Editing John Stuart Mill (section)

===Theory of liberty===
{{Liberalism sidebar}}
{{Radicalism sidebar|people}}
{{Main|On Liberty}}
Mill's ''[[On Liberty]]'' (1859) addresses the nature and limits of the [[Power (philosophy)|power]] that can be legitimately exercised by society over the [[individual]]. Mill's idea is that only if a democratic society follows the Principle of Liberty can its political and social institutions fulfill their role of shaping national character so that its citizens can realise the permanent interests of people as progressive beings. (Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, p. 289)

Mill states the Principle of Liberty as: "the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection." "The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant."<ref name="handle21">Mill, John Stuart. [1859] 1869. ''On Liberty'' (4th ed.). London: [[Longman|Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer]], [https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.hn3phv?urlappend=%3Bseq=25 pp. 21–22]. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221117165326/https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/imgsrv/html?id=hvd.hn3phv;seq=22|date=17 November 2022}}.</ref>

One way to read Mill's Principle of Liberty as a principle of public reason is to see it excluding certain kinds of reasons from being taken into account in legislation, or in guiding the moral coercion of public opinion. (Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, p. 291) These reasons include those founded in other persons good; reasons of excellence and ideals of human perfection; reasons of dislike or disgust, or of preference.

Mill states that "harms" which may be prevented include acts of [[Omission (law)|omission]] as well as acts of commission. Thus, failing to rescue a [[drowning]] child counts as a harmful act, as does failing to pay [[taxes]], or failing to appear as a [[witness]] in court. All such harmful omissions may be regulated, according to Mill. By contrast, it does not count as harming someone if—without force or fraud—the affected individual [[consent]]s to assume the risk: thus one may permissibly offer unsafe employment to others, provided there is no deception involved. He does, however, recognise one limit to consent: society should not permit people to [[Voluntary slavery|sell themselves into slavery]].

The question of what counts as a self-regarding action and what actions, whether of omission or commission, constitute harmful actions subject to regulation, continues to exercise interpreters of Mill. He did not consider giving offence to constitute "harm"; an action could not be restricted because it violated the conventions or morals of a given society.<ref name=":4">Mill, John Stuart. [1859] 2001. ''[https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/mill/liberty.pdf On Liberty]. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191114024129/https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/mill/liberty.pdf|date=14 November 2019}}''. Kitchener, ON: Batoche Books. Retrieved 17 June 2020.</ref>
[[File:J S Mill and H Taylor.jpg|thumb|right|upright=1.15|John Stuart Mill and [[Helen Taylor (feminist)|Helen Taylor]]. Helen was the daughter of Harriet Taylor and collaborated with Mill for fifteen years after her mother's death in 1858.]]

====Social liberty and tyranny of majority====
Mill believed that "the struggle between [[Liberty]] and [[Authority]] is the most conspicuous feature in the portions of history."<ref name="OnLiberty-Bartleby">{{cite web|url=https://www.bartleby.com/130/1.html|title=I. Introductory. Mill, John Stuart. 1869. On Liberty|website=bartleby.com|access-date=16 July 2018}}</ref> For him, liberty in antiquity was a "contest...between subjects, or some classes of subjects, and the government."<ref name="OnLiberty-Bartleby" />

Mill defined ''[[social liberty]]'' as protection from "the [[tyranny]] of political rulers". He introduced a number of different concepts of the form tyranny can take, referred to as social tyranny, and ''[[tyranny of the majority]]''. ''Social liberty'' for Mill meant putting limits on the ruler's power so that he would not be able to use that power to further his own wishes and thus make decisions that could harm society. In other words, people should have the right to have a say in the government's decisions. He said that ''social liberty'' was "the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual." It was attempted in two ways: first, by obtaining recognition of certain immunities (called [[Political liberty|''political liberties'']] or [[Civil and political rights|''rights'']]); and second, by establishment of a system of "[[constitutional]] checks".

However, in Mill's view, limiting the power of government was not enough:<ref>Mill, John Stuart. [1859] 2006. ''[[On Liberty]].'' [[Penguin Classics]]. {{ISBN|978-0141441474}}. pp. 10–11.</ref><blockquote>Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself.</blockquote>

====Liberty====
Mill's view on [[liberty]], which was influenced by [[Joseph Priestley]] and [[Josiah Warren]], is that [[individuals]] ought to be free to do as they wished unless they caused harm to others. Individuals are rational enough to make decisions about their well-being. Government should interfere when it is for the protection of society. Mill explained:<ref name="handle21"/>

<blockquote>The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. ... The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns him, his independence is, of right, [[Absolute (philosophy)|absolute]]. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the [[individual]] is [[sovereignty|sovereign]].</blockquote>

====Freedom of speech====
''On Liberty'' involves an impassioned defence of [[free speech]]. Mill argues that free [[discourse]] is a [[necessary condition]] for intellectual and [[social progress]]. We can never be sure, he contends, that a silenced opinion does not contain some element of the truth. He also argues that allowing people to air false opinions is productive for two reasons. First, individuals are more likely to abandon erroneous beliefs if they are engaged in an open [[exchange of ideas]]. Second, by forcing other individuals to re-examine and re-affirm their beliefs in the process of debate, these beliefs are kept from declining into mere [[dogma]]. It is not enough for Mill that one simply has an unexamined belief that happens to be true; one must understand why the belief in question is the true one. Along those same lines Mill wrote, "unmeasured vituperation, employed on the side of prevailing opinion, really does deter people from expressing contrary opinions, and from listening to those who express them."<ref>Mill, John Stuart. [1859] 1909. "[[iarchive:harvardclassics25eliouoft/page/194/mode/2up|On Liberty]]". pp. 195–290 in ''[[Harvard Classics]]'' 25, edited by [[Charles William Eliot|C. W. Eliot]]. New York: [[P.F. Collier and Son|PF Collier & Son]]. [[iarchive:harvardclassics25eliouoft/page/248/mode/2up|p. 248]].</ref><ref name=":4" />{{Rp|51}}

