Editing Hu Jintao (section)

=== Foreign policy ===
{{See also|List of international trips made by Hu Jintao}}
[[File:Dmitry Medvedev in China 14 April 2011-2.jpeg|thumb|Hu with the leaders of the [[BRICS]] countries (from left, [[Manmohan Singh|Singh]], [[Dmitry Medvedev|Medvedev]], [[Dilma Rousseff|Rousseff]] and [[Jacob Zuma|Zuma]]) in April 2011]]
[[File:Secretary Clinton, VIce President Biden and Dr. Biden Co-Host a Luncheon in Honor of Chinese President Hu Jintao (5371703392).jpg|thumb|Hu at a 2011 luncheon with [[Vice President of the United States|U.S. Vice President]] [[Joe Biden]] and [[United States Secretary of State|Secretary of State]] [[Hillary Clinton]]]]
[[File:The Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh and the President of China, Mr. Hu Jintao in a press conference held by the leaders of five Outreach Countries (O5) during G-8 Summit, at Sapporo, Japan on July 08, 2008.jpg|thumb|Hu with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during the [[34th G8 summit|2008 G8 Summit]], in [[Sapporo]], Japan]]
[[File:Hu Protest2 (5367462375).jpg|thumb|Protests against Hu during his 2011 U.S. visit]]
Under Hu's leadership, China continued its style of developmental diplomacy which had been adopted under Deng Xiaoping and continued by Jiang Zemin.<ref name=":02">{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1332788951 |title=The dragon roars back : transformational leaders and dynamics of Chinese foreign policy |date=2023 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-3415-2 |location=Stanford, California |pages=11 |oclc=1332788951}}</ref><ref name="Ewing, 2003" /> China's international behavior continued to be generally pragmatic and predictable.<ref name=":02" /> Hu pledged that China would seek peaceful development in a harmonious world to assure the international community that China's economic growth offered opportunities and benefits rather than conflicts.<ref name=":2">{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1332788951 |title=The dragon roars back : transformational leaders and dynamics of Chinese foreign policy |date=2022 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-3415-2 |location=Stanford, California |pages=51 |oclc=1332788951}}</ref> The key attributes of a harmonious world view of foreign policy are building and accepting a world where countries diverge in their paths of national development and political systems, coexistence of diverse civilizations, and rejected unilateralism and hegemonic ambitions.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1331741429 |title=The dragon roars back : transformational leaders and dynamics of Chinese foreign policy |date=2023 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-3088-8 |location=Stanford, California |pages=75 |oclc=1331741429 |access-date=5 January 2023 |archive-date=6 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230306101710/https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1331741429 |url-status=live }}</ref>

In 2006, Hu articulated the four phases of China's foreign policy developmental objectives: (1) big powers were the key, (2) periphery countries the priority, (3) developing countries the foundation, and (4) multilateralism the stage.<ref name=":2" />

In 2009, Chinese leader Hu Jintao called for a bolstered arms control agenda at the United Nations General Assembly, joining United States President [[Barack Obama]]'s earlier calls for a nuclear-free world.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1331741429 |title=The dragon roars back : transformational leaders and dynamics of Chinese foreign policy |date=2023 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-3088-8 |location=Stanford, California |pages=237 |oclc=1331741429 |author-link=Suisheng Zhao |access-date=5 January 2023 |archive-date=6 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230306101710/https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1331741429 |url-status=live }}</ref>

Throughout Hu's tenure, China's cooperation with [[Global North and Global South|global south]] countries increased.<ref name=":7">{{Cite book |last=Garlick |first=Jeremy |title=Advantage China: Agent of Change in an Era of Global Disruption |date=2024 |publisher=[[Bloomsbury Academic]] |isbn=978-1-350-25231-8}}</ref>{{Rp|page=79}}

He sought to develop China's [[China–Japan relations|relationship with Japan]], which he visited in 2008.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Spencer |first=Richard |date=6 May 2008 |title=China's President Hu Jintao visits Japan |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/1930258/Chinas-President-Hu-Jintao-visits-Japan.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221022214958/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/1930258/Chinas-President-Hu-Jintao-visits-Japan.html |archive-date=22 October 2022 |access-date=22 October 2022 |website=[[The Daily Telegraph]]}}</ref> He downgraded [[China–Russia relations|relations with Russia]] because of unfulfilled deals.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://thediplomat.com/2011/07/chinese-foreign-policy-after-hu/|title=Chinese Foreign Policy After Hu|last=Pei|first=Minxin|website=thediplomat.com|access-date=19 January 2020|archive-date=2 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210302204802/https://thediplomat.com/2011/07/chinese-foreign-policy-after-hu/|url-status=live}}</ref>

Hu emphasized an [[China's core interests|international relations premise of "shared responsibility": China would contribute to global common good, but it must not adversely affect its core]] interests in doing so, and its commitments must be conditional to those of other nations.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1331741429 |title=The dragon roars back : transformational leaders and dynamics of Chinese foreign policy |date=2023 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-3088-8 |location=Stanford, California |pages=76 |oclc=1331741429 |access-date=5 January 2023 |archive-date=6 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230306101710/https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1331741429 |url-status=live }}</ref> In the analysis of academic [[Suisheng Zhao]], under Hu's leadership, "China remained a reluctant rising power and selectively took on global and regional obligations. Chinese foreign policy became omnidirectional, multilevel, and multidimensional."<ref name=":2" />

