The 'Spheres of Existence' or 'Stages on Life's Way'}} | {{harvnb|Carlisle|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=lxQLlAM_vrkC&pg=PA21 21–22]}} | {{harvnb|Schulz|2014|pp=135–138}} }}</ref>

[[Arthur Schopenhauer]] (1788–1860) developed a [[Philosophical pessimism|pessimistic philosophy]], characterizing the world as a place of suffering, brought into being by a blind, irrational [[Will (philosophy)#Schopenhauer|will]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Stewart|2023|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oImzEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA9 9, 129–132]}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ Existential Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|p=xx}} }}</ref> Influenced by Schopenhauer, the problem of nihilism took center stage in the thought of [[Friedrich Nietzsche]] (1844–1900). He understood it as a broad cultural phenomenon in which people lose the values and ideals guiding their lives. He explored the causes and consequences of this shift in evaluative outlook, examining reactions to it and ways of overcoming it.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|p=1}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=37–40}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=672}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|pp=xi–xii}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 1. Historical Background}} }}</ref> According to Nietzsche, nihilism often manifests in a distorted form as passive nihilism, masking its life-denying nature behind religious dogmas, conventional morality, and societal norms. Against this tendency, Nietzsche recommended active nihilism, which openly acknowledges the lack of meaning and uses its negative force to dismantle established values.{{efn|This includes his pronouncement that "[[God is dead]]".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=51–52}} | {{harvnb|Gillespie|1996|pp=xi–xii}} }}</ref>}} He saw this as a transitional phase to overcome nihilism in general, leading to a vital [[affirmation of life]] through a [[Transvaluation of values|revaluation of all values]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=37–57}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=Lead section, § 2. Friedrich Nietzsche and Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|pp=672–673}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 1. Historical Background}} }}</ref>

[[File:Heidegger 2 (1960).jpg|thumb|alt=Black-and-white photo of a seated man in a dark suit with white hair.|[[Martin Heidegger]] conceived nihilism as a fundamental historical movement in Western thought.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 2. Friedrich Nietzsche and Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=170–174}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 4. Critical Comment}} | {{harvnb|Diken|2008|p=3}} | {{harvnb|Wrathall|2025|loc=§ 5. The History of Being}} }}</ref>]]

Many subsequent developments in the 20th-century history of nihilism were responses to Nietzsche's philosophy.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|p=57}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=Lead section, § 2. Friedrich Nietzsche and Nihilism, § 5. Conclusion}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=672}} | {{harvnb|Toribio Vazquez|2021|pp=1199–1200, 1206–1207}} }}</ref> [[Martin Heidegger]] (1889–1976) agreed with Nietzsche's description of the pervasive and corrosive nature of nihilism, seeing it as a fundamental historical movement in Western thought reaching back to the ancient period. Interpreting Nietsche's concept of the [[will to power]] and [[The Question Concerning Technology|modern technological developments]], Heidegger came to the conclusion that Nietzsche's attempt to overcome nihilism fails and leads to an even more complete nihilism. As an alternative, Heidegger turned to early [[Presocratic philosophy]] to recover a non-nihilistic understanding of being.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 2. Friedrich Nietzsche and Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=170–174}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 4. Critical Comment}} | {{harvnb|Diken|2008|p=3}} | {{harvnb|Wrathall|2025|loc=§ 5. The History of Being}} }}</ref>

[[Bertrand Russell]] (1872–1970) proposed a view aligned with cosmic nihilism, characterizing humanity as an accidental and insignificant byproduct of cosmic forces that are alien and indifferent to human concerns.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|p=27}} | {{harvnb|Manschreck|1976|p=88}} }}</ref> Against the backdrop of [[World War I]], [[Dadaists]] expressed aspects of nihilism through art, seeking to undermine established norms and values while embracing [[nonsense]] and absurdity.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Manschreck|1976|pp=89–90}} | {{harvnb|Stewart|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oImzEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA18 18]}} | {{harvnb|Toribio Vazquez|2021|pp=1199–1200, 1206–1207}} }}</ref> The question of nihilism and its denial of the meaning of life played a central role for [[Existentialism|existentialist philosophers]].<ref>{{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=81–85}}</ref> [[Jean-Paul Sartre]] (1905–1980) asserted that humans have [[existence precedes essence|no inborn essence]] defining who they are or what their purpose is. He argued that they can overcome this lack of predefined meaning through [[freedom]], proposing that people make their lives meaningful by inventing themselves and their values.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 3. Existential nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=82–85}} }}</ref> In his [[Absurdism|absurdist philosophy]], [[Albert Camus]] (1913–1960) explored the psychological paradox that arises from the inherent drive to seek meaning in an objectively meaningless world. He termed this condition "the absurd" and advocated for a defiant stance or rebellion against the lack of meaning.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=§ 3. Existential nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=32–33}} | {{harvnb|Joyce|2013}} }}</ref>

In the second half of the 20th century, various aspects of nihilism emerged in [[postmodern philosophy]], often in response to Nietzsche and Heidegger.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|pp=xi–xiii, 77, 79, 86}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Gratton|2018|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=88–89}} }}</ref> [[Jacques Derrida]]'s (1930–2004) philosophy of [[deconstruction]] challenged the existence of absolute truth and stable meaning in its attempt to expose the hidden assumptions and biases on which this viewpoint rests.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|pp=78–79}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}} }}</ref> [[Jean-Francois Lyotard]] (1924–1998) explored [[antifoundationalism]], rejecting the existence of universal frameworks of understanding, termed [[metanarratives]]. He aimed to undermine their validity as standards of truth claims, proposing instead that they are merely different [[language game]]s people play without a clear hierarchy prioritizing one language game over the others.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|pp=90–93}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Gratton|2018|loc=Lead section, § 3.2 Justice in light of the Postmodern Condition}} | {{harvnb|Woodward|loc=§ 4b. The Postmodern Condition}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=88–90, 92–93}} }}</ref> Similarly, [[Richard Rorty]] (1931–2007) dismissed the notion of objective truths, suggesting that people rely on their own judgment and creativity instead of privileging established perspectives, like the scientific worldview.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Tartaglia|2020|p=87}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}} }}</ref> Against Nietzsche's and Heidegger's attempts to overcome nihilism, [[Gianni Vattimo]] (1936–2023) embraced it, viewing nihilism as the only viable alternative in the [[postmodern era]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Olson|2000|p=184}} | {{harvnb|Harris|loc=Lead section, § 3. Hermeneutical Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Slocombe|2006|pp=xi, 91}} }}</ref>