Editing Luftwaffe (section)

==Omissions and failures==
===Lack of aerial defence===
The failure of the Luftwaffe in the Defence of the Reich campaign was a result of a number of factors. The Luftwaffe lacked an effective air defence system early in the war. Hitler's foreign policy had pushed Germany into war before these defences could be fully developed. The Luftwaffe was forced to improvise and construct its defences during the war.

The daylight actions over German-controlled territory were sparse in 1939–1940. The responsibility of the defence of German air space fell to the {{lang|de|Luftgaukommandos}} (air district commands). The defence systems relied mostly on the "flak" arm. The defences were not coordinated and communication was poor. This lack of understanding between the flak and flying branches of the defence would plague the Luftwaffe throughout the war.<ref name="Caldwell and Muller 2007, p. 42">{{harvnb|Caldwell|Muller|2007|p=42}}</ref> Hitler, in particular, wanted the defence to rest on anti-aircraft artillery as it gave the civilian population a "psychological crutch" no matter how ineffective the weapons.<ref name="Murray 1983, p. 132">{{harvnb|Murray|1983|p=132}}</ref>

Most of the battles fought by the Luftwaffe on the Western Front were against [[Circus offensive|the RAF's "Circus" raids]] and the occasional daylight raid into German air space. This was a fortunate position since the Luftwaffe's strategy of focusing its striking power on one front started to unravel with the failure of the invasion of the Soviet Union. The "peripheral" strategy of the Luftwaffe between 1939 and 1940 had been to deploy its fighter defences at the edges of Axis occupied territory, with little protecting the inner depths.<ref name="Caldwell and Muller 2007, p. 46">{{harvnb|Caldwell|Muller|2007|p=46}}</ref> Moreover, the front line units in the West were complaining about the poor numbers and performance of aircraft. Units complained of lack of {{lang|de|Zerstörer}} aircraft with all-weather capabilities and the "lack of climbing power of the Bf 109".<ref name="Caldwell and Muller 2007, p. 46" /> The Luftwaffe's technical edge was slipping as the only formidable new aircraft in the German arsenal was the [[Focke-Wulf Fw 190]]. Milch was to assist Udet with aircraft production increases and the introduction of more modern types of fighter aircraft. However, they explained at a meeting of the Reich Industrial Council on 18 September 1941 that the new next-generation aircraft had failed to materialise, and production of obsolete types had to continue to meet the growing need for replacements.<ref name="Caldwell and Muller 2007, p. 46" />

The buildup of the {{lang|de|[[Jagdwaffe]]}} ("Fighter Force") was too rapid and its quality suffered. It was not put under a unified command until 1943, which also affected the performance of the nine {{lang|de|Jagdgeschwader}} fighter wings in existence in 1939. No further units were formed until 1942, and the years of 1940–1941 were wasted. The OKL failed to construct a strategy; instead, its command style was reactionary, and its measures not as effective without thorough planning. This was particularly apparent with the ''[[Focke-Wulf Fw 190 operational history|Sturmböck]]'' squadrons, formed to replace the increasingly ineffective twin-engined {{lang|de|Zerstörer}} heavy fighter wings as the primary defence against USAAF daylight raids. The {{lang|de|Sturmböcke}} flew Fw 190A fighters armed with heavy 20mm and 30mm cannon to destroy heavy bombers, but this increased the weight and affected the performance of the Fw 190 at a time when the aircraft were meeting large numbers of equal if not superior Allied types.<ref>{{harvnb|Caldwell|Muller|2007|p=286}}</ref>

Daytime aerial defence against the USAAF's strongly defended heavy bomber forces, particularly the [[Eighth Air Force]] and the [[Fifteenth Air Force]], had its successes through the calendar year of 1943. But at the start of 1944, [[Jimmy Doolittle#Escort fighter tactics|Eighth AF commander Jimmy Doolittle made a major change in offensive fighter tactics]], which defeated the Luftwaffe's day fighter force from that time onwards. Steadily increasing numbers of the superlative [[North American P-51 Mustang]] single-engine fighter, leading the USAAF's bombers into German airspace defeated first the {{lang|de|[[Heavy fighter#Germany|Bf 110 Zerstörer]]}} wings, then the [[Focke-Wulf Fw 190 operational history#The Sturmböcke|Fw 190A Sturmböcke]].

