Editing Gamal Abdel Nasser (section)

=== Suez Crisis ===
{{Main|Suez Crisis|Closure of the Suez Canal (1956-1957)}}
[[File:Suez nationalization.ogv|thumb|right|thumbtime=2:16|alt=A black and white newsreel reporting Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal|[[Movietone newsreel]]s reporting Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal and both domestic and Western reactions]]
France and the UK, the largest shareholders in the Suez Canal Company, saw its nationalization as yet another hostile measure aimed at them by the Egyptian government. Nasser was aware that the canal's nationalization would instigate an international crisis and believed the prospect of military intervention by the two countries was 80 percent likely.<ref>{{Harvnb|Rogan|2011|p=299}}</ref> Nasser dismissed their claims,<ref>[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mpfuYTSFlVo Nasser 1956 speech mocking the media and the British denunciation of him] (in Egyptian Arabic, YouTube)</ref> and believed that the UK would not be able to intervene militarily for at least two months after the announcement, and dismissed Israeli action as "impossible".<ref>{{Harvnb|Heikal|1973|p=91}}</ref> In early October, the [[United Nations Security Council|UN Security Council]] met on the matter of the canal's nationalization and adopted [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 118|a resolution]] recognizing Egypt's right to control the canal as long as it continued to allow passage through it for foreign ships.<ref>{{Harvnb|Heikal|1973|pp=103–104}}</ref> According to Heikal, after this agreement, "Nasser estimated that the danger of invasion had dropped to 10 percent".<ref>{{Harvnb|Heikal|1973|p=105}}</ref> Shortly thereafter, however, the UK, France, and Israel made a [[Protocol of Sèvres|secret agreement]] to take over the Suez Canal, occupy the Suez Canal zone,<ref name="Jankowski68" /><ref>{{Citation |first=Avi |last=Shlaim |author-link=Avi Shlaim |url=http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ssfc0005/The%20Protocol%20of%20Sevres%201956%20Anatomy%20of%20a%20War%20Plot.html |title=The Protocol of Sèvres,1956: Anatomy of a War Plot |work=[[International Affairs (journal)|International Affairs]] |volume=73 |year=1997 |issue=3 |pages=509–530 |access-date=6 October 2009}}</ref> and topple Nasser.<ref>{{Harvnb|Dawisha|2009|p=179}}</ref><ref>{{Harvnb|Jankowski|2001|p=66}}</ref><ref>{{Harvnb|Kandil|2012|p=47}}</ref>

On 29 October 1956, Israeli forces crossed the [[Sinai Peninsula]], overwhelmed Egyptian army posts, and quickly advanced to their objectives. Two days later, British and French planes bombarded Egyptian airfields in the canal zone.<ref name="Aburish119">{{Harvnb|Aburish|2004|pp=118–119}}</ref> Nasser ordered the military's high command to withdraw the Egyptian Army from Sinai to bolster the canal's defenses.<ref name="Shemesh116" /> Moreover, he feared that if the armored corps was dispatched to confront the Israeli invading force and the British and French subsequently landed in the canal city of [[Port Said]], Egyptian armor in the Sinai would be cut off from the canal and destroyed by the combined tripartite forces.<ref name="Shemesh116" /> Amer strongly disagreed, insisting that Egyptian tanks meet the Israelis in battle.<ref name="Shemesh116" /> The two had a heated exchange on 3 November, and Amer conceded.<ref name="Shemesh116">{{Harvnb|Shemesh|Troen|1990|p=116}}</ref> Nasser also ordered blockage of the canal by sinking or otherwise disabling forty-nine ships at its entrance.<ref name="Aburish119" />

Despite the commanded withdrawal of Egyptian troops, about 2,000 Egyptian soldiers were killed during engagement with Israeli forces,<ref name="Bidwell398">{{Harvnb|Bidwell|1998|p=398}}</ref> and some 5,000 Egyptian soldiers were captured by the Israeli Army.<ref name="Shemesh116" /> Amer and [[Salah Salem]] proposed requesting a ceasefire, with Salem further recommending that Nasser surrender himself to British forces.<ref name="Jankowski68" /> Nasser berated Amer and Salem, and vowed, "Nobody is going to surrender."<ref name="Aburish119" /> Nasser assumed military command. Despite the relative ease in which Sinai was occupied, Nasser's prestige at home and among Arabs was undamaged.<ref>{{Harvnb|Dekmejian|1971|p=46}}</ref> To counterbalance the Egyptian Army's dismal performance, Nasser authorized the distribution of about 400,000 rifles to civilian volunteers and hundreds of militias were formed throughout Egypt, many led by Nasser's political opponents.<ref name="Alexander94">{{Harvnb|Alexander|2005|p=94}}</ref>

