Editing Economy of North Korea (section)

==Economic sectors==

===Manufacturing===
[[File:Fábrica máquinas-herramienta Huichón (5).jpg|thumb|Tool-machine factory in [[Huichon]]]]

North Korea also implements planned economy in industry. The government will provide fuel and materials for a factory, while the factory will manufacture products and quantities according to the government's requirements.

North Korea's self-reliant development strategy assigned top priority to developing heavy industry, with parallel development in agriculture and light industry. This policy was achieved mainly by giving heavy industry preferential allocation of state investment funds. More than 50% of state investment went to the industrial sector during the 1954–1976 period (47.6%, 51.3%, 57.0%, and 49.0%, respectively, during the [[Three-Year Plan]], Five-Year Plan, First Seven-Year Plan, and Six-Year Plan). As a result, gross industrial output grew rapidly.<ref name="Savada1994" />{{rp|123–127}}

As was the case with the growth in national output, the pace of growth has slowed markedly since the 1960s. The rate declined from 41.7% and 36.6% a year during the Three-Year Plan and Five-Year Plan, respectively, to 12.8%, 16.3%, and 12.2%, respectively, during the First Seven Year Plan, Six-Year Plan, and Second Seven-Year Plan. As a result of faster growth in industry, that sector's share in total national output increased from 16.8% in 1946 to 57.3% in 1970. Since the 1970s, industry's share in national output has remained relatively stable. From all indications, the pace of industrialization during the Third Seven-Year Plan up to 1991 is far below the planned rate of 9.6%. In 1990 it was estimated that the industrial sector's share of national output was 56%.<ref name="Savada1994"/>{{rp|123–127}}

Industry's share of the combined total of gross agricultural and industrial output climbed from 28% in 1946 to well over 90% in 1980. Heavy industry received more than 80% of the total state investment in industry between 1954 and 1976 (81.1%, 82.6%, 80%, and 83%, respectively, during the Three-Year Plan, Five-Year Plan, First Seven-Year Plan, and Six-Year Plan), and was overwhelmingly favored over light industry.<ref name="Savada1994"/>

North Korea claims to have fulfilled the Second Seven-Year Plan (1978–1984) target of raising the industrial output in 1984 to 120% of the 1977 target, equivalent to an average annual growth rate of 12.2%. Judging from the production of major commodities that form the greater part of industrial output, however, it is unlikely that this happened. For example, the increase during the 1978–1984 plan period for electric power, coal, steel, metal-cutting machines, tractors, passenger cars, chemical fertilizers, chemical fibers, cement, and textiles, respectively, was 78%, 50%, 85%, 67%, 50%, 20%, 56%, 80%, 78%, and 45%.<ref name="Savada1994"/>{{rp|123–127}}
Raw materials were in short supply and so were energy and hard currency. Infrastructure decayed and machinery became obsolete. Unlike other [[Eastern Bloc|socialist countries in the Eastern Bloc]], North Korea kept planning in a highly centralized manner and refused to liberalize economic management.

[[File:Fabrica de cristal duro Huichon4.jpg|left|thumb|[[Huichon#Huichon Hard Glassware Factory|Huichon Hard Glass Factory]]]]
In the mid-1980s, the speculation that North Korea would emulate China in establishing Chinese-style [[special economic zone]]s was flatly denied by then deputy chairman of the Economic Policy Commission [[Yun Ki-pok]] (Yun became chairman as of June 1989). China's special economic zones typically are coastal areas established to promote economic development and the introduction of advanced technology through [[Foreign direct investment|foreign investment]]. Investors are offered preferential tax terms and facilities. The zones, which allow greater reliance on market forces, have more decision-making power in economic activities than do provincial-level units. Over the years, China has tried to convince the North Korean leadership of the advantages of these zones by giving tours of the various zones and explaining their values to visiting high-level officials.<ref name="Savada1994"/>

In April 1982, [[Kim Il Sung]] announced a new economic policy giving priority to increased agricultural production through [[land reclamation]], development of the country's infrastructure—especially power plants and transportation facilities—and reliance on domestically produced equipment. There also was more emphasis on trade.

