Editing Józef Piłsudski (section)

==In government==
[[File:5 Warszawa 083.jpg|thumb|right|alt=see caption|[[Belweder]] Palace, Warsaw, Piłsudski's official residence during his years in power]]On 31 May 1926, the Sejm elected Piłsudski president of the Republic, but Piłsudski refused the office due to the presidency's limited powers. Another of his old friends, [[Ignacy Mościcki]], was elected in his stead. Mościcki then appointed Piłsudski as [[Ministry of National Defence (Poland)|Minister of Military Affairs]] (defence minister), a post he held for the rest of his life through eleven successive governments, two of which he headed from 1926 to 1928 and for a brief period in 1930. He also served as [[General Inspector of the Armed Forces]] and Chairman of the War Council.{{r|PolandGov}}

Piłsudski had no plans for major reforms; he quickly distanced himself from the most radical of his left-wing supporters and declared that his coup was to be a "revolution without revolutionary consequences".{{r|PWN}} His goals were to stabilize the country, reduce the influence of political parties (which he blamed for corruption and inefficiency) and strengthen the army.{{r|PWN|Urbank97_528–9}} His role in the Polish government over the subsequent years has been called a dictatorship or a "quasi-dictatorship".{{sfn|Biskupski|2012|p=46}}

===Internal politics===
Piłsudski's coup entailed sweeping limitations on parliamentary government, as his [[Sanation]] government (1926–1939), at times employing authoritarian methods, sought to curb perceived corruption and incompetence of the parliament rule, and in Piłsudski's words, restore "moral health" to public life (hence the name of his faction, "Sanation", which could be understood as "moral purification").<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Biskupski|first1=M. B. B.|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=I-ySkJHOQsIC&dq=Pilsudski+%22moral+health%22&pg=PA145|title=The Origins of Modern Polish Democracy|last2=Pula|first2=James S.|last3=Wróbel|first3=Piotr J.|date=15 April 2010|publisher=Ohio University Press|isbn=978-0-8214-4309-5|pages=145|language=en}}</ref><ref name="BEIPCQ" /><ref name="FMBALNPLPSC" /><ref name="TFARPRP" /> From 1928, the Sanation government was represented by the ''[[Non-partisan Bloc for Cooperation with the Government]]'' (BBWR).<ref name="BEIPCQ" /><ref name="FMBALNPLPSC" /><ref name="TFARPRP" /> Popular support and an effective propaganda apparatus allowed Piłsudski to maintain his authoritarian powers, which could not be overruled either by the president, who was appointed by Piłsudski, or by the Sejm.{{r|PolandGov}} The powers of the Sejm were curtailed by [[August Novelization|constitutional amendments]] that were introduced soon after the coup, on 2 August 1926.{{r|PolandGov}} From 1926 to 1930, Piłsudski relied chiefly on propaganda to weaken the influence of opposition leaders.{{r|PWN}}

