Editing James Longstreet (section)

===Gettysburg===
{{external media| float = right| video1 = [https://www.c-span.org/video/?462049-4/confederate-general-james-longstreet-gettysburg Presentation by Cory M. Pfarr, "Confederate General James Longstreet at Gettysburg", June 30, 2019], [[C-SPAN]]}}
{{main|Gettysburg campaign|Battle of Gettysburg}}

====Campaign plans====
[[File:Longstreet at Gettysburg.tif|upright=1.2|right|thumb|Longstreet at Gettysburg {{circa}} 1900]]
Following Chancellorsville and the death of Stonewall Jackson, Longstreet and Lee met in mid-May to discuss the army's summer campaign. Longstreet once more pushed for the detachment of all or part of his corps to be sent to Tennessee. The justification for this course of action was becoming more urgent as Union Major General Ulysses S. Grant was [[Vicksburg campaign|advancing]] on the critical Confederate stronghold on the [[Mississippi River]], [[Vicksburg, Mississippi|Vicksburg]]. Longstreet argued that a reinforced army under Bragg could defeat Rosecrans and drive toward the [[Ohio River]], which would compel Grant to break his hold on Vicksburg.{{sfn|Wert|1993|pp=242–246}} He advanced these views during a meeting with Seddon, who approved of the idea but doubted that Lee would, and opined that Davis would be unlikely to go against Lee's wishes. Longstreet had criticized Bragg's generalship and may have been hoping to replace him, although he also might have wished to see Joseph Johnston take command, and indicated that he would be content to serve under him as a corps commander. Lee prevented this by telling Davis that parting with large numbers of troops would force him to move his army closer to Richmond, and instead advanced a plan to [[Gettysburg campaign|invade Pennsylvania]]. A campaign in the North would relieve agricultural and military pressure that the war was placing on Virginia and North Carolina, and, by threatening a federal city, disrupt Union offensives elsewhere and erode support for the war among Northern civilians.{{sfn|Piston|1987|p=44}} In his memoirs, Longstreet described his reaction to Lee's proposal:

{{Blockquote|His plan or wishes announced, it became useless and improper to offer suggestions leading to a different course. All that I could ask was that the policy of the campaign should be one of defensive tactics; that we should work so as to force the enemy to attack us, in such good position as we might find in our own country, so well adapted to that purpose—which might assure us of a grand triumph. To this, he readily assented as an important and material adjunct to his general plan.{{sfn|Longstreet|1991|p=331}}}}

There is conflicting evidence for the veracity of Longstreet's account. It was written years after the campaign and is affected by hindsight, both of the results of the battle and of heavy postbellum criticism. In letters of the time, Longstreet made no reference to such a bargain. In April 1868, Lee said that he "had never made any such promise, and had never thought of doing any such thing".{{sfn|Coddington|1968|p=11}}{{sfn|Wert|1993|p=246}} Yet in his post-battle report, Lee wrote, "It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base, unless attacked by the enemy."<ref name="Lee Gettysburg">{{cite web |url=http://facweb.furman.edu/~benson/docs/lee.htm |title=Lee's Report of the Gettysburg Campaign |last=Lee |first=Robert E. |date=January 1864 |publisher=Furman University |access-date=September 20, 2017 |archive-date=February 24, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210224143252/http://facweb.furman.edu/~benson/docs/lee.htm |url-status=live }}</ref>

The Army of Northern Virginia was reorganized after Jackson's death. Two division commanders, [[Richard S. Ewell]] and A.P. Hill, were promoted to lieutenant general and assumed command of the Second and the newly created [[Third Corps, Army of Northern Virginia|Third Corps]] respectively. Longstreet's First Corps gave up R.H. Anderson's division during the reorganization, leaving Longstreet with the divisions of Hood, McLaws, and Pickett.{{sfn|Coddington|1968|p=12}}{{sfn|Wert|1993|p=248}}

After determining that an advance north was inevitable, Longstreet dispatched the scout [[Henry Thomas Harrison]], whom he had met during the Suffolk Campaign, to gather information. He paid Harrison in gold and told him that he "did not care to see him till he could bring information of importance".{{sfn|Longstreet|1991|p=333}} Ewell's corps led the army north, followed by Longstreet's and Hill's. The First Corps crossed the Potomac River from June 25 to 26.{{sfn|Coddington|1968|pp=114–117}} Harrison reported to Longstreet on the evening of June 28 and was instrumental in warning the Confederates that the Army of the Potomac was advancing north to meet them more quickly than they had anticipated, and was already gathered around Frederick, Maryland. Lee was initially skeptical, but the report prompted him to order the immediate concentration of his army north of Frederick near [[Gettysburg, Pennsylvania]]. Harrison also brought news that Hooker had been replaced as commander of the Army of the Potomac by Meade.{{sfn|Coddington|1968|pp=188–190}}