===Development and equipment===
[[File:Heinkel He 177A-02 in flight 1942.jpg|left|thumb|The most troublesome of all German designs during WWII – both in development and in service – was the [[Heinkel He 177 Greif|He 177]]A {{lang|de|Greif}} heavy bomber.]]
In terms of technological development, the failure to develop a long-range bomber and capable long-range fighters during this period left the Luftwaffe unable to conduct a meaningful strategic bombing campaign throughout the war.<ref>{{harvnb|Bergström|2007|p=118}}</ref> However, Germany at that time suffered from limitations in raw materials such as oil and aluminum, which meant that there were insufficient resources for much beyond a tactical air force: given these circumstances, the Luftwaffe's reliance on tactical mid-range, twin-engined medium bombers and short-range dive-bombers was a pragmatic choice of strategy.<ref>{{harvnb|Homze|1976|p=123}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Bergström|2007|p=108}}</ref> It might also be argued that the Luftwaffe's {{lang|de|Kampfgeschwader}} medium and heavy bomber wings were perfectly capable of attacking strategic targets, but the lack of capable long-range escort fighters left the bombers unable to carry out their missions effectively against determined and well-organised fighter opposition.<ref name="Corum 1997, p. 282">{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=282}}</ref>

The greatest failure for the {{lang|de|Kampfgeschwader}}, however, was being saddled with an aircraft intended as a capable four-engined heavy bomber: the perpetually troubled Heinkel He 177, whose engines were [[Heinkel He 177#Engine difficulties|prone to catch fire]] in flight. Of the three parallel proposals from the Heinkel engineering departments for a four-engined version of the A-series He 177 [[Heinkel He 277#Trio of separate efforts|by February 1943]], one of these being [[Heinkel He 277|the Heinkel firm's ''Amerikabomber'' candidate]], only one, the [[Heinkel He 177#Further development: the Heinkel He 177B|He 177B]], emerged in the concluding months of 1943. Only three airworthy prototypes of the B-series He 177 design were produced by early 1944, by which point the [[Avro Lancaster]], the most successful RAF heavy bomber, was already in widespread service.

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1978-043-02, Focke-Wulf Fw 200 C Condor.jpg|thumb|upright=0.7|Arguably, one of the greatest tactical failures was the neglect of naval aviation in the western theatre, 1939–1941 (pictured is a [[Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor|Focke-Wulf Fw 200]] C Condor).]]

Another failure of procurement and equipment was the lack of a dedicated [[Naval aviation|naval air arm]]. Felmy had already expressed a desire to build a naval air arm to support {{lang|de|Kriegsmarine}} operations in the Atlantic and British waters. Britain was dependent on food and raw materials from its Empire and North America. Felmy pressed this case firmly throughout 1938 and 1939, and, on 31 October 1939, {{lang|de|[[Grand admiral|Großadmiral]]}} [[Erich Raeder]] sent a strongly worded letter to Göring in support of such proposals. The early-war twin-engined [[Heinkel He 115]] floatplane and [[Dornier Do 18]] [[flying boat]] were too slow and short-ranged. The then-contemporary [[Blohm & Voss BV 138]] {{lang|de|Seedrache}} ("seadragon") flying boat became the Luftwaffe's primary seaborne maritime patrol platform, with nearly 300 examples built; it had a 4,300 km (2,670 mi) maximum range. Another Blohm und Voss design of 1940, the enormous, 46-meter wingspan [[Blohm & Voss BV 222]] {{lang|de|Wiking}} maritime patrol flying boat was capable of a 6,800 km (4,200-mile) range at maximum endurance. The [[Dornier Do 217]] would have been ideal as a land-based choice but suffered production problems.{{cn|date=December 2023}} Raeder also complained about the poor standard of aerial torpedoes, although their design was the responsibility of the {{lang|de|Kriegsmarine}}, even considering production of the Japanese [[Type 91 torpedo#Provision of the aerial torpedo technology to Germany|Type 91 torpedo]] used in the [[Attack on Pearl Harbor]] as the {{lang|de|Lufttorpedo}} '''LT 850''' by August 1942.{{Efn| see [[Yanagi missions]] and [[Heinkel He 111 operational history#Torpedo bomber operations|Heinkel He 111 torpedo bomber operations]]}}<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=281}}</ref>