In September 1984, North Korea promulgated a [[joint venture]] law to attract foreign [[Capital (economics)|capital]] and [[technology]]. The new emphasis on expanding [[trade]] and acquiring technology was not, however, accompanied by a shift in priorities away from support of the military. In 1991, North Korea announced the creation of a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the northeast regions of [[Rason]] ([[Rason Special Economic Zone]]) and [[Chongjin|Ch'ŏngjin]]. Investment in this SEZ has been slow in coming. Problems with [[infrastructure]], [[bureaucracy]], uncertainties about the security of investments, and viability have hindered growth and development. Nevertheless, thousands of small Chinese businesses had set up profitable operations in North Korea by 2011.<ref name="bbc-20111220">{{cite news|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16254565 |title=Kim's death and the North Korean economy |author=Tony Michell |publisher=BBC |date=December 20, 2011 |access-date=April 10, 2012 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120425011744/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16254565 |archive-date=April 25, 2012 }}</ref>

A government research center, the [[Korea Computer Center]], was set up in 1990, starting the slow development of an [[information technology]] industry.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://38north.org/2011/10/ptjia102611/ |title=North Korea: An Up-and-Coming IT-Outsourcing Destination |author=Paul Tjia |date=November 18, 2011 |work=[[38 North]], [[School of Advanced International Studies]] |publisher=Johns Hopkins University |access-date=November 18, 2011 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111130005525/http://38north.org/2011/10/ptjia102611/ |archive-date=November 30, 2011 }}</ref>

In 2013 and 2014, the [[State Economic Development Administration]] announced a number of smaller special economic zones covering export handling, mineral processing, high technology, gaming and tourism.<ref name="tribune-20141217">{{cite news |url=http://www.tribunemagazine.org/2014/12/pyongyang-shows-signs-of-change/ |title=Pyongyang shows signs of change |author=Glyn Ford |newspaper=Tribune |date=December 17, 2014 |access-date=December 20, 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141220180930/http://www.tribunemagazine.org/2014/12/pyongyang-shows-signs-of-change/ |archive-date=December 20, 2014 |url-status=dead |author-link=Glyn Ford }}</ref> International conferences on special economic zones took place in 2013 and 2014, and the concept of many provincial economic zones was considered. However from 2019 these possibilities have diminished, partly out of a concern of excessive foreign influence on North Korean society.<ref name=38north-20221221>{{cite web |url=https://www.38north.org/2022/12/understanding-kim-jong-uns-economic-policymaking-rolling-out-economic-development-zones/ |title=Understanding Kim Jong Un's Economic Policymaking: Rolling Out Economic Development Zones |last1=Carlin |first1=Robert |last2=Minyoung |first2=Rachel Lee |publisher=The Henry L. Stimson Center |work=[[38 North]] |date=21 December 2022 |access-date=10 January 2023 |archive-date=January 10, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230110132314/https://www.38north.org/2022/12/understanding-kim-jong-uns-economic-policymaking-rolling-out-economic-development-zones/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

====Garment industry====
The most successful export industry is the [[Clothing industry|garment industry]]. Production is by a North Korean firm for a European or other foreign partner, by a Chinese firm operating in North Korea with a North Korean partner, or by North Korean workers working in Chinese or other foreign factories.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.nknews.org/2015/01/twelve-north-koreans-to-work-in-factory-in-europe/ |title=Twelve North Koreans to work in factory in Europe |date=January 14, 2015 |website=[[NK News]] |access-date=August 9, 2016 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160719100526/https://www.nknews.org/2015/01/twelve-north-koreans-to-work-in-factory-in-europe/ |archive-date=July 19, 2016 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.channel4.com/info/press/news/brexit-who-ll-do-your-job-now-channel-4-dispatches |title=Brexit: Who'll Do Your Job Now? |date=August 7, 2016 |website=Channel 4 Dispatches – Channel 4 – Info – Press |publisher=Channel 4 UK TV |access-date=August 9, 2016 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160819120332/http://www.channel4.com/info/press/news/brexit-who-ll-do-your-job-now-channel-4-dispatches |archive-date=August 19, 2016 }}</ref> Wages are the lowest in northeastern Asia.<ref name=38N83012>{{cite web |title=Garment Production in North Korea |url=http://38north.org/2012/08/tjia082912/ |publisher=[[38 North]].Org, The U.S.-Korea Institute (USKI) at SAIS, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University |access-date=September 26, 2012 |author=Paul Tjia |date=August 30, 2012 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120926083556/http://38north.org/2012/08/tjia082912/ |archive-date=September 26, 2012 }}</ref>