====July 1–2====
{{main|Battle of Gettysburg, second day}}
[[File:Gettysburg Battle Map Day2.png|thumb|upright=1.5|Gettysburg, July 2 {{legend|#ff0000|Confederate}}{{legend|#0000ff|Union}}|alt=Map with lines and arrows showing troops movements]]
Longstreet's actions at the [[Battle of Gettysburg]] would become the centerpiece of lasting controversy.<ref>Sears, Stephen W. "[http://americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/ah/2005/1/2005_1_46.shtml General Longstreet and the American Cause] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081120004214/http://www.americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/ah/2005/1/2005_1_46.shtml |date=2008-11-20 }}" ''American Heritage'', Feb/March 2005.</ref> Longstreet arrived on the battlefield at about 4:30p.m on the first day, July 1, 1863, hours ahead of his troops. Lee had not intended to fight before his army was fully concentrated, but chance and decisions by A.P. Hill, whose troops were the first to be engaged, brought on the confrontation. The battle on the first day was a strong Confederate victory. Two Union corps had been driven by Ewell and Hill from their positions north of Gettysburg back through the town into defensive positions on the heights to the south. Meeting with Lee, Longstreet was concerned about the strength of the Union defensive position on elevated ground and advocated a strategic movement around their left flank, to "secure good ground between him and his capital", which would presumably compel Meade to attack defensive positions erected by the Confederates.{{sfn|Piston|1987|p=51}}{{sfn|Longstreet|1991|pp=346–361}}{{sfn|Coddington|1968|pp=360–361}} Instead, Lee exclaimed, "If the enemy is there tomorrow, I will attack him." Longstreet replied, "If he is there tomorrow it is because he wants you to attack."{{sfn|Longstreet|1991|p=358}} Lee, energized by the success of his army that day, again refused. Longstreet suggested an immediate assault on the federal positions, but Lee insisted on waiting for Hood and McLaws, who were marching towards Gettysburg on the Chambersburg Pike. Longstreet sent a courier down the Cashtown Road to hurry them along. They eventually bivouacked about four miles (6.4&nbsp;km) behind the lines. Pickett was performing rearguard duty in [[Cashtown, Pennsylvania|Cashtown]] and would not be ready to move until morning. A major blunder occurred when Ewell failed to seize the heights on [[Cemetery Hill]] after being ordered to do so "if practicable" by Lee.{{sfn|Wert|1993|pp=258–261; 267}}{{sfn|Sorrel|1905|p=165}}{{sfn|Longstreet|1991|p=259}}

Lee's plan for July 2 called for Longstreet to attack the Union's left flank, to be followed by Hill's attack on [[Cemetery Ridge]] near the center, while Ewell demonstrated on the Union right. Longstreet again argued for a flanking maneuver around the Union left, but Lee rejected his plan. Longstreet was not ready to attack as early as Lee envisioned. He received permission from Lee to wait for [[Alabama Brigade (American Civil War)|Law's brigade]] of Hood's division to reach the field before advancing. Law marched his men quickly, covering {{convert|28|mi}} in eleven hours, but did not arrive until noon. Three of Longstreet's brigades were still in march column some distance from their designated positions.{{sfn|Fuller|1957|p=198}}{{sfn|Wert|1993|pp=260–261}} Longstreet's soldiers were forced to take a long detour while approaching the enemy position, misled by inadequate reconnaissance that failed to identify a completely concealed route.{{sfn|Coddington|1968|pp=378–379}}