It was at Port Said that Nasser saw a confrontation with the invading forces as being the strategic and psychological focal point of Egypt's defense.<ref name="Kyle445-446">{{Harvnb|Kyle|2011|pp=445–446}}</ref> A third infantry battalion and hundreds of national guardsmen were sent to the city as reinforcements, while two regular companies were dispatched to organize popular resistance.<ref name="Kyle445-446" /> Nasser and Boghdadi traveled to the canal zone to boost the morale of the armed volunteers. According to Boghdadi's memoirs, Nasser described the Egyptian Army as "shattered" as he saw the wreckage of Egyptian military equipment en route.<ref name="Kyle445-446" /> When British and French forces landed in Port Said on 5–6 November, its local militia put up a stiff resistance, resulting in street-to-street fighting.<ref name="Alexander94" /><ref name="Kyle13-4">{{Harvnb|Kyle|2001|pp=113–114}}</ref> The Egyptian Army commander in the city was preparing to request terms for a ceasefire, but Nasser ordered him to desist. The British-French forces managed to largely secure the city by 7 November.<ref name="Kyle13-4" /> Between 750 and 1,000 Egyptians were killed in the battle for Port Said.<ref name="Bidwell398" />

The US [[Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower|Eisenhower administration]] condemned the tripartite invasion, and supported UN resolutions demanding withdrawal and a [[United Nations Emergency Force]] (UNEF) to be stationed in Sinai.<ref name="Yaqub51">{{Harvnb|Yaqub|2004|p=51}}</ref> Nasser commended Eisenhower, stating he played the "greatest and most decisive role" in stopping the "tripartite conspiracy".<ref>{{Harvnb|Dawisha|2009|p=180}}</ref> By the end of December, British and French forces had totally withdrawn from Egyptian territory,<ref name="Yaqub51" /> while Israel completed its withdrawal in March 1957 and released all Egyptian [[prisoners of war]].<ref name="Bidwell398" /><ref>{{cite web|title=Establishment of UNEF (United Nations Emergency Force)|url=https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unef1backgr2.html |publisher=United Nations |access-date=29 July 2010}}</ref> As a result of the Suez Crisis, Nasser brought in a set of regulations imposing rigorous requirements for residency and citizenship as well as [[1956–57 exodus and expulsions from Egypt|forced expulsions]], mostly affecting British and French nationals and Jews with foreign nationality, as well as many [[Egyptian Jews]].<ref>{{harvnb|Beinin|2005|p=87}}</ref> Some 25,000 Jews, almost half of the Jewish community, left in 1956, mainly for Israel, Europe, the United States and South America.<ref name="Laskier2">{{cite web|url=http://www.hsje.org/Egypt/Egypt%20Today/egyptian_jewry_under_the_nasser_.htm|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080125011249/http://www.hsje.org/Egypt/Egypt%20Today/egyptian_jewry_under_the_nasser_.htm|url-status=dead|archive-date=25 January 2008|title=Egyptian Jewry under the Nasser Regime, 1956–70|author=Michael M. Laskier|publisher=Historical Society of Jews from Egypt|year=1995|access-date=12 January 2017}}</ref><ref>[http://israelite.galileo.usg.edu/israelite/view?docId=bookreader/asi/asi1957/asi1957-0450.mets.xml#page/1/mode/1up Nasser refutes Jewish accusations of expulsion or mistreatment] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171010024713/http://israelite.galileo.usg.edu/israelite/view?docId=bookreader/asi/asi1957/asi1957-0450.mets.xml#page/1/mode/1up |date=10 October 2017}} in the Southern Israelite (Jewish) Newspaper, 1957</ref>

After the fighting ended, Amer accused Nasser of provoking an unnecessary war and then blaming the military for the result.<ref>{{harvnb|Kandil|2012|p=50}}</ref> On 8 April, the canal was reopened,<ref>{{harvnb|Aburish|2004|p=123}}</ref> and Nasser's political position was enormously enhanced by the widely perceived failure of the invasion and attempt to topple him. British diplomat [[Sir Anthony Nutting, 3rd Baronet|Anthony Nutting]] claimed the crisis "established Nasser finally and completely" as the ''rayyes'' (president) of Egypt.<ref name="Jankowski68" />