Without specialised naval or land-based, purpose-designed maritime patrol aircraft, the Luftwaffe was forced to improvise. The [[Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor]] – developed as a civilian airliner  – lacked the structural strength for combat maneuvering at lower altitudes, making it unsuitable for use as a bomber in maritime patrol duties. The Condor lacked speed, armor and bomb load capacity. Sometimes the fuselage literally "broke its back" or a wing panel dropped loose from the [[wing root]] after a hard landing. Nevertheless, it was adapted for the long-range reconnaissance and anti-shipping roles and, between August 1940 and February 1941, Fw 200s sank 85 vessels for a claimed total of 363,000 GRT. Had the Luftwaffe focused on naval aviation – particularly maritime patrol aircraft with long range, Germany might well have been in a position to win the [[Battle of the Atlantic]].{{cn|date=December 2023}} However, Raeder and the {{lang|de|Kriegsmarine}} failed to press for naval air power until the war began, mitigating the Luftwaffe's responsibility. At the same time Göring regarded any other branch of the German military developing its own aviation as an encroachment on his authority and continually frustrated the navy's attempts to build its own airpower.<ref name="Corum 1997, p. 282"/>

The absence of a strategic bomber force for the Luftwaffe, following Wever's death in 1936 and the end of the Ural bomber programme was not addressed until the authorisation of the "[[Bomber B]]" design competition in July 1939, which sought to replace the medium bomber force with which the Luftwaffe would begin the war, and the partly achieved {{lang|de|[[Schnellbomber]]}} high-speed medium bomber concept with more advanced, twin-engined high-speed bomber aircraft fitted with pairs of relatively [[Bomber B#High-output engines|"high-power" engines]] of 1,500 kW (2,000 hp) and upwards as a follow-on to the earlier {{lang|de|Schnellbomber}} project, that would also be able to function as shorter-range heavy bombers.

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-B19957, Edgar Petersen.jpg|thumb|upright|left|{{lang|de|Oberst}} [[Edgar Petersen]], head of the Luftwaffe's {{lang|de|Erprobungsstellen}} network of test facilities late in the war]] 

The spring 1942 {{lang|de|[[Amerikabomber]]}} programme sought to produce strategic bomber designs for the Luftwaffe to directly attack the United States from Europe or the Azores. Inevitably, both the ''Bomber B'' and {{lang|de|Amerikabomber}} programmes were victims of the continued emphasis of the {{lang|de|Wehrmacht}} combined military's insistence for its Luftwaffe air arm to support the {{lang|de|Heer}} as its primary mission, and the damage to the German aviation industry from Allied bomber attacks.

====Challenges in directly addressing combat pilots' issues====
The RLM's apparent lack of a dedicated "technical-tactical" department, that would have directly been in contact with combat pilots to assess their needs for weaponry upgrades and tactical advice, had never been seriously envisioned as a critically ongoing necessity in the planning of the original German air arm.<ref name="Caldwell and Muller 2007, p. 287">{{harvnb|Caldwell|Muller|2007|p=287}}</ref> The RLM did have its own ''Technisches Amt'' (T-Amt) department to handle aviation technology issues, but this was tasked with handling all aviation technology issues in Nazi Germany, both military and civilian in nature, and also not known to have ever had any clear and actively administrative and consultative links with the front-line forces established for such purposes. On the front-line combat side of the issue, and for direct contact with the German aviation firms making the Luftwaffe's warplanes, the Luftwaffe did have its own reasonably effective system of four military aviation test facilities, or {{lang|de|Erprobungstellen}} located at three coastal sites – [[Peenemünde Airfield|Peenemünde-West]] (also incorporating a separate facility in nearby [[Karlshagen]]), [[Tarnewitz test site|Tarnewitz]] and [[Priwall Peninsula|Travemünde]] – and the central inland site of [[Müritz Airpark|Rechlin]], itself first established as a military airfield in late August 1918 by the German Empire, with the four-facility system commanded later in World War II by {{lang|de|Oberst}} [[Edgar Petersen]]. However, due to lack of co-ordination between the RLM and the OKL, all fighter and bomber development was oriented toward short-range aircraft, as they could be produced in greater numbers, rather than quality long-range aircraft, something that put the Luftwaffe at a disadvantage [[Aircraft of the Battle of Britain#German fighter fuel capacity|as early as the Battle of Britain]].<ref name="Caldwell and Muller 2007, p. 287"/> The "ramp-up" to production levels required to fulfill the Luftwaffe's front-line needs was also slow, not reaching maximum output until 1944.<ref name="Caldwell and Muller 2007, p. 287"/> 