Postbellum criticism of Longstreet claims that he was ordered by Lee to attack in the early morning and that his delays were a significant contributor to the loss of the battle.{{sfn|Dickson|2000|p=1215}} Early and [[William N. Pendleton]] testified that Lee had ordered Longstreet to attack at sunrise and that Longstreet disobeyed. This claim was factually untrue and denied by Lee's staff officers [[Walter H. Taylor]] and [[Charles Marshall (colonel)|Charles Marshall]].{{sfn|Connelly|Bellows|1982|p=34}} Lee agreed to the delays for arriving troops and did not issue his formal order for the attack until 11 A.M. Longstreet did not aggressively pursue Lee's orders to launch an attack. Sorrel writes that Longstreet, unenthusiastic about the attack, displayed lethargy in bringing his troops forward. While Lee expected an attack around noon, Longstreet was not ready until 4 P.M. Meade used the time to bring more of his troops forward.{{sfn|Wert|1993|p=268}}{{sfn|Hattaway|Jones|1983|pp=406–407}}{{sfn|Sorrel|1905|pp=166–168}} Campaign historian Edwin Coddington presents the approach to the federal positions as "a comedy of errors such as one might expect of inexperienced commanders and raw militia, but not of Lee's 'War Horse' and his veteran troops".{{sfn|Coddington|1968|pp=378–380}}

Hood opposed an attack on the Union left, arguing that the Union position was too strong, and proposed that his troops be moved to the right near [[Big Round Top]] and hit the Union in the rear. Longstreet insisted that Lee had rejected this plan and ordered him to make the assault against the front of the enemy lines.{{sfn|Longstreet|1991|pp=355; 368}}{{sfn|Alexander|1989|p=237}}{{sfn|Sorrel|1905|p=169}} Once the assault began at around 4&nbsp;pm, Longstreet pressed McLaws and Hood strongly against heavy Union resistance.{{sfn|Tagg|1998|pp=206–207}} Longstreet personally led the attack on horseback. Union Major General [[Daniel Sickles]], commanding the III Corps, had, contrary to Meade's orders, marched his men to the [[The Peach Orchard|Peach Orchard]], an exposed position well in front of the main Union lines. R.H. Anderson's division of Hill's corps, alongside McLaws' division and part of the division of Hood, launched a ferocious assault against Sickles with heavy artillery support which, after extremely intense fighting, pushed his corps back to the main Union lines. The Confederates were eventually repulsed after encountering fierce resistance from Union reinforcements. General Hood was wounded and replaced in command of his division by Law. Brigade commanders Barksdale and [[Paul Jones Semmes]], both under McLaws, were mortally wounded. Law's brigade attempted to carry [[Little Round Top]], a hill on the far left of the Union lines. The hill had originally been without troops before Union Brigadier General [[Gouverneur K. Warren]], Chief of Engineers, taking advantage of the Confederate delay, sent soldiers from the V Corps to fortify it. Confederate troops took the part of the hill known as [[Devil's Den]], but were unable to drive off Union forces at the top of the hill.{{sfn|Sorrel|1905|pp=168–169}}{{sfn|Alexander|1989|pp=237–241}}{{sfn|Longstreet|1991|pp=368–374}}{{sfn|Wert|1993|pp=273–278}} The attacks had failed, and Longstreet's corps suffered more than 4,000 casualties.{{sfn|Wert|1993|pp=278–279}} Contributing to Longstreet's failure was the fact that his attacks did not occur simultaneously with those of A.P. Hill and Ewell. Large portions of Hill's and Ewell's corps, including soldiers who had seen significant action the day before, were unengaged, and Meade was able to shift [[Thomas H. Ruger]]'s division from Ewell's front to oppose Longstreet.{{sfn|Alexander|1989|pp=242–243}}

====July 3====
{{main|Pickett's Charge}}
On the night of July 2, Longstreet did not follow his usual custom of meeting Lee at his headquarters to discuss the day's battle, claiming that he was too fatigued. Instead, he spent part of the night planning for a movement around Big Round Top that would allow him to attack the enemy's flank and rear. Longstreet, despite his use of scouting parties, was apparently unaware that a considerable body of troops from the Union [[VI Corps (Union Army)|VI Corps]] under [[John Sedgwick]] was in position to block this move. Shortly after issuing orders for the attack, around sunrise, Longstreet was joined at his headquarters by Lee, who was dismayed at this turn of events. The commanding general had intended for Longstreet to attack the Union left early in the morning in a manner similar to the attack of July 2, using Pickett's newly arrived division, in concert with a resumed attack by Ewell on Culp's Hill. What Lee found was that no one had ordered Pickett's division forward from its bivouac in the rear and that Longstreet had been planning an independent operation without consulting with him.{{sfn|Coddington|1968|pp=455–458}} Lee wrote in his after-battle report that Longstreet's "dispositions were not completed as early as was expected".<ref name="Lee Gettysburg"/>