====Taiwan====
Early in his [[Hu–Wen Administration|leadership]], Hu faced a pro-independence counterpart in then [[Taiwan|Republic of China]] (ROC) president [[Chen Shui-bian]]. Chen called for talks without any preconditions, repudiating the [[1992 Consensus]]. Chen Shui-bian and the [[Democratic Progressive Party]] (DPP) had continued to express an ultimate goal of [[de jure]] [[Taiwanese independence]], and made statements on the [[political status of Taiwan]] that the PRC considers provocative. Hu's initial response was a combination of "soft" and "hard" approaches. On the one hand, Hu expressed a flexibility to negotiate on many issues of concern to Taiwan. On the other hand, he continued to refuse talks without preconditions and remained committed to [[Chinese unification]] as an ultimate goal. While Hu gave some signs of being more flexible with regard to political relationships with Taiwan as in his [[May 17 Statement]], where he offered to address the issue of "international living space" for Taiwan, Hu's government remained firm in its position that the PRC would not tolerate any attempt by the Taiwanese government to declare de jure independence from China.<ref name="Zhao Suisheng 2010" />

After Chen's re-election in 2004, Hu's government changed tactics, conducting a no-contact policy with Taiwan due to Chen and the DPP's independence leanings and repudiation of the 1992 consensus. The government maintained its military build-up against Taiwan, and pursued a vigorous policy of isolating Taiwan diplomatically. In March 2005, the [[Anti-Secession Law]] was passed by the [[National People's Congress]], formalizing "non-peaceful means" as an option of response to a declaration of independence in Taiwan.

Hu's government increased contacts with the [[Kuomintang]] (KMT), its former foe in the [[Chinese Civil War]], and still a major party in Taiwan.<ref name=":322">{{Cite book |last=Hammond |first=Ken |title=China's Revolution and the Quest for a Socialist Future |publisher=1804 Books |year=2023 |isbn=9781736850084 |location=New York, NY |pages=}}</ref>{{Rp|page=138}} The increased contacts culminated in the [[2005 Pan-Blue visits to mainland China]], including a historic meeting between Hu and then-KMT chairman [[Lien Chan]] in April 2005. This was the first meeting between the leaders of the two parties since the conclusion of World War II.<ref>{{cite news |last=Sisci |first=Francesco |date=5 April 2005 |title=Strange cross-Taiwan Strait bedfellows |work=[[Asia Times]] |url=http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GD05Ad08.html |url-status=unfit |access-date=15 May 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080512150111/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GD05Ad08.html |archive-date=12 May 2008}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last=Zhong |first=Wu |date=29 March 2005 |title=KMT makes China return in historic trip to ease tensions |work=The Standard |url=http://www.thestandard.com.hk/stdn/std/Front_Page/GC29Aa02.html |url-status=dead |access-date=16 May 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080602220112/http://www.thestandard.com.hk/stdn/std/Front_Page/GC29Aa02.html |archive-date=2 June 2008}}</ref>

On 20 March 2008, the Kuomintang under [[Ma Ying-jeou]] won the presidency in Taiwan, and a majority in the [[Legislative Yuan]]. Thereafter Hu immediately turned to a more 'soft' diplomatic approach and opened the way to a thaw in relations between the two sides.<ref>{{cite news |last=Sisci |first=Francesco |date=28 June 2006 |title=Hu Jintao and the new China |work=[[Asia Times]] |url=http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HF28Ad01.html |url-status=unfit |access-date=15 May 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080706184832/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HF28Ad01.html |archive-date=6 July 2008}}</ref> A series of historic meetings between the CCP and KMT have followed. On 12 April 2008, Hu Jintao met with Taiwan's vice president-elect [[Vincent Siew]] in the latter's role as chairman of the Cross-strait Common Market Foundation during the [[Boao Forum for Asia]]. On 28 May 2008, Hu met with KMT chairman [[Wu Po-hsiung]], the first meeting between the heads of the CCP and the KMT as ruling parties. During this meeting, Hu and Wu agreed that both sides should re-commence official dialogue under the 1992 consensus &ndash; that "both sides recognize there is only one China, but agree to differ on its definition." Wu committed the new government in Taiwan against Taiwanese independence; Hu committed his government to addressing the concerns of the Taiwanese people in regard to security, dignity, and "international living space", with a priority given to allowing Taiwan to participate in the [[World Health Organization]].

In addition to the party-to-party dialogue, de facto governmental dialogue took place via the [[Straits Exchange Foundation]] and the [[Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits]] in June 2008 on the basis of the 1992 Consensus, with the first meeting held in Beijing. Both Hu and his new counterpart [[Ma Ying-jeou]] agreed that the 1992 Consensus is the basis for negotiations between the two sides of the Taiwan strait. On 26 March 2008, Hu Jintao held a telephone talk with then US president [[George W. Bush]], in which he became the first Chinese leader to officially recognize the 1992 Consensus.<ref>{{cite news |date=27 March 2008 |title=Chinese, U.S. presidents hold telephone talks on Taiwan, Tibet |publisher=Xinhuanet |url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-03/27/content_7865209.htm |url-status=dead |access-date=15 May 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080512002546/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-03/27/content_7865209.htm |archive-date=12 May 2008}}</ref> After several months of negotiations, in December 2008, the two sides agreed on the resumption of the [[Three Links]], i.e., a re-opening of mail, trade, and direct air links between the two sides. Relations continued to be cordial between the two sides during Hu's tenure, and trade increased immensely, culminating in the signing of the preferential trade agreement [[Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement]] (ECFA) in 2010.