Production of fighters was not given priority until the [[Emergency Fighter Program]] was begun in 1944; [[Adolf Galland]] commented that this should have occurred at least a year earlier.<ref name="Caldwell and Muller 2007, p. 287"/> Galland also pointed to the mistakes and challenges made in the development of the [[Messerschmitt Me 262]] including the protracted development time required for its [[Junkers Jumo 004]] jet engines to achieve reliability. German combat aircraft types that were first designed and flown in the mid-1930s had become obsolete, yet were kept in production, in particular the Ju 87 Stuka, and the Bf 109, because there were no well-developed replacement designs.<ref name="Caldwell and Muller 2007, p. 287"/>

===Production failures===
The failure of German production was evident from the start of the Battle of Britain. By the end of 1940, the Luftwaffe had suffered heavy losses and needed to regroup. Deliveries of new aircraft were insufficient to meet the drain on resources; the Luftwaffe, unlike the RAF, was failing to expand its pilot and aircraft numbers.<ref name="Overy 1980, p. 32">{{harvnb|Overy|1980|p=32}}</ref> This was partly owing to production planning failures before the war and the demands of the army. Nevertheless, the German aircraft industry was being outproduced in 1940. In terms of fighter aircraft production, the British exceeded their production plans by 43%, while the Germans remained 40% "behind" target by summer 1940. In fact, German production in fighters fell from 227 to 177 per month between July and September 1940.<ref name="Overy 1980, p. 32"/> One of the many reasons for the failure of the Luftwaffe in 1940 was that it did not have the operational and material means to destroy the British aircraft industry,<ref>{{harvnb|Overy|1980|p=33}}</ref> something that the much-anticipated ''Bomber B'' design competition was intended to address.

The so-called "Göring programme", had largely been predicated on the defeat of the Soviet Union in 1941. After the {{lang|de|Wehrmacht}}<nowiki/>'s failure in front of Moscow, industrial priorities for a possibility in increasing aircraft production were largely abandoned in favor to support the army's increased attrition rates and heavy equipment losses.<ref name="Murray 1983, p. 133">{{harvnb|Murray|1983|p=133}}</ref> Milch's reforms expanded production rates. In 1941 an average of 981 aircraft (including 311 fighters) were produced each month.<ref name="Murray 1983, p. 133" /> In 1942 this rose to 1,296 aircraft of which 434 were fighters.<ref name="Murray 1983, p. 133" /> Milch's planned production increases were initially opposed. But in June, he was granted materials for 900 fighters per month as the average output. By the summer of 1942, the {{lang|de|Luftwaffe's}} operational fighter force had recovered from a low of 39% (44% for fighters and 31% for bombers) in the winter of 1941–1942, to 69% by late June (75% for fighters and 66% for bombers) in 1942. However, after increased commitments in the east, overall operational ready rates fluctuated between 59% and 65% for the remaining year.<ref name="Murray 1983, p. 138">{{harvnb|Murray|1983|p=138}}</ref> Throughout 1942 the Luftwaffe was out produced in fighter aircraft by 250% and in twin-engine aircraft by 196%.<ref name="Murray 1983, p. 139">{{harvnb|Murray|1983|p=139}}</ref>

The appointment of [[Albert Speer]] as Minister of Armaments increased production of existing designs and the few new designs that had originated from earlier in the war. However, the intensification of Allied bombing caused the dispersion of production and prevented an efficient acceleration of expansion. German aviation production reached about 36,000 combat aircraft for 1944. However, by the time this was achieved the Luftwaffe lacked the fuel and trained pilots to make this achievement worthwhile.<ref name="Murray 1983, pp. 253-255">{{harvnb|Murray|1983|pp=253–255}}</ref>

The failure to maximise production immediately after the failures in the Soviet Union and North Africa ensured the Luftwaffe's effective defeat in the period of September 1943 – February 1944. Despite the tactical victories won, they failed to achieve a decisive victory. By the time production reached acceptable levels, as so many other factors had for the Luftwaffe – and for the entire {{lang|de|Wehrmacht}}<nowiki/>'s weapons and ordnance technology as a whole – late in the war, it was "too little, too late".<ref name="Murray 1983, pp. 253-255" />

