Editing First Battle of El Alamein (section)

===Attack on Tel el Eisa resumed===
[[File:Destroyed Panzer IIIs near Tel el Eisa 1942.jpg|right|thumb|Destroyed Panzer IIIs near Tel el Eisa]]
To the north, Australian 9th Division continued its attacks. At 06:00 on 22 July, Australian 26th Brigade attacked Tel el Eisa and Australian 24th Brigade attacked Tel el Makh Khad toward Miteirya (Ruin Ridge).<ref name="Playfair357"/> It was during this fighting that [[Arthur Stanley Gurney]] performed the actions for which he was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. The fighting for Tel el Eisa was costly, but by the afternoon the Australians controlled the feature.<ref name= "Playfair357"/><ref>{{harvnb|Johnston|Stanley|2002|pp=88–93, 97}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Bates|1992|pp=208–211}}.</ref> That evening, Australian 24th Brigade attacked Tel el Makh Khad with the tanks of 50th RTR in support. The tank unit had not been trained in close infantry support and failed to co-ordinate with the Australian infantry. The result was that the infantry and armour advanced independently and having reached the objective 50th RTR lost 23 tanks because they lacked infantry support.<ref name="Playfair357"/><ref>{{harvnb|Johnston|Stanley|2002|pp=93–96}}.</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Bates|1992|pp=212–214}}.</ref>

Once more, the Eighth Army had failed to destroy Rommel's forces, despite its overwhelming superiority in men and equipment. On the other hand, for Rommel the situation continued to be grave as, despite successful defensive operations, his infantry had suffered heavy losses and he reported that "the situation is critical in the extreme".<ref>Panzer Army Africa Battle Report dated 22 July 1942 K.T.B. 1220</ref>

====Operation Manhood====
On 26/27 July, Auchinleck launched Operation Manhood in the northern sector in a final attempt to break the Axis forces. XXX Corps was reinforced with 1st Armoured Division (less 22nd Armoured Brigade), 4th Light Armoured Brigade, and 69th Infantry Brigade. The plan was to break the enemy line south of Miteirya ridge and exploit north-west. The South Africans were to make and mark a gap in the minefields to the south-east of Miteirya by midnight of 26/27 July.<ref name="Playfair357"/> By 01:00 on 27 July, 24th Australian Infantry Brigade was to have captured the eastern end of the Miteirya ridge and would exploit toward the north-west. The 69th Infantry Brigade would pass through the minefield gap created by the South Africans to Deir el Dhib and clear and mark gaps in further minefields. The 2nd Armoured Brigade would then pass through to El Wishka and would be followed by 4th Light Armoured Brigade which would attack the Axis lines of communication.<ref name= "Playfair358">{{harvnb|Playfair|Flynn|Molony|Gleave|2004|p=358}}.</ref>

[[File:Valentine tank Mk3 desert.jpg|left|upright=1.3|thumb|A [[Valentine tank]] in North Africa, carrying British infantry]]
This was the third attempt to break through in the northern sector, and the Axis defenders were expecting the attack.<ref>{{harvnb|Barr|2005|p=176}}; {{harvnb|Bates|1992|p=216}}.</ref> Like the previous attacks, it was hurriedly and therefore poorly planned.<ref>{{harvnb|Bates|1992|p=217}}.</ref> The Australian 24th Brigade managed to take their objectives on Miteirya Ridge by 02:00{{efn|Playfair states that the "...timing soon fell behind, but by 3&nbsp;am the Australians had taken their objective"<ref name= "Playfair358"/>}} of 27 July.<ref>{{harvnb|Johnston|Stanley|2002|p=102–106}}; {{harvnb|Bates|1992|p=219}}.</ref> To the south, the British 69th Brigade set off at 01:30 and managed to take their objectives by about 08:00. However, the supporting anti-tank units became lost in the darkness or delayed by minefields, leaving the attackers isolated and exposed when daylight came. There followed a period during which reports from the battlefront regarding the minefield gaps were confused and conflicting. As a consequence, the advance of 2nd Armoured Brigade was delayed.<ref name= "Playfair358"/><ref>{{harvnb|Barr|2005|pp=178–179, 181–182}}.</ref> Rommel launched an immediate counter-attack and the German armoured battlegroups overran the two forward battalions of 69th Brigade.<ref name= "Playfair358"/><ref>{{harvnb|Barr|2005|pp=179–181}}; {{harvnb|Johnston|Stanley|2002|p=107–112}}; {{harvnb|Bates|1992|pp=224–225}}.</ref> Meanwhile, 50th RTR supporting the Australians was having difficulty locating the minefield gaps made by Australian 2/24th Battalion. They failed to find a route through and in the process were caught by heavy fire and lost 13 tanks. The unsupported 2/28th Australian battalion on the ridge was overrun. The 69th Brigade suffered 600 casualties and the Australians 400 for no gain.<ref name="Playfair358"/>

