Editing Louis Althusser (section)

===Ideological state apparatuses===
{{Main|Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses}}
Because Althusser held that a person's desires, choices, intentions, preferences, judgements, and so forth are the effects of social practices, he believed it necessary to conceive of how society makes the individual in its own image. Within capitalist societies, the human individual is generally regarded as a subject—a self-conscious, "responsible" agent whose actions can be explained by their beliefs and thoughts. For Althusser, a person's capacity to perceive themselves in this way is not innate. Rather, it is acquired within the structure of established social practices, which impose on individuals the role (''forme'') of a subject.<ref>As Althusser states, "No human, i.e. social individual can be the agent of a practice if he does not have the ''form of a subject''. The 'subject-form' is actually the form of the historical existence of every individual, of every agent of social practices." Althusser, L. (1973), "Reply to John Lewis" in ''Essays in Self-Criticism'' (1976), pp. 33–100, 95. {{ISBN|0-902308-87-4}}</ref> Social practices both determine the characteristics of the individual and give them an idea of the range of properties they can have, and of the limits of each individual. Althusser argues that many roles and activities are acquired and learned by social practice: for example, the production of steelworkers is a part of economic practice, while the production of lawyers is part of politico-legal practice. However, other characteristics of individuals, such as their beliefs about [[Eudaimonia|the good life]] or their [[metaphysics|metaphysical]] reflections on the nature of the self, do not easily fit into these categories.

In Althusser's view, values, desires, and preferences are inculcated in by ideological practice, the sphere which has the defining property of constituting individuals as subjects.<ref>Althusser, L. (1970), "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" in ''Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays'' (1971), pp. 121–76, 160. {{ISBN|0-902308-89-0}}</ref> Ideological practice consists of an assortment of institutions called "[[ideological state apparatuses]]" (ISAs), which include the family, the media, religious organizations, and most importantly in capitalist societies, the education system, as well as the received ideas that they propagate.<ref>Althusser, L. (1970), "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses", 135–39</ref> No single ISA produces in people the belief of self-conscious agents. Instead, this belief is derived from learning what it is to be a daughter, a schoolchild, black, a steelworker, a councillor, and so forth.

Despite its many institutional forms, the function and structure of ideology is unchanging and present throughout history;<ref>Althusser, L. (1970), "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses", 152</ref> as Althusser states, "ideology has no history".<ref>Althusser, L. (1970), "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses", 150</ref> All ideologies constitute a subject, even though he or she may differ according to each particular ideology. Memorably, Althusser illustrates this with the concept of "hailing" or "[[interpellation (philosophy)|interpellation]]". He compares ideology to a policeman shouting "Hey you there!" toward a person walking on the street. Upon hearing this call, the person responds by turning around and in doing so, is transformed into a subject.<ref>Althusser, L. (1970), "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses", 163.</ref> The person being hailed recognizes themselves as the subject of the hail, and knows to respond.<ref>Althusser, L. (1970), "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses", 163</ref> Althusser calls this recognition a "mis-recognition" (''méconnaissance''),<ref>Althusser, L. (1970), "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses", 161</ref> because it works retroactively: a material individual is [[always already]] an ideological subject, even before he or she is born.<ref name="Althusser, L. 1970">Althusser, L. (1970), "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses", 164</ref> The "transformation" of an individual into a subject has always already happened; Althusser here acknowledges a debt to [[Spinoza]]'s theory of [[immanence]].<ref name="Althusser, L. 1970"/>

To highlight this, Althusser offers the example of Christian religious ideology, embodied in the Voice of [[God]], instructing a person on what their place in the world is and what he must do to be reconciled with [[Christ]].<ref>Althusser, L. (1970), "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses", 166</ref> From this, Althusser draws the point that in order for that person to identify as a Christian, he must first already be a subject; that is, by responding to God's call and following His rules, he affirms himself as a free agent, the author of the acts for which he assumes responsibility.<ref>Althusser, L. (1970), "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses", 169</ref> People cannot recognize themselves outside ideology, and in fact, their very actions reach out to this overarching structure. Althusser's theory draws heavily from Jacques Lacan and his concept of the [[Mirror Stage]]<ref>Althusser, L. (1970), "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses", 162</ref>—people acquire their identities by seeing themselves mirrored in ideologies.<ref>Althusser, L. (1970), "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses", 168</ref>