===Engine development===
[[File:Daimler Benz DB 610.jpg|thumb|right|A restored DB 610 "power system" engine, comprising a pair of DB 605 inverted V12s – the top of its central space-frame motor-mount structure can be seen.]]
By the late 1930s, [[airframe]] construction methods had progressed to the point where airframes could be built to any required size,<ref>founded on the all-metal airframe design technologies pioneered by [[Hugo Junkers]] [[Junkers J 1]] in 1915</ref> especially in Germany with aircraft like the [[Dornier Do X]] flying boat and the [[Junkers G.38|Junkers G 38]] airliner. However, powering such designs was a major challenge. Mid-1930s aero engines were limited to about 600 hp and the first 1000 hp engines were just entering the prototype stage{{snd}}for Nazi Germany's then-new Luftwaffe air arm, this meant liquid-cooled inverted V12 designs like the [[Daimler-Benz DB 601]].<ref>Mantelli-Brown- Kittel-Graf 2019 pp. 23–24.</ref>

Nazi Germany's initial need for substantially more powerful aviation engines originated with the private venture [[Heinkel He 119]] high-speed reconnaissance design, and the [[Messerschmitt Me 261]] for maritime reconnaissance duties. To give enough power in each engine installation, Daimler-Benz coupled two DB 601 engines as single "power system" with the propeller gear reduction housing across the front ends of the two engines. The combined powerplant, known as the DB 606, gave {{convert|2,700|PS}} maximum output in February 1937, for a total weight of around 1.5 tonnes.<ref name="weldedtogether-606">{{harvnb|Griehl|Dressel|1998|p=224}}</ref>

Daimler-Benz's was at the same time developing a 1,500 kW class [[X engine|X-configuration]] engine design resulting in the twenty-four cylinder [[Daimler-Benz DB 604]] (four banks of six cylinders each). Possessing essentially the same displacement of {{convert|46.5|L|in3}} as the initial version of the liquid-cooled [[Junkers Jumo 222]] multibank engine, six banks of four inline cylinders apiece instead; coincidentally, both the original Jumo 222 design and the DB 604 each weighed about a third less (at some {{convert|1,080|kg|lb|disp=or}} of dry weight) than the DB 606. The DB 604's protracted development was diverting valuable German aviation powerplant research resources, and with more development of the "twinned-[[Daimler-Benz DB 605|DB 605]]" based DB 610 coupled engine (itself initiated in June 1940 with a top output level of {{cvt|2950|PS}},<ref name="weldedtogether-606" /> and brought together in the same way – with the same all-up weight of 1.5 tonnes – as the DB 606 had been) giving improved results at the time, the Reich Air Ministry stopped all work on the DB 604 in September 1942.<ref>{{cite book |last1=von Gersdorff |first1=Kyrill |last2=Schubert |first2=Helmut |title=Die deutsche Luftfahrt: Flugmotoren und Strahltriebwerke. |language=de |year=2007 |publisher=Bernard & Graefe Verlag |location=Bonn |isbn=978-3-7637-6128-9}}</ref> Such "coupled powerplants" were the exclusive choice of power for the [[Heinkel He 177 Greif|Heinkel He 177A ''Greif'']] heavy bomber, mistasked from its beginnings in being intended to do moderate-angle "dive bombing" for a 30-meter wingspan class, heavy bomber design – the twin nacelles for a pair of DB 606s or 610s did reduce drag for such a combat "requirement", but the poor design of the He 177A's engine accommodations for these twin-crankcase "power systems" caused [[Heinkel He 177#Engine difficulties|repeated outbreaks of engine fires]], causing the "dive bombing" requirement for the He 177A to be cancelled by mid-September 1942.<ref>{{harvnb|Griehl|Dressel|1998|p=54}}</ref>

BMW worked on what was essentially an enlarged version of its highly successful [[BMW 801]] design from the [[Focke-Wulf Fw 190]]A. This led to the 53.7-litre displacement [[BMW 802]] in 1943, an eighteen-cylinder air-cooled radial, weighing {{convert|1530|kg|abbr=on}} matching that of the 24-cylinder liquid-cooled inline DB 606; and the even larger, 83.5-litre displacement [[BMW 803]] 28-cylinder liquid-cooled radial, which from post-war statements from BMW development personnel were each considered to be "secondary priority" development programmes at best.{{Cn|date=December 2023}} This situation with the 802 and 803 designs led to the company's engineering personnel being redirected to place all efforts on improving the 801 to develop it to its full potential.<ref>{{cite magazine |last=Fedden |first=Sir Roy |date=6 December 1945 |title=German Piston-Engine Progress |page=603 |magazine=Flight Magazine |location=London, UK |publisher=Flightglobal}}</ref> The BMW 801F radial development, through its use of features coming from the 801E subtype, was able to substantially exceed the over-1,500 kW output level.{{sfn|Christopher|2013|pp=80–81}}