The Eighth Army was exhausted, and on 31 July Auchinleck ordered an end to offensive operations and the strengthening of the defences to meet a major counter-offensive.

[[File:Italian high-water mark on road to Alex edited.jpg|thumb|Commemorative stone put up by the [[7th Bersaglieri Regiment]] on the road from Alexandria to El Alamein at the high-water mark for the Italian advance. The inscription reads: ''Mancò la fortuna, non-il valore'' (A lack of fortune, not of valour).]]
Rommel was later to blame the failure to break through to the Nile on how the sources of supply to his army had dried up and how:
{{blockquote|then the power of resistance of many Italian formations collapsed. The duties of comradeship, for me particularly as their Commander-in-Chief, compel me to state unequivocally that the defeats which the Italian formations suffered at Alamein in early July were not the fault of the Italian soldier. The Italian was willing, unselfish and a good comrade, and, considering the conditions under which he served, had always given better than average. There is no doubt that the achievement of every Italian unit, especially of the motorised forces, far surpassed anything that the Italian Army had done for a hundred years. Many Italian generals and officers won our admiration both as men and as soldiers. The cause of the Italian defeat had its roots in the whole Italian military state and system, in their poor armament and in the general lack of interest in the war by many Italians, both officers and statesmen. This Italian failure frequently prevented the realisation of my plans.|Rommel<ref>Liddell Hart (ed), 'The Rommel Papers' (London 1953), pp.261–262.</ref>}}

Rommel complained bitterly about the failure of important Italian convoys to get desperately needed tanks and supplies through to him, always blaming the [[Comando Supremo|Italian Supreme Command]], never suspecting British code breaking.<ref>{{harvnb|Gannon|2002|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Kgb14s5UNmAC&pg=PA81 81]}}.</ref>

According to Dr James Sadkovich and others, Rommel often displayed a distinct tendency to blame and scapegoat his Italian allies to cover up his own mistakes and deficiencies as a commander in the field.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal |last=Sadkovich |first=Dr James |date=May 1991 |title=Of Myths and Men: Rommel and the Italians in North Africa 1940–42 |journal=International History Review |volume=13 |issue=2 |pages=284–313 |doi=10.1080/07075332.1991.9640582}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Robinson |first=James R. |date=September 1997 |title=The Rommel myth |journal=Military Review |volume=77 |pages=81–89}}</ref> For example, while Rommel was a very good tactical commander, the Italian and German High Commands were concerned that he lacked operational awareness and a sense of strategic objectives.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Kirkland |first=Major Donald. E |date=May 1986 |title=Rommel's Desert Campaigns: a study in Operational level weakness |journal=School of Advanced Military Studies |pages=4–36}}</ref> Dr Sadkovich points out that he would often out-run his logistics and squander valuable (mostly Italian) military hardware and resources, in battle after battle, without clear strategic goals or an appreciation of the limited logistics with which his Italian allies were desperately trying to provide him.<ref name=":0" />