Editing Jacobo Árbenz (section)

===Operation PBSuccess===
[[File:Gloriosa victoria-Diego-Rivera-1.jpg|left|thumb|280x280px|''Gloriosa [https://puntocritico.com/ausajpuntocritico/2020/09/06/gloriosa-victoria/ victoria]'' (in English, Glorious victory) by [[Diego Rivera]], circa 1954. It shows General [[Carlos Castillo Armas|Castillo Armas]] making a pact with members of the U.S. government at the time, such as US ambassador to Guatemala [[John Peurifoy]], Secretary of State [[John Foster Dulles]] and his brother, [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] Director [[Allen Dulles]], with the face of the bomb alluding to [[Dwight D. Eisenhower|President Eisenhower]]. In the background is shown a [[United Fruit Company]] ship exporting bananas, as well as the figure of Archbishop [[Mariano Rossell y Arellano]] officiating a mass over the massacred bodies of the workers. Castillo Armas would lead the overthrow of Árbenz.]]
The CIA operation to overthrow Jacobo Árbenz, code-named [[1954 Guatemalan coup d'état|Operation PBSuccess]], was authorized by [[Dwight D. Eisenhower|Eisenhower]] in August 1953.{{sfn|Kornbluh|Doyle|1997}} [[Carlos Castillo Armas]], once Arana's lieutenant, who had been exiled following the [[Guatemalan Revolution#1949 coup attempt|failed coup]] in 1949, was chosen to lead the coup.{{sfn|Immerman|1982|pp=141–143}} Castillo Armas recruited a force of approximately 150 mercenaries from among Guatemalan exiles and the populations of nearby countries.{{sfn|Immerman|1982|pp=162–165}} In January 1954, information about these preparations were leaked to the Guatemalan government, which issued statements implicating a "Government of the North" in a plot to overthrow Árbenz. The US government denied the allegations, and the US media uniformly took the side of the government; both argued that Árbenz had succumbed to communist propaganda.{{sfn|Gleijeses|1992|pp=259–262}} The US stopped selling arms to Guatemala in 1951, and soon after blocked arms purchases from Canada, Germany, and Rhodesia.{{sfn|Immerman|1982|pp=144–150}} By 1954, Árbenz had become desperate for weapons, and decided to acquire them secretly from [[Czechoslovakia]], an action seen as establishing a communist beachhead in the Americas.{{sfn|Gleijeses|1992|pp=280–285}}{{sfn|Immerman|1982|pp=155–160}} The shipment of these weapons was portrayed by the CIA as [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] interference in the [[America's Backyard|United States' backyard]], and acted as the final spur for the CIA to launch its coup.{{sfn|Immerman|1982|pp=155–160}}

Árbenz had intended the shipment of weapons from the ''Alfhem'' to be used to bolster peasant militia, in the event of army disloyalty, but the US informed the Guatemalan army chiefs of the shipment, forcing Árbenz to hand them over to the military, and deepening the rift between him and the chiefs of his army.{{sfn|Gleijeses|1992|pp=300–311}} Castillo Armas' forces invaded Guatemala on 18 June 1954.{{sfn|Cullather|2006|pp=87–89}} The invasion was accompanied by an intense campaign of [[psychological warfare]] presenting Castillo Armas' victory as a ''fait accompli'', with the intent of forcing Árbenz to resign.{{sfn|Kornbluh|Doyle|1997}}{{sfn|Immerman|1982|p=165}} The most wide-reaching psychological weapon was the radio station known as the "[[Voice of Liberation]]", whose transmissions broadcast news of rebel troops converging on the capital, and contributed to massive demoralization among both the army and the civilian population.{{sfn|Cullather|2006|pp=100–101}} Árbenz was confident that Castillo Armas could be defeated militarily,{{sfn|Gleijeses|1992|pp=320–323}} but he worried that a defeat for Castillo Armas would provoke a US invasion.{{sfn|Gleijeses|1992|pp=320–323}} Árbenz ordered [[Carlos Enrique Díaz de León|Carlos Enrique Díaz]], the chief of the army, to select officers to lead a counter-attack. Díaz chose a corps of officers who were all known to be men of personal integrity, and who were loyal to Árbenz.{{sfn|Gleijeses|1992|pp=320–323}}

By 21 June, Guatemalan soldiers had gathered at [[Zacapa]] under the command of Colonel Víctor M. León, who was believed to be loyal to Árbenz.{{sfn|Gleijeses|1992|pp=326–329}} The leaders of the communist party also began to have their suspicions, and sent a member to investigate. He returned on 25 June, reporting that the army was highly demoralized, and would not fight.{{sfn|Cullather|2006|p=97}}{{sfn|Gleijeses|1992|pp=330–335}} PGT Secretary General [[Alvarado Monzón]] informed Árbenz, who quickly sent another investigator of his own, who brought back a message asking Árbenz to resign. The officers believed that given US support for the rebels, defeat was inevitable, and Árbenz was to blame for it.{{sfn|Gleijeses|1992|pp=330–335}} The message stated that if Árbenz did not resign, the army was likely to strike a deal with Castillo Armas.{{sfn|Gleijeses|1992|pp=330–335}}{{sfn|Cullather|2006|p=97}} On 25 June, Árbenz announced that the army had abandoned the government, and that civilians needed to be armed in order to defend the country; however, only a few hundred individuals volunteered.{{sfn|Gleijeses|1992|pp=342–345}}{{sfn|Cullather|2006|pp=100–101}} Seeing this, Díaz reneged on his support of the president, and began plotting to overthrow Árbenz with the assistance of other senior army officers. They informed US ambassador [[John Peurifoy]] of this plan, asking him to stop the hostilities in return for Árbenz's resignation.{{sfn|Gleijeses|1992|pp=345–349}} Peurifoy promised to arrange a truce, and the plotters went to Árbenz and informed him of their decision. Árbenz, utterly exhausted and seeking to preserve at least a measure of the democratic reforms that he had brought, agreed. After informing his cabinet of his decision, he left the presidential palace at 8&nbsp;pm on 27 June 1954, having taped a resignation speech that was broadcast an hour later.{{sfn|Gleijeses|1992|pp=345–349}} In it, he stated that he was resigning in order to eliminate the "pretext for the invasion," and that he wished to preserve the gains of the [[Guatemalan Revolution|October Revolution]].{{sfn|Gleijeses|1992|pp=345–349}} He walked to the nearby [[List of diplomatic missions of Mexico|Mexican Embassy]], seeking political asylum.{{sfn|Schlesinger|Kinzer|1999|p=201}}