====Automotive industry====
[[File:Pyongyang bus.jpg|thumb|A North Korean manufactured trolleybus, a Chollima 90]]
{{Main|Automotive industry in North Korea}}
The North Korean motor vehicle production establishes military, industrial and construction goals, with private car ownership by citizens remaining on low demand. Having Soviet origins (the subsequent practice of cloning foreign specimens, and a recent automobile joint-venture), North Korea has developed a wide-range automotive industry with production of all types of vehicles. The basis for production is in urban and off-road minis; luxury cars; SUV cars; small, medium, heavy, and super-heavy cargo; construction and off-road trucks; minibuses/minivans, coach buses, civilian and articulated buses, trolleybuses, and trams. However, North Korea produces far fewer vehicles than its production capability due to the ongoing economic crisis. North Korea has not joined or collaborated with the [[Organisation Internationale des Constructeurs d'Automobiles|OICA]], or with any other automotive organization, so any critical information about its motor vehicle industry is limited.

===Power and energy===
{{Main|Energy in North Korea}}[[File:Electrical engineering components.jpg|left|upright|thumb|Electrical engineering components]]
The energy sector is one of the most serious bottlenecks in the North Korean economy. Since 1990, the supply of oil, coal, and electricity declined steadily, and seriously affected all sectors of the economy. [[Crude oil]] was formerly imported by pipeline at "friendship prices" from the former Soviet Union or China, but the withdrawal of Russian concessions and the reduction of imports from China brought down annual imports from about {{convert|23|Moilbbl}} in 1988 to less than {{convert|4|Moilbbl}} by 1997. As the imported oil was refined for fuels for transportation and agricultural machinery, a serious cutback in oil imports caused critical problems in transportation and agriculture.

According to statistics compiled by the South Korean agency Statistics Korea based on [[International Energy Agency]] (IEA) data, per capita electricity consumption fell from its peak in 1990 of 1247 kilowatt hours to a low of 712 kilowatt hours in 2000. It slowly rose since then to 819 kilowatt hours in 2008, a level below that of 1970.<ref name=DNK8612>{{cite news |title=Economic Collapse Reflected in Scarce Electricity |url=http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=9629 |access-date=August 6, 2012 |newspaper=[[Daily NK]] |date=August 6, 2012 |author=Kim Tae Hong |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120904031624/http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=9629 |archive-date=September 4, 2012 }}</ref><ref name=YN8612>{{cite news|title=N. Korea's power consumption per capita at 1970s levels |url=http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2012/08/06/0200000000AEN20120806003300315.HTML |access-date=August 6, 2012 |newspaper=[[Yonhap News Agency]] |date=August 6, 2012 |agency=Yonhap |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141022150718/http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2012/08/06/0200000000AEN20120806003300315.HTML |archive-date=October 22, 2014 }}</ref>

North Korea has no [[Coke (fuel)|coking coal]], but has substantial reserves of [[anthracite]] in [[Anju (city)|Anju]], Aoji ([[Undok|Ŭndŏk]]), and other areas. Coal production peaked at 43 million tons in 1989 and steadily declined to 18.6 million tons in 1998. Major causes of coal shortages include [[mine flooding]], and outdated mining technology. As coal was used mainly for industry and electricity generation, decrease in coal production caused serious problems in industrial production and electricity generation.

Electricity generation of North Korea peaked in 1989 at about 30 TWh. There were seven large hydroelectric plants in the 1980s. Four were along the [[Yalu River]], built with Chinese aid, and supplying power to both countries. In 1989, 60% of electricity generation was [[hydroelectricity|hydroelectric]] and 40% fossil fueled, mostly coal-fired.

