Editing Metaphysics (section)

== Criticism <!--'Antimetaphysicalism' and 'Anti-metaphysicalism' redirect here-->==
[[File:Allan Ramsay - David Hume, 1711 - 1776. Historian and philosopher - Google Art Project.jpg|thumb|alt=Oil painting showing David Hume from the front against a dark background, dressed in a red coat with gold embroidery, his left arm resting on a surface|[[David Hume]] criticizes metaphysicians for trying to gain knowledge outside the field of sensory experience.]]

Despite its status as one of the main branches of philosophy, metaphysics has received numerous criticisms questioning its legitimacy as a field of inquiry.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 5. Is Metaphysics Possible?}} | {{harvnb|Manley|2009|pp=1–2}} }}</ref> One criticism argues that metaphysical inquiry is impossible because humans lack the cognitive capacities needed to access the ultimate nature of reality.<ref>{{harvnb|Van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 5. Is Metaphysics Possible?}}</ref> This line of thought leads to [[skepticism]] about the possibility of metaphysical knowledge. Empiricists often follow this idea, like Hume, who asserts that there is no good [[Knowledge#Sources|source of metaphysical knowledge]] since metaphysics lies outside the field of [[Empirical evidence|empirical knowledge]] and relies on dubious intuitions about the realm beyond sensory experience. Arguing that the mind actively structures experience, [[Critique of Pure Reason|Kant criticizes traditional metaphysics]] for its attempt to gain insight into the mind-independent nature of reality. He asserts that knowledge is limited to the realm of possible experience, meaning that humans are not able to decide questions like [[Kant's antinomies#The first antinomy (of space and time)|whether the world has a beginning in time or is infinite]]. A related argument favoring the unreliability of metaphysical theorizing points to the deep and lasting [[Disagreements (epistemology)|disagreements]] about metaphysical issues, suggesting a lack of overall progress.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rea|2021|pp=210–212}} | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|pp=16–17}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=4–5}} | {{harvnb|Willaschek|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=wmjtDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA43 43]}} | {{harvnb|McCormick|loc=Lead section, § 6. Kant's Dialectic }} }}</ref>

Another criticism holds that the problem lies not with human cognitive abilities but with metaphysical statements themselves, which some claim are neither true nor false but [[Meaning (philosophy)|meaningless]]. According to [[Logical positivism|logical positivists]], for instance, the meaning of a statement is given by the procedure used to [[Verificationism|verify]] it, usually through the [[observations]] that would confirm it. Based on this controversial assumption, they argue that metaphysical statements are meaningless since they make no testable predictions about experience.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Van Inwagen|Sullivan|Bernstein|2023|loc=§ 5. Is Metaphysics Possible?}} | {{harvnb|Manley|2009|p=4}} | {{harvnb|Rea|2021|pp=212–215}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|p=5}} }}</ref>

{{anchor|Ontological deflationism}}
A slightly weaker position allows metaphysical statements to have meaning while holding that metaphysical disagreements are merely verbal disputes about different ways to describe the world. According to this view, the disagreement in the metaphysics of composition about whether there are tables or only particles arranged table-wise is a trivial debate about linguistic preferences without any substantive consequences for the nature of reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Manley|2009|pp=1–4}} | {{harvnb|Rea|2021|pp=213–215}} | {{harvnb|Tahko|2015|pp=71–72}} }}</ref> The position that metaphysical disputes have no meaning or no significant point is called ''metaphysical'' or ''ontological deflationism''.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Manley|2009|pp=4, 15, 32}} | {{harvnb|Sider|2009|pp=386–387}} }}</ref> This view is opposed by so-called ''serious metaphysicians'', who contend that metaphysical disputes are about substantial features of the underlying structure of reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Manley|2009|pp=28, 36}} | {{harvnb|Kriegel|2016|pp=272–273}} }}</ref> A closely related debate between ontological [[Philosophical realism|realists]] and anti-realists concerns the question of whether there are any objective facts that determine which metaphysical theories are true.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Chalmers|2009|pp=77–78}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=304–305}} | {{harvnb|Tahko|2015|pp=65–66, 68}} }}</ref> A different criticism, formulated by [[Pragmatism|pragmatists]], sees the fault of metaphysics not in its cognitive ambitions or the meaninglessness of its statements, but in its practical irrelevance and lack of usefulness.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|p=5}} | {{harvnb|Macarthur|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ra7QDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA166 166]}} }}</ref>

[[Martin Heidegger]] criticized traditional metaphysics, saying that it fails to distinguish between individual entities and being as their ontological ground. His attempt to reveal the underlying assumptions and limitations in the history of metaphysics to "overcome metaphysics" influenced [[Jacques Derrida]]'s method of [[deconstruction]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Wheeler|2020|loc=§ 1. Biographical Sketch, § 2.2.1 The Question, § 3.3 Technology}} | {{harvnb|Gilje|Skirbekk|2017|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_I00e3SQAwMC&pg=PA463 463–464]}} | {{harvnb|Holland|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Beaulieu|Kazarian|Sushytska|2014|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=d4PzBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA3 3–4]}} | {{harvnb|George|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Ym7vCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA2 2]}} }}</ref> Derrida employed this approach to criticize metaphysical texts for relying on opposing terms, like presence and absence, which he thought were inherently unstable and contradictory.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Reynolds|loc=Lead Section, § 2. Deconstructive Strategy}} | {{harvnb|Gilje|Skirbekk|2017|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_I00e3SQAwMC&pg=PA463 463–464]}} | {{harvnb|Holland|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref>

There is no consensus about the validity of these criticisms and whether they affect metaphysics as a whole or only certain issues or approaches in it. For example, it could be the case that certain metaphysical disputes are merely verbal while others are substantive.<ref>{{harvnb|Rea|2021|pp=215–216, 223–224}}</ref>