[[File:Pickett's-Charge.png|thumb|upright=1.5|left|Pickett's Charge, July 3 {{legend|#ff0000|Confederate}}{{legend|#0000ff|Union}}|alt=Map with lines and arrows showing troops movements]]
Since his plans for an early morning coordinated attack were now infeasible, Lee instead ordered Longstreet to coordinate a massive assault on the center of the Union line at Cemetery Ridge with his corps. The Union position was held by the [[II Corps (Union Army)|II Corps]] under [[Winfield Scott Hancock]]. Longstreet strongly felt that this assault had little chance of success, and shared his concerns with Lee.{{sfn|Wert|1993|pp=283–284; 296–297}} The Confederates would have to march over close to one mile (1.6&nbsp;km) of open ground and negotiate sturdy fences under fire.{{sfn|Longstreet|1991|p=386}}{{sfn|Coddington|1968|p=503}} Longstreet urged Lee not to use his entire corps in the attack, arguing that the divisions of Law and McLaws were tired from the previous day and that shifting them away from their positions would dangerously expose the Confederate right flank. Lee conceded and instead decided to use men from A.P. Hill's corps to accompany Pickett. The force would include about 14,000 or 15,000 men.{{sfn|Longstreet|1991|p=386}}{{sfn|Wert|1993|pp=283–285}} Longstreet again told Lee that he believed the attack would fail.{{sfn|Wert|1993|p=283}}

Lee did not change his mind, and Longstreet relented. The final plan called for an artillery barrage by 170 cannon under Alexander. Then, the three brigades under Pickett and the four brigades in the division of [[Henry Heth]], temporarily commanded by Brigadier General [[J. Johnston Pettigrew]], positioned to Pickett's left, would lead the attack. Two brigades from [[William Dorsey Pender]]'s division, temporarily commanded by Brigadier General [[Isaac R. Trimble]], would fill in as support behind Pettigrew. Two brigades from R.H. Anderson's division were to support Pickett's right flank. Despite his vocal disapproval of the plan and although most of the units came from A.P. Hill's corps, Lee designated Longstreet to lead the attack. Longstreet dutifully saw to the positioning of Pickett's men. General Pickett placed the brigades of Garnett and Brigadier General [[James L. Kemper]] in front with Armistead behind them in support. However, Longstreet neglected to adequately check on Pettigrew's division. Pettigrew had never commanded a division before, and the division which he had just been appointed to lead had suffered one-third casualties in the fighting on July 1. His men were positioned behind Pickett's lines, leaving Pickett vulnerable, and the troops on his far left were dangerously exposed. Longstreet and Hill still had a tense relationship, which may have played a role in Longstreet not carefully overseeing Hill's troops. Hill was with Lee and Longstreet throughout much of the morning, but wrote after the battle that he had ordered his men to report to Longstreet, implying that he felt he was not responsible for arranging them.{{sfn|Wert|1993|pp=284–287}}

During preparations for the attack, Longstreet began to agonize over the assault. He attempted to pass the responsibility for launching Pickett's division to Alexander. The artillery bombardment began at about 1 P.M. Union batteries responded, and the two sides fired back and forth for about one hour and forty minutes. When the time came to actually order Pickett forward, Longstreet could only nod in assent, unable to verbalize the order, thus beginning the assault known as [[Pickett's Charge]]. Beginning at about 3 P.M., Confederate troops marched towards the Union positions. As Longstreet had anticipated, the attack was a complete disaster. The assaulting units suffered massive casualties. Pettigrew and Trimble were wounded. Pickett's first two brigades were severely mauled. Kemper was wounded and Garnett was killed. Armistead's brigade briefly breached the stone wall that marked Hancock's lines, where Armistead fell mortally wounded, but the brigade was repulsed.{{sfn|Alexander|1989|pp=254–265}}{{sfn|Longstreet|1991|pp=389–410}}{{sfn|Wert|1993|pp=288–297}} To his men, Lee said, "It is all my fault."{{sfn|Piston|1987|p=61}} According to two of Longstreet's staff officers, Lee subsequently expressed regret for not taking Longstreet's advice.{{sfn|Wert|1993|pp=296–297}} On July 4, the Confederate army began its [[retreat from Gettysburg]]. Hampered by rain, the bulk of the army finally made it across the Potomac River on the night of July 13–14.{{sfn|Wert|1993|p=293}}{{sfn|Sorrel|1905|pp=174–176}}