In 1997, coal accounted for more than 80% of primary energy consumption and hydro power more than 10%.{{Citation needed|date=September 2021}} Net imports of coal represented only about 3% of coal consumption. Hydroelectric power plants generated about 55% of North Korea's electricity and coal-fired thermal plants about 39% in 1997.<ref name="Electricity production from coal sources (% of total) - Korea, Dem. People's Rep.">{{cite web|url=https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.COAL.ZS?locations=KP|title=Electricity production from coal sources (% of total) – Korea, Dem. People's Rep.|publisher=World Bank|access-date=September 26, 2021|archive-date=September 26, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210926063033/https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.COAL.ZS?locations=KP|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Electricity production from hydroelectric sources (% of total) - Korea, Dem. People's Rep.">{{cite web|url=https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.HYDRO.ZS?locations=KP|title=Electricity production from hydroelectric sources (% of total) – Korea, Dem. People's Rep.|publisher=World Bank|access-date=September 26, 2021|archive-date=September 26, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210926071338/https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.HYDRO.ZS?locations=KP|url-status=live}}</ref> However, with only 20% of the per capita electricity generation of Japan, North Korea suffered from chronic supply shortages. Coal exports to China accounted for a major portion of North Korea's revenue in mid-2010s.<ref name=CoalDiplomacy>{{cite web |url=http://gregpavone.com/dprk-coal |publisher=Harvard Kennedy School |date=March 2014 |first=Gregory |last=Pavone |title=Coal Diplomacy: The Political Economy of North Korean Coal |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150904004856/http://gregpavone.com/dprk-coal |archive-date=September 4, 2015 |access-date=May 25, 2015 }}</ref>

Some hydroelectric facilities were believed to be out of operation due to damage from major flooding in 1995. Coal-fired power plants were running well under capacity, due in part to a serious decline in coal supply and in part to problems with transportation of coal. The electricity supply steadily declined and was 17 TWh in 1998.{{Citation needed|date=December 2021}} Transmission losses sit at just under 16% (15.8%) as of 2014.<ref name="Electric power transmission and distribution losses (% of output) - Korea, Dem. People's Rep.">{{cite web|url=https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.LOSS.ZS?locations=KP|title=Electric power transmission and distribution losses (% of output) – Korea, Dem. People's Rep.|publisher=World Bank|access-date=September 26, 2021|archive-date=September 26, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210926063031/https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.LOSS.ZS?locations=KP|url-status=live}}</ref>

===Construction===
[[File:PYONGYANG CITY DPRK NORTH KOREA OCT 2012 (8647588769).jpg|thumb|Mansudae People's Theatre, opened in 2012]]
Construction has been an active sector in North Korea. This was demonstrated not only through large housing programmes, of which most were visible in the high-rise apartment blocks in [[Pyongyang]], but also in the smaller modern apartment complexes widespread even in the countryside. These are dwarfed in every sense by "grand monumental edifices". The same may apply even to apparently economically useful projects such as the [[Nampo Dam]], which cost US$4bn.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Korea North Country Study Guide Volume 1 Strategic Information and Developments|publisher=International Business Publications, USA|isbn=978-1433027802|pages=187|date=April 13, 2015}}</ref>

The years of economic contraction in the 1990s slowed this sector as it did others; the shell of the 105-story [[Ryugyŏng Hotel]] towered unfinished on [[Pyongyang]]'s skyline for over a decade. The [[Bank of Korea]] claims that construction's share of GDP fell by almost one-third between 1992 and 1994, from 9.1% to 6.3%. This accords with a rare official figure{{Citation needed|date=January 2008}} of 6% for 1993, when the sector was said to have employed 4.2% of the labour force. However, the latter figure excludes the [[Korean People's Army]], which visibly does much of the country's construction work.<ref name=38north-20170718/>