As an influential advocate of freedom of speech, Mill objected to censorship:<ref>Mill, John Stuart. [1859] 1985. ''On Liberty'', edited by [[Gertrude Himmelfarb|G. Himmelfarb]], UK: [[Penguin Books|Penguin]]. pp. 83–84.</ref>

<blockquote>I choose, by preference the cases which are least favourable to me—in which the argument opposing freedom of opinion, both on truth and that of [[utility]], is considered the strongest. Let the opinions impugned be the belief in God and in a future state, or any of the commonly received doctrines of morality. ... But I must be permitted to observe, that it is not the feeling sure of a doctrine (be it what it may) which I call an assumption of [[infallibility]]. It is the undertaking to decide that question ''for others'', without allowing them to hear what can be said on the contrary side. And I denounce and reprobate this pretension not the less, if put forth on the side of my most solemn convictions. However positive any one's persuasion may be, not only of the falsity, but of the pernicious consequences–not only of the pernicious consequences, but (to adopt expressions which I altogether condemn) the immorality and impiety of an opinion; yet if, in pursuance of that private judgment, though backed by the public judgment of his country or his contemporaries, he prevents the opinion from being heard in its defence, he assumes infallibility. And so far from the assumption being less objectionable or less dangerous because the opinion is called immoral or impious, this is the case of all others in which it is most fatal.</blockquote>

Mill outlines the benefits of "searching for and discovering the truth" as a way to further knowledge. He argued that even if an opinion is false, the truth can be better understood by refuting the error. And as most opinions are neither completely true nor completely false, he points out that allowing free expression allows the airing of competing views as a way to preserve partial truth in various opinions.<ref name="Freedomof">Paul, Ellen Frankel, Fred Dycus Miller, and Jeffrey Paul. 2004. ''Freedom of Speech'' 21. [[Cambridge University Press]].</ref> Worried about minority views being suppressed, he argued in support of freedom of speech on political grounds, stating that it is a critical component for a [[representative government]] to have to empower debate over [[public policy]].<ref name="Freedomof" /> He also eloquently argued that freedom of expression allows for [[personal growth]] and [[self-realization]]. He said that freedom of speech was a vital way to develop talents and realise a person's potential and creativity. He repeatedly said that eccentricity was preferable to uniformity and stagnation.<ref name="Freedomof" />

====Harm principle====
The belief that freedom of speech would advance society [[presupposed]] a society sufficiently culturally and institutionally advanced to be capable of progressive improvement. If any argument is really wrong or harmful, the public will judge it as wrong or harmful, and then those arguments cannot be sustained and will be excluded. Mill argued that even any arguments which are used in justifying murder or [[rebellion]] against the government should not be [[Political repression|politically suppressed]] or [[Persecution|socially persecuted]]. According to him, if rebellion is really necessary, people should rebel; if murder is truly proper, it should be allowed. However, the way to express those arguments should be a [[public speech]] or writing, not in a way that causes actual harm to others. Such is the ''[[harm principle]]'': "That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others."<ref>Mill, John Stuart. [1859] 1863. ''On Liberty''. [[Ticknor and Fields]]. p. 23.</ref>

At the beginning of the 20th century, [[Associate justice]] [[Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.]] made the standard of "clear and present danger" based on Mill's idea. In the majority opinion, Holmes writes:

<blockquote> The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.<ref>''[[Schenck v. United States]]'', 249 U.S. 47 (1919).</ref></blockquote>

Holmes suggested that falsely [[Shouting fire in a crowded theater|shouting out "Fire!" in a dark theatre]], which evokes panic and provokes injury, would be such a case of speech that creates an illegal danger.{{sfn|George|Kline|2006|p=409}} But if the situation allows people to [[reason]] by themselves and decide to accept it or not, any argument or theology should not be blocked.

Here is Mill on the same topic: "No one pretends that actions should be as free as opinions. On the contrary, even opinions lose their immunity, when the circumstances in which they are expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous act. An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn-dealer, or when handed about among the same mob in the form of a placard" (''On LIberty'', chapter 3).  

Mill's argument is now generally accepted by many [[Democracy|democratic countries]], and they have laws at least guided by the harm principle. For example, in American law some exceptions limit free speech such as [[obscenity]], [[defamation]], [[breach of peace]], and "[[fighting words]]".{{sfn|George|Kline|2006|p=410}}

====Freedom of the press====

In ''On Liberty'', Mill thought it was necessary for him to restate the case for press freedom. He considered that argument already won. Almost no politician or commentator in mid-19th-century Britain wanted a return to Tudor and Stuart-type press censorship. However, Mill warned new forms of censorship could emerge in the future.<ref>''John Stuart Mill's On Liberty: A Translation into Modern English'', Kindle edition, 2013. {{ISBN|978-0906321638}}.</ref> Indeed, in 2013 the Cameron Tory government considered setting up an independent official regulator of the UK press.<ref>"British Press Freedom under Threat", New York Times, 14 November 2013.</ref> This prompted demands for better basic legal protection of press freedom. A new British Bill of Rights could include a US-type constitutional ban on governmental infringement of press freedom and block other official attempts to control freedom of opinion and expression.<ref>Abbott, Lewis F. ''Defending Liberty: The Case for a New Bill of Rights''. ISR/Google Books, 2019. p. 22. {{ISBN|978-0906321737}}.</ref>