Editing Guadalcanal campaign (section)

=== Battle of Edson's Ridge ===
{{Main|Battle of Edson's Ridge}}

On 7 September, Kawaguchi issued his attack plan to "rout and annihilate the enemy in the vicinity of the Guadalcanal Island airfield". Kawaguchi's plan called for the forces under his command, split into three divisions, to approach the Lunga perimeter inland, culminating with a surprise night attack. Oka's forces would attack the perimeter from the west, while Ichiki's Second Echelon, renamed the Kuma Battalion, would attack from the east. The main attack would be conducted from the jungle south of the Lunga perimeter by Kawaguchi's "Center Body", numbering 3,000 men in three battalions.<ref>Frank, pp. 219–220; and Smith, pp. 113–115, 243. Most of the men in Ichiki's second echelon were from [[Asahikawa, Hokkaidō]]. "Kuma" refers to the [[brown bear]]s that lived in that area.</ref> By 7 September, most of Kawaguchi's troops had departed Taivu to begin marching towards Lunga Point along the coastline. About 250 Japanese troops remained behind to guard the brigade's supply base at Taivu.<ref>Frank, p. 220; Smith, p. 121.</ref>

[[File:EdsonMikeRed.jpg|thumb|upright|U.S. Marine Lieutenant Colonel [[Merritt A. Edson]] (here photographed as a major general) led Marine forces in the Battle of Edson's Ridge]]
Meanwhile, native scouts under the direction of [[Martin Clemens]], a [[Coastwatchers|coastwatcher]] officer in the [[British Solomon Islands Protectorate Defence Force]] and the British district officer for Guadalcanal, brought reports to the U.S. Marines of Japanese troops at Taivu near the village of Tasimboko. Edson subsequently planned a raid on the Japanese troop concentration at Taivu.<ref>Zimmerman, p. 80; Griffith, p. 125.</ref> On 8 September, after being dropped off near Taivu by boat, Edson's men captured Tasimboko and forced the Japanese defenders to retreat into the jungle.<ref>Hough, pp. 298–299; Frank, pp. 221–222; Smith, p. 129; Griffith, pp. 129–130.</ref> In Tasimboko, Edson's troops discovered Kawaguchi's main supply depot, including large stockpiles of food, ammunition, medical supplies, and a powerful [[shortwave]] radio. After destroying everything in sight, aside from some documents and equipment that were carried back with them, the Marines returned to the Lunga perimeter. Intelligence gathered from the captured documents indicated that at least 3,000 Japanese troops were on the island, planning to initiate a large-scale ground assault on the airfield in short order.<ref>Griffith, pp. 130–132; Frank, pp. 221–222; and Smith, p. 130.</ref>

Edson, along with Colonel [[Gerald C. Thomas]], Vandegrift's operations officer, correctly anticipated that the main Japanese attack would fall upon Lunga Ridge, a narrow, grassy, {{convert|1000|yd|m|sigfig=1|adj=mid|-long}} coral ridge that ran parallel to the [[Lunga River (Solomon Islands)|Lunga River]], just south of Henderson Field. The ridge offered a natural avenue of approach to the airfield, commanded the surrounding area, and was almost undefended. On 11 September, the 840 men of Edson's battalion were deployed onto and around the ridge and began digging in.<ref>Frank, pp. 223, 225–226; Griffith, pp. 132, 134–135; and Smith, pp. 130–131, 138.</ref>

[[File:GuadBloodyRidgeSep12-14.gif|thumb|left|Map of the Lunga perimeter on Guadalcanal showing the approach routes of the Japanese forces and the locations of the Japanese attacks during the battle. Oka's attacks were in the west (left), the Kuma Battalion attacked from the east (right) and the center body attacked "Edson's Ridge" (Lunga Ridge) in the lower center of the map.]]

On the night of 12 September, Kawaguchi's 1st Battalion attacked the Raiders between the Lunga River and ridge, forcing one Marine company to fall back to the ridge before the Japanese halted their attack for the night. The next night Kawaguchi faced Edson's 840 Raiders with 3,000 troops of his brigade, reinforced by an assortment of light artillery. The Japanese began their attack just after nightfall, with Kawaguchi's 1st Battalion assaulting Edson's right flank just to the west of the ridge. After breaking through the Marine lines, the battalion's assault was eventually stopped by Marine units occupying the northern section of the ridge.<ref>Smith, pp. 161–167. The Marine defenders that finally defeated Kokusho's charge were most likely from the [[11th Marine Regiment (United States)|11th Marines]] with assistance from the 1st Pioneer Battalion (Smith, p. 167; and Frank, p. 235).</ref>

Two companies from Kawaguchi's 2nd Battalion charged up the southern edge of the ridge and pushed Edson's troops back to Hill&nbsp;123, in the center section of the ridge. Throughout the night the Marines at this position, supported by a battery of howizers brought up from Lunga Point, turned back wave after wave of frontal Japanese infantry attacks, several of which devolved into hand-to-hand combat. The weight of these repeated assaults eventually pressed the Marines back to within a quarter mile of the airfield. At this stage, as the intensity of the battle reached its apex, small groups of Japanese soldiers managed to break through Edson's lines, with some reaching the edge of the airfield itself. Several Japanese soldiers were killed as they attempted to climb onto and destroy parked aircraft, and General Vandegrift's command post even came under direct attack at dawn, with several Japanese infiltrators killed within sight of the general.<ref name=":0" /> Nonetheless, Kawaguchi's units were spent, and the main Japanese attack on Edson's positions ground to a halt. The supporting attacks by the Kuma Battalion and Oka's unit at other locations on the Lunga perimeter were likewise defeated. On 14 September, Kawaguchi led the survivors of his shattered brigade on a five-day march west to the Matanikau Valley to join with Oka's unit.<ref>Smith, pp. 162–193; Frank, pp. 237–246; and Griffith, pp. 141–147.</ref> In total Kawaguchi's forces lost about 850 killed, with the Marines suffering 104.<ref>Griffith, p. 144; and Smith, pp. 184–194.</ref>

On 15 September at Rabaul, Hyakutake learned of Kawaguchi's defeat and forwarded the news to [[Imperial General Headquarters]] in Japan. In an emergency meeting, the senior Japanese IJA and IJN command staffs concluded that "Guadalcanal might develop into the decisive battle of the war". The results of the battle now began to exert significant strategic impact on Japanese operations in other areas of the Pacific. Hyakutake realized that he could not send sufficient men and [[materiel]] to defeat the Allied forces on Guadalcanal while simultaneously supporting the major ongoing Japanese [[Kokoda Track campaign|offensive on the Kokoda Track]] in New Guinea. Hyakutake, with the concurrence of General Headquarters, ordered his troops on New Guinea, who were within {{convert|30|mi|km|sigfig=1}} of their objective of Port Moresby, to withdraw until the "Guadalcanal matter" was resolved. Hyakutake prepared to send more troops to Guadalcanal for another attempt to recapture Henderson Field.<ref>Smith pp. 197–198</ref>