Since about 2012, when 18 tower blocks were built in Pyongyang, a construction boom has taken place in Pyongyang. Major projects include the [[Mansudae People's Theatre]] (2012), [[Munsu Water Park]] (2013), the modernisation of [[Pyongyang International Airport]] (2015) and the Science and Technology Center (2015).<ref name=38north-20170718>{{cite news |url=http://www.38north.org/2017/07/hferon071817/ |title=Pyongyang's Construction Boom: Is North Korea Beating Sanctions? |last=Féron |first=Henri |publisher=U.S.–Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies |work=[[38 North]] |date=July 18, 2017 |access-date=July 20, 2017 |archive-date=July 18, 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170718223655/http://www.38north.org/2017/07/hferon071817/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=nyt-20170430/>

===Banking===
{{Further|North Korean won|List of banks in North Korea}}
The [[Central Bank of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea|Central Bank of North Korea]], under the [[Ministry of Finance (North Korea)|Ministry of Finance]], has a network of 227 local branches. Several reissues of banknotes in recent years suggest that citizens are inclined to hoard rather than bank any savings that they make from their incomes; reportedly they now also prefer foreign currency. At least two foreign aid agencies{{Clarify|date=March 2008}} have recently set up microcredit schemes, lending to farmers and small businesses.{{Citation needed|date=January 2008}}

In late 2009, North Korea revalued its currency, effectively confiscating all privately held money above the equivalent of US$35 per person.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/02/business/global/02korea.html?_r=2 |author=Choe Sang-Hun |title=North Korea Revalues Its Currency |location=North Korea |newspaper=[[The New York Times]] |date=December 9, 2009 |access-date=December 20, 2011 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130521001602/http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/02/business/global/02korea.html?_r=2 |archive-date=May 21, 2013 }}</ref> The revaluation effectively wiped out the savings of many North Koreans. Days after the revaluation the won dropped 96% against the United States dollar.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Lim |first1=Bomi |title=North Korean Won Plunges 96% After Government Revaluation |url=https://infiniteunknown.net/2009/12/09/north-korea-won-plunges-96-percent-against-the-dollar-after-government-revaluation/ |website=Infinite Unknown |publisher=[[Bloomberg News]] |access-date=April 8, 2022 |date=December 9, 2009 |archive-date=August 8, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220808140735/https://infiniteunknown.net/2009/12/09/north-korea-won-plunges-96-percent-against-the-dollar-after-government-revaluation/ |url-status=live }}</ref> [[Pak Nam-gi]], the director of the Planning and Finance Department of North Korea's ruling Workers' Party, was blamed for the disaster and later executed in 2010.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601080&sid=amrsl_DDQ7.A|title=North Korea Executes Official for Currency Reform, Yonhap Says|publisher=Bloomberg|date=March 17, 2010}}</ref>

[[File:Koryo Credit Card.jpg|thumb|A Koryo cash card reader in 2012]]
In 2004 and 2006 laws were passed to codify rules for savings and commercial banking.  However it was not until 2012 that North Korean banks started to seriously compete for retail customers. Competing electronic cash cards have become widely accepted in [[Pyongyang]] and other cities, but are generally not linked to bank accounts. North Korean banks have introduced retail products which permit a mobile phone app to make payments and top-ups.<ref name=38north-20170203>{{cite news |url=http://38north.org/2017/02/aabrahamian020317/ |title=Banking on North Korea's Banks? |author=Andray Abrahamian |publisher=U.S.-Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies |work=[[38 North]] |date=February 3, 2017 |access-date=February 4, 2017 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170203223456/http://38north.org/2017/02/aabrahamian020317/ |archive-date=February 3, 2017 }}</ref><ref name=38north-20170406/>