The culmination of his dictatorial and supralegal policies came in the 1930s, with the imprisonment and trial of political opponents (the [[Brest trial]]s) on the eve of the [[1930 Polish legislative election]] and with the 1934 establishment of the [[Bereza Kartuska Detention Camp]] for political prisoners in present-day [[Biaroza]],{{r|PWN}} where some prisoners were brutally mistreated.{{r|Śleszyński03}} After the BBWR's 1930 victory, Piłsudski allowed most internal matters to be decided by [[Piłsudski's colonels|his colonels]] while he concentrated on military and foreign affairs.{{r|PWN}} His treatment of political opponents and their 1930 arrest and imprisonment was internationally condemned and the events damaged Poland's reputation.{{r|Biskupski2000}}
[[File:Aleksandra Piłsudska.JPG|thumb|alt=A man, a woman, and a child are on the left, posed to face the camera. To the right is a girl, drawing|Piłsudski, second wife [[Aleksandra Piłsudska|Aleksandra]], daughters, 1928]]
Piłsudski became increasingly disillusioned with democracy in Poland.{{r|CohenY89_65}} His intemperate public utterances (he called the Sejm a "prostitute") and his sending of 90 armed officers into the Sejm building in response to an impending [[vote of no-confidence]] caused concern in contemporary and modern observers who have seen his actions as setting precedents for authoritarian responses to political challenges.{{r|Times7Apr1930|Times11Nov1929|NYT12091993_Perlez}} He sought to transform the [[parliamentary system]] into a [[presidential system]]; however, he opposed the introduction of [[totalitarianism]].{{r|PWN}} The adoption of a new Polish constitution in April 1935 was tailored by Piłsudski's supporters to his specifications, providing for a strong presidency; but the [[April Constitution]] served Poland until World War II, and carried its [[Polish Government in Exile|Government in Exile]] until the end of the war and beyond. Piłsudski's government depended more on his [[charismatic authority]] than on [[rational-legal authority]].{{r|PWN}} None of his followers could claim to be his legitimate heir, and after his death the [[Sanacja|Sanation]] structure would quickly fracture, returning Poland to the pre-Piłsudski era of parliamentary political contention.{{r|PWN}}
[[File:Józef Piłsudski homaging at John III Sobieski tomb, commemorating 250 anniversary of battle of Vienna.PNG|thumb|alt=A man is standing, facing a staircase|In 1933 Piłsudski pays homage at tomb of King [[John III Sobieski]], commemorating 250th anniversary of victorious [[Battle of Vienna]].]]

Piłsudski's government began a period of national stabilization and of improvement in the situation of [[ethnic minorities]], which formed about a third of the Second Republic's population.{{r|Stachura04_79|ColuEncyclPoland}} Piłsudski replaced the [[National Democracy (Poland)|National Democrats]]' "[[polonization|ethnic-assimilation]]" with a "state-assimilation" policy: citizens were judged not by their ethnicity but by their loyalty to the state.{{r|Snyder04_144|Zimm04_166}} Widely recognized for his opposition to the National Democrats' anti-Semitic policies,{{r|Vital99_788|Payne95_141|Lieven94_163|Engelking01_75|Flannery05_200|Zimm03_19}} he extended his policy of "state-assimilation" to [[Polish Jews]].{{r|Snyder04_144|Zimm04_166|Prizel98_61|Wein90_292}} The years 1926 to 1935 and Piłsudski himself were favorably viewed by many Polish Jews whose situation improved especially under Piłsudski-appointed Prime Minister [[Kazimierz Bartel]].{{r|Cieplinski02|Paulsson03_37}} Many Jews saw Piłsudski as their only hope for restraining antisemitic currents in Poland and for maintaining public order; he was seen as a guarantor of stability and a friend of the Jewish people, who voted for him and actively participated in his political bloc.{{r|Snyder07_66}} Piłsudski's death in 1935 brought a deterioration in the quality of life of Poland's Jews.{{r|Zimm03_19}}

During the 1930s, a combination of developments, from the [[Great Depression]]{{r|Snyder04_144}} to the [[vicious spiral]] of ''[[Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists|OUN]]'' terrorist attacks and government pacifications, caused government relations with the national minorities to deteriorate.{{r|Snyder04_144}}{{sfn|Davies|2005|loc=p. 407 (1982 ed. Columbia Univ. Press)}} Unrest among national minorities was also related to foreign policy. Troubles followed repressions in the largely-Ukrainian eastern Galicia, where nearly 1,800 persons were arrested. Tension also arose between the government and Poland's German minority, particularly in [[Upper Silesia]]. The government did not yield to calls for antisemitic measures, but the Jews (8.6% of Poland's population) grew discontented for economic reasons that were connected with the Depression. By the end of Piłsudski's life, his government's relations with national minorities were increasingly problematic.{{sfn|Leslie|1983|p=182}}