The twinned-up [[Daimler-Benz DB 601]]-based, 1,750 kW output DB 606, and its more powerful descendant, the 2,130 kW output DB 605-based DB 610, weighing some 1.5 tonnes apiece, were the only 1,500 kW-plus output level aircraft powerplants to ever be produced by Germany for Luftwaffe combat aircraft, mostly for the Heinkel He 177A heavy bomber. Even the largest-displacement inverted V12 aircraft powerplant built in Germany, the 44.52-litre (2,717 cu. in.) [[Daimler-Benz DB 603]], which saw widespread use in twin-engined designs, could not exceed 1,500 kW output without more development. By March 1940, even the DB 603 was being "twinned-up"<ref name="weldedtogether-606" /> as the 601/606 and 605/610 had been, to become their replacement "power system": this was the strictly experimental, approximately 1.8-tonne weight apiece, twin-crankcase DB 613; capable of over 2,570 kW (3,495 PS) output, but which never left its test phase.{{Citation needed|date=January 2021}}

The proposed over-1,500 kW output subtypes of German aviation industry's existing piston aviation engine designs—which adhered to using just a single crankcase that ''were'' able to substantially exceed the aforementioned over-1,500 kW output level—were the DB 603 LM (1,800 kW at take-off, in production), the DB 603 N (2,205 kW at take-off, planned for 1946) and the BMW 801F (1,765 kW (2,400 PS) engines. The pioneering nature of jet engine technology in the 1940s resulted in numerous development problems for both of Germany's major jet engine designs to see mass production, the [[Junkers Jumo 004|Jumo 004]] and [[BMW 003]] (both [[Axial compressor|axial flow]] designs), with the more powerful [[Heinkel HeS 011]] never leaving the test phase.{{sfn|Christopher|2013|p=74}}

===Personnel and leadership===
The bomber arm was given preference and received the "better" pilots. Later, fighter pilot leaders were few in numbers as a result of this. As with the late shift to fighter production, the Luftwaffe pilot schools did not give the fighter pilot schools preference soon enough. The Luftwaffe, the OKW argued, was still an offensive weapon, and its primary focus was on producing bomber pilots. This attitude prevailed until the second half of 1943.<ref name="Caldwell and Muller 2007, p. 287"/> During the Defence of the Reich campaign in 1943 and 1944, there were not enough commissioned fighter pilots and leaders to meet attrition rates;<ref name="Caldwell and Muller 2007, p. 287"/> as the need arose to replace aircrew (as attrition rates increased), the quality of [[Defence of the Reich#Pilot selection and training|pilot training deteriorated]] rapidly. Later this was made worse by fuel shortages for pilot training caused by the [[Oil campaign of World War II|Allied strategic bombing campaign against German oil production]]. Overall this meant reduced training on operational types, formation flying, gunnery training, and combat training, and a total lack of instrument training.<ref name="Caldwell and Muller 2007, p. 287"/>

At the beginning of the war, commanders were replaced with younger commanders too quickly. These younger commanders had to learn "in the field" rather than entering a front-line post fully qualified. Training of formation leaders was not systematic until 1943, which was far too late, with the Luftwaffe already stretched. The Luftwaffe thus lacked a cadre of staff officers to set up new combat units with carefully selected and skilled combat personnel, and pass on experience.<ref name="Caldwell and Muller 2007, p. 287"/>

Moreover, Luftwaffe leadership from the start poached the training command, which undermined its ability to replace losses,<ref name="Ketley and Rolfe, p. 4" /> while also planning for "short sharp campaigns",<ref name="Ketley and Rolfe, p. 8">{{harvnb|Ketley|Rolfe |1996|p=8}}</ref> which did not pertain. Moreover, no plans were laid for [[night fighter]]s.<ref name="Ketley and Rolfe, p. 8"/> In fact, when protests were raised, [[Hans Jeschonnek]], Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe, said, "First we've got to beat Russia, then we can start training!"<ref>{{harvnb|Ketley|Rolfe |1996|loc=quoted p. 4}}</ref>