As of May 2013, [[China Merchants Bank]],<ref name="NK trade">{{cite news|title=Cooling China-N Korea ties hit border town |newspaper=Financial Times |date=May 15, 2013 |author=Rabinovitch, Simon |url=http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a631e4ee-bbc8-11e2-a4b4-00144feab7de.html |url-status=live |access-date=December 14, 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141209030223/http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a631e4ee-bbc8-11e2-a4b4-00144feab7de.html |archive-date=December 9, 2014 }}</ref> [[Industrial and Commercial Bank of China]], [[China Construction Bank]], and [[Agricultural Bank of China]], stopped "all cross-border cash transfers, regardless of the nature of the business" with North Korea.<ref name="China banks sactions">{{cite news | url=http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9bb568b0-bba0-11e2-82df-00144feab7de.html#axzz2TIsuNx9M | archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221210201221/https://www.ft.com/content/9bb568b0-bba0-11e2-82df-00144feab7de#axzz2TIsuNx9M | archive-date=December 10, 2022 | url-access=subscription | url-status=live | title=China banks rein in support for North Korea | newspaper=Financial Times | date=May 13, 2013 | access-date=May 14, 2013 | author=Rabinovitch, Simon }}</ref> The [[Bank of China]], China's primary institution for foreign exchange transactions, said, on May 14, 2013, that "it had closed the account of [[Foreign Trade Bank]], North Korea's main foreign exchange bank".<ref name="China banks sactions"/><ref name="Bank of China">{{cite news | url=http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a7154272-b702-11e2-a249-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2TIsuNx9M | archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221210201235/https://www.ft.com/content/a7154272-b702-11e2-a249-00144feabdc0#axzz2TIsuNx9M | archive-date=December 10, 2022 | url-access=subscription | title=China reduces banking lifeline to N Korea | newspaper=Financial Times | date=May 7, 2013 | access-date=May 14, 2013 | author1=Simon Rabinovitch | author2=Simon Mundy | url-status=live }}</ref> However, "smaller banks based in northeastern China across the border from North Korea said it was still handling large-scale cross-border transfers." For example, the [[Bank of Dalian]] branch in Dandong was still doing transfers to North Korea.<ref name="China banks sactions"/>

[[Kim Jong Un]] from 2015 has sought to enlarge and reform the banking sector, to assist economic growth, with credit cards viewed as a way to increase money circulation. The concept of socialist commercial banks is being developed to utilize "idle funds" effectively, including the savings of individuals, to promote economic growth.<ref name=38north-20211222>{{cite web |url=https://www.38north.org/2021/12/understanding-kim-jong-uns-economic-policymaking-pyongyangs-views-on-banking/ |title=Understanding Kim Jong Un's Economic Policymaking: Pyongyang's Views on Banking |last1=Carlin |first1=Robert |last2=Lee |first2=Rachel Minyoung |publisher=The Henry L. Stimson Center |work=[[38 North]] |date=December 22, 2021 |access-date=January 3, 2022 |archive-date=January 3, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220103212659/https://www.38north.org/2021/12/understanding-kim-jong-uns-economic-policymaking-pyongyangs-views-on-banking/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Retail===
[[File:Number One Department Store, Pyongyang.jpg|thumb|upright|[[Pyongyang Department Store No. 1|Number One Department Store]] in Pyongyang]]
Until the early 2000s the official retail sector was mainly state-controlled,<ref name=guardian-20160711>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/11/north-korea-too-rich-fake-death-defector-story |title='I got too rich in North Korea and had to fake my own death' – a defector's story |author=Roman Super, Claire Bigg |newspaper=The Guardian |date=July 11, 2016 |access-date=April 12, 2017 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170413071710/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/11/north-korea-too-rich-fake-death-defector-story |archive-date=April 13, 2017 }}</ref> under the direction of the People's Services Committee. Consumer goods were few and of poor quality, with most provided on a ration basis. There were state-run stores and direct factory outlets for the masses, and special shops with luxuries for the elite—as well as a chain of hard-currency stores (a joint venture with the association of pro-Pyongyang Korean residents in Japan, the [[Ch'ongryŏn]]), with branches in large cities.

In 2002 and in 2010, [[Jangmadang|private markets]] were progressively legalized, mostly for food sales.<ref name="atimes-20110923"/> As of 2013, urban and farmer markets were held every 10 days, and most urban residents lived within 2&nbsp;km of a market.<ref name="FAO-WFP-2013"/> Since the 2009 economic intervention, it is common for North Korean citizens to make purchases with [[Chinese yuan]] and [[United States dollar]]s.<ref name="currency">{{Cite web |url=https://apnews.com/article/north-korea-economy-dollar-currency-kim-251a6fee83845253da5b6e0309008a87 |language=en-US |date=2023-06-08 |accessdate=2023-06-09 |title='Dollarization' of North Korean economy, once vital, now potential threat to Kim's rule |last=Kim |first=Hyung-Jin |website=[[Associated Press News]] |archive-date=June 9, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230609072901/https://apnews.com/article/north-korea-economy-dollar-currency-kim-251a6fee83845253da5b6e0309008a87 |url-status=live }}</ref>