In the military sphere, Piłsudski was praised for his plan at the Battle of Warsaw in 1920, but was criticized for subsequently concentrating on personnel management and neglecting modernization of military strategy and equipment.{{r|PWN|Garlicki195_178}} According to his detractors, his experiences in World War I and the Polish-Soviet War led him to over-estimate the importance of cavalry, and to neglect the development of armor and air forces.{{r|Garlicki195_178}} His supporters, on the other hand, contend that, particularly from the late 1920s, he supported the development of these military branches.{{r|Urbank97_2_330-7}} Modern historians concluded that the limitations on Poland's military modernization in this period was less doctrinal than financial.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Zaloga|first1=Steve|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=L1EpAQAAMAAJ&q=%22+financial+rather+than+doctrinal%22|title=The Polish Campaign, 1939|last2=Madej|first2=W. Victor|date=1990|publisher=Hippocrene Books|isbn=978-0-87052-013-6|pages=11|language=en}}</ref>

===Foreign policy===
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-B0527-0001-293, Warschau, Empfang Goebbels bei Marschall Pilsudski.jpg|thumb|alt=Four men are posed, facing the camera|German ambassador, [[Hans-Adolf von Moltke]], Piłsudski, [[Joseph Goebbels]] and [[Józef Beck]], Polish Foreign minister, in [[Warsaw]] on 15 June 1934, five months after the [[German–Polish Non-Aggression Pact]]]]Piłsudski sought to maintain his country's independence in the international arena. Assisted by his protégé, Foreign Minister [[Józef Beck]], he sought support for Poland in alliances with western powers, such as France and Britain, and with friendly neighbors such as Romania and Hungary.{{r|Urbank97_539–40}} A supporter of the Franco-Polish Military Alliance and the [[Polish–Romanian alliance]], part of the [[Little Entente]], Piłsudski was disappointed by the policy of [[appeasement]] pursued by the French and British governments, evident in their signing of the [[Locarno Treaties]].{{r|Prizel98_71|Lukacs01_30|Jordan02_23}} The Locarno treaties were intended by the British government to ensure a peaceful handover of the territories claimed by Germany such as the [[Sudetenland]], the [[Polish Corridor]], and the [[Free City of Danzig]] (modern [[Gdańsk]], Poland) by improving Franco-German relations to such extent that France would dissolve its alliances in eastern Europe.{{sfn|Schuker|1999|p=48-49}} Piłsudski aimed to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union and Germany,{{r|Prizel98_71|Lukacs01_30|Jordan02_23}} and relations with Germany and the [[Soviet Union]] during Piłsudski's tenure could, for the most part, be described as neutral.{{r|Prizel98_71|Urbank97_538-40}} Under Piłsudski, Poland maintained good relations with neighboring [[Kingdom of Romania|Romania]], Hungary and [[Latvia]], but were strained with [[Czechoslovakia]], and worse with [[Lithuania]].{{sfn|Goldstein|2002|p=29}}

A recurring fear of Piłsudski was that France would reach an agreement with Germany at the expense of Poland. In 1929, the French agreed to pull out of the Rhineland in 1930, five years earlier than the Treaty of Versailles specified. The same year, the French announced plans for the [[Maginot Line]] along the border with Germany, and construction of the Maginot line began in 1930. The Maginot line was a tacit French admission that Germany would be rearming beyond the limits set by the Treaty of Versailles in the near-future and that France intended to pursue a defensive strategy.{{sfn|Young|1996|p=19-21}} At the time Poland signed the alliance with France in 1921, the French were occupying the Rhineland and Polish plans for a possible war with ''Reich'' were based on the assumption of a French offensive into the north German plain from their bases in the Rhineland. The French pullout from the Rhineland and a shift to a defensive strategy as epitomized by the Maginot line completely upset the entire basis of Polish foreign and defense policy.{{sfn|Young|1996|p=21}}

