Editing Military doctrine (section)

===Israel===
{{Further|Israel Defense Forces#Doctrine}}

====Strategic doctrine====
Israel's military doctrine is formed by its small size and lack of [[strategic depth]]. To compensate, it relies on [[deterrence theory|deterrence]], including through a presumed [[Nuclear weapons and Israel|nuclear weapons arsenal]]. It tries to overcome its quantitative disadvantage by staying qualitatively superior.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/doctrine/|title=Strategic Doctrine – Israel|date=25 May 2000|publisher=[[Federation of American Scientists]]|access-date=1 March 2014}}</ref> Its doctrine is based on a strategy of defense but is operationally offensive, by [[pre-emptive war|pre-empting]] enemy threats and securing a quick, decisive victory if deterrence fails. Israel maintains a heightened state of readiness, advanced [[early warning]] systems, and a robust [[military intelligence]] capability to ensure attackers cannot take advantage of Israel's lack of strategic depth.<ref name="Sadeh1997" /> Early warning and speedy victory is also desired because the [[Israel Defense Forces]] rely heavily on [[Reserve duty (Israel)|reservists]] during major wars; lengthy mobilization of reservists is costly to the Israeli economy.<ref name="Kahana2006">{{cite book|last=Kahana|first=Ephraim|title=Historical Dictionary of Israeli Intelligence|url=https://archive.org/details/pdfy-BdOjPqsYSoHgw2U9|access-date=10 July 2014|date=2006-04-19|publisher=Scarecrow Press|isbn=9780810865006|page=xxxix}}</ref> Israeli doctrine is constructed with the assumption that Israel would be largely self-sufficient in its war-fighting, without nearby allies to assist.<ref name="Sadeh1997">{{cite book|last=Sadeh|first=Eligar|title=Militarization and State Power in the Arab–Israeli Conflict: Case Study of Israel, 1948–1982|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TGHcpPPJrswC&pg=PA49|access-date=1 March 2014|date=1997-08-01|publisher=Universal-Publishers|isbn=9780965856461|pages=49–50}}</ref>

Israel's emphasis on operational offense was espoused by its first prime minister, [[David Ben-Gurion]], as early as 1948 (during the  [[1948 Arab–Israeli war]]):
<blockquote>If [the Arabs] attack us as they did this time, we shall transfer the war to the gates of their country. ... We do not intend to conduct ... a static defensive war at the venue where we were attacked. If they attack us again, in the future, we want the war to be waged not in our country, but in the enemy's country, and we want to be not on the defensive but on the attack.<ref>Quoted in Sadeh, p. 53.</ref></blockquote>

[[Yitzhak Rabin]], who was [[Ramatkal|Chief of the IDF Staff]] during the [[Six-Day War]], offered a similar explanation for Israel's pre-emptive beginning to the war:
<blockquote>The basic philosophy of Israel was not to initiate war, unless an [[casus belli|act of war]] was carried out against us. We then lived within the lines prior to the Six-Day War, lines that gave no depth to Israel—and therefore, Israel was in a need, whenever there would be a war, to go immediately on the [[offensive (military)|offensive]]—to carry the war to the enemy's land.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iDWXI8-4fxk| archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211211/iDWXI8-4fxk| archive-date=2021-12-11 | url-status=live|title=Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin Interview with Bill Boggs|publisher=[[YouTube]]|access-date=29 January 2014}}{{cbignore}}</ref></blockquote>

====Tactical doctrine====
[[Israel Defense Forces|IDF]] command has been decentralized since the early days of the state, with junior commanders receiving broad authority within the context of [[mission-type tactics|mission-type orders]].<ref>Sadeh, p. 55.</ref> Israeli junior officer training has emphasized the need to make quick decisions in battle to prepare them appropriately for [[maneuver warfare]].<ref>{{cite book|title=Maneuver Warfare Handbook|author=William S. Lind|publisher=Westview Press|location=Boulder, Colorado|edition=Kindle|series=Westview Special Studies in Military Affairs|year=1985}}. Location 1044.</ref>