Editing Mind (section)

=== Animal ===
It is commonly acknowledged today that animals have some form of mind, but it is controversial to which animals this applies and how their mind differs from the human mind.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carruthers|2019|pp=ix, 29–30}} | {{harvnb|Griffin|1998|pp=53–55}} }}</ref> Different conceptions of the mind lead to different responses to this problem. When understood in a very wide sense as the capacity to process information, the mind is present in all forms of life, including insects, plants, and individual cells.<ref>{{harvnb|Spradlin|Porterfield|2012|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=aynUBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA17 17–18]}}</ref> On the other side of the spectrum are views that deny the existence of mentality in most or all non-human animals based on the idea that they lack key mental capacities, like abstract [[rationality]] and symbolic language.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carruthers|2019|pp=29–30}} | {{harvnb|Steiner|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=nHBEBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA93 93]}} | {{harvnb|Thomas|2020|pp=999–1000}} }}</ref> The status of [[Animal cognition|animal minds]] is highly relevant to the field of [[ethics]] since it affects the treatment of animals, including the topic of [[animal rights]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Griffin|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=K2uXAwAAQBAJ&pg=PR9 ix]}} | {{harvnb|Carruthers|2019|p=ix}} | {{harvnb|Fischer|2021|pp=28–29}} }}</ref>

Discontinuity views state that the minds of non-human animals are fundamentally different from human minds and often point to higher mental faculties, like thinking, reasoning, and deliberate decision-making.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Fischer|2021|pp=30–32}} | {{harvnb|Lurz|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Carruthers|2019|pp=ix, 29–30}} | {{harvnb|Penn|Holyoak|Povinelli|2008|pp=109–110}} }}</ref> This outlook is reflected in the traditionally influential position of defining humans as "[[rational animal]]s" as opposed to all other animals.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Melis|Monsó|2023|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|Rysiew|2012}} }}</ref> Continuity views, by contrast, emphasize similarities and see cognitive differences in degree rather than kind. Central considerations for this position are the shared evolutionary origin and organic similarities on the level of the brain and nervous system. Observable behavior is another key factor, such as problem-solving skills, [[animal communication]], and reactions to and expressions of pain and pleasure. Of particular importance are the questions of consciousness and [[sentience]], that is, to what extent non-human animals have a subjective experience of the world and are capable of suffering and feeling joy.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Fischer|2021|pp=32–35}} | {{harvnb|Lurz|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Griffin|1998|pp=53–55}} | {{harvnb|Carruthers|2019|pp=ix–x}} | {{harvnb|Penn|Holyoak|Povinelli|2008|pp=109–110}} }}</ref>