In June 1932, just before the [[Lausanne Conference of 1932|Lausanne Conference]] opened, Piłsudski heard reports that the new German chancellor [[Franz von Papen]] was about to make an offer for a Franco-German alliance to the French Premier Édouard Herriot which would be at the expense of Poland.{{sfn|Wandycz|1988|p=237}} In response, Piłsudski sent the destroyer [[ORP Wicher (1928)|ORP ''Wicher'']] into the harbour of Danzig.{{sfn|Wandycz|1988|p=237}} Though the issue was ostensibly about access rights for the Polish Navy in Danzig, the real purpose of sending ''Wircher'' was as a way to warn Herriot not to disadvantage Poland in a deal with Papen.{{sfn|Wandycz|1988|p=237}} The ensuring [[Danzig crisis (1932)|Danzig crisis]] sent the desired message to the French and improved the Polish Navy's access rights to Danzig.{{sfn|Wandycz|1988|p=237}}

Poland signed the [[Soviet-Polish Non-Aggression Pact]] in 1932.{{r|Urbank97_539–40}} The Soviet-Polish Pact was considered at the time to be a major success of Polish diplomacy, which had been greatly weakened by the [[toll war]] with Germany, the renouncement of parts of the [[Treaty of Versailles]] and the loosened ties with [[France]] after it agreed to the [[Locarno Treaties]]. Critics of the pact state that it allowed Stalin to eliminate his socialist opponents, primarily in Ukraine. The pacts were supported by advocates of Piłsudski's [[Prometheism|Promethean]] programme.{{sfn|Charaszkiewicz|2000|p=64}} After [[Adolf Hitler]] [[Machtergreifung|came to power]] in Germany in January 1933, Piłsudski is rumored to have proposed to France a [[preventive war]] against Germany.{{r|Urbank97_2_317-26}} Lack of French enthusiasm may have been a reason for Poland signing the [[German–Polish Non-Aggression Pact]] in 1934.{{r|EBritannica_JP|Urbank97_539–40}}<ref name="TT_NGP"/><ref name="GQH"/> Little evidence has, however, been found in French or Polish diplomatic archives that such a proposal for preventive war was ever actually advanced.<ref name="Bel"/> Critics of Poland's pact with Germany accused Piłsudski of underestimating Hitler's aggressiveness,{{r|Hehn05_76}} and giving Germany time to re-arm.{{sfn|Kershaw|2001|p=237}}{{r|Davidson04_25}} Hitler repeatedly suggested a German-Polish alliance against the Soviet Union, but Piłsudski declined, instead seeking precious time to prepare for a potential war with either Germany or the Soviet Union. Just before his death, Piłsudski told [[Józef Beck]] that it must be Poland's policy to maintain neutral relations with Germany, keep up the Polish alliance with France and improve relations with the United Kingdom.{{r|Urbank97_539–40}} The two non-aggression pacts were intended to strengthen Poland's position in the eyes of its allies and neighbors.{{r|PolandGov}} Piłsudski was probably aware of the weakness of the pacts, stating: "Having these pacts, we are straddling two stools. This cannot last long. We have to know from which stool we will tumble first, and when that will be".{{r|Kipp93_95}}

===Economic policy===
Despite coming from a socialist background and initially implementing socialist reforms, Piłsudski's government followed the conservative free-market economic tradition of the [[Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth]] throughout its existence. Poland had one of the lowest taxation rates in Europe, with 9.3% of taxes as a distribution of national income. Piłsudski's government was also heavily dependent on foreign investments and economies, with 45.4% of Polish equity capital controlled by foreign corporations. After the [[Great Depression]], the Polish economy crumbled and failed to recover until [[Ignacy Mościcki]]'s government introduced economic reforms with more government interventions with an increase in tax revenues and public spending after Piłsudski's death. These interventionist policies saw Poland's economy recover from the recession until the USSR and the German invasion of Poland in 1939.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Dadak |first=Casimir |date=May 2012 |title=National Heritage and Economic Policies in Free and Sovereign Poland after 1918 |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/contemporary-european-history/article/abs/national-heritage-and-economic-policies-in-free-and-sovereign-poland-after-1918/B65FA110EF9020504F284BB52EB5B907 |journal=Contemporary European History |language=en |volume=21 |issue=2 |pages=193–214 |doi=10.1017/S0960777312000112 |s2cid=161683968 |issn=1469-2171}}</ref>