In 2012, the third large [[shopping mall]] in [[Pyongyang]], the Kwangbok Area Shopping Center, opened.<ref name=38north-20170406>{{cite news |url=http://38north.org/2017/04/rfrank040617/ |title=Consumerism in North Korea: The Kwangbok Area Shopping Center |first=Ruediger |last=Frank |publisher=U.S.–Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies |work=[[38 North]] |date=April 6, 2017 |access-date=April 10, 2017 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170411055001/http://38north.org/2017/04/rfrank040617/ |archive-date=April 11, 2017 }}</ref><ref name=reuters-20150604>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-change-consumption-idUSKBN0OJ2UH20150604 |title=Pyongyang Bling: The rise of North Korea's consumer comrades |author=James Pearson, Ju-min Park |work=Reuters |date=June 4, 2015 |access-date=April 12, 2017 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170413072212/http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-change-consumption-idUSKBN0OJ2UH20150604 |archive-date=April 13, 2017 }}</ref> In 2014 the construction of another large shopping mall started.<ref name="nknews-20160811">{{cite news |url=https://www.nknews.org/2016/08/north-korea-building-large-shopping-complex-in-pyongyang/ |title=North Korea building large shopping complex in Pyongyang |author=Jh Ahn |work=[[NK News]] |date=August 11, 2016 |access-date=September 10, 2016 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160926234316/https://www.nknews.org/2016/08/north-korea-building-large-shopping-complex-in-pyongyang/ |archive-date=September 26, 2016 }}</ref> As of 2017, these malls sold competing brands of goods, for example at least ten different kinds of toothpaste were being sold.<ref name=38north-20170406/>

In 2017, the [[Korea Institute for National Unification]] estimated there were 440 government-approved markets employing about 1.1 million people.<ref name=nyt-20170430>{{cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/30/world/asia/north-korea-economy-marketplace.html |title=As Economy Grows, North Korea's Grip on Society Is Tested |last=Sang-Hun |first=Choe |newspaper=[[The New York Times]] |date=April 30, 2017 |access-date=May 25, 2018 |archive-date=January 4, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200104075253/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/30/world/asia/north-korea-economy-marketplace.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

In 2021, the authorities began major crackdowns aimed at reducing the role of the markets with the shift to a state-run monopoly on food sales and measures to ensure that food would pass through state-run shops, a network of which the government had been building since 2019.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Jiro |first1=ISHIMARU |title=What occurred behind the veil in N.Korea 2020-2023…A disaster unfolding due to shifts in the Kim Jong-un regime's policies…Part 3: Kim Jong-un's anti-market policies |url=https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2024/01/politics/invisibility-3/ |access-date=5 September 2024 |agency=ASIAPRESS |publisher=RIMJIN-GANG |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240815115526/https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2024/01/politics/invisibility-3/ |archive-date=15 August 2024}}</ref> These shops monopolized the sale and distribution of domestically produced goods and a great portion of newly imported goods.<ref>{{cite news |title=National Unified Price System' implemented on domestic products...Stores are given booklet showing prices in new system… Government aims to tighten control over economy |url=https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2024/04/society-economy/national-price/ |access-date=5 September 2024 |agency=ASIAPRESS |publisher=RIMJIN-GANG |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240815135234/https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2024/04/society-economy/national-price/ |archive-date=15 August 2024 |location=Japan}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=How is the country's fishing industry doing? |url=https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2023/12/society-economy/fisheries-3/ |access-date=5 September 2024 |agency=ASIAPRESS |publisher=RIMJIN-GANG |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240224153337/https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2023/12/society-economy/fisheries-3/ |archive-date=24 February 2024 |location=Japan}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=How is the country's fishing industry doing? Distribution of seafood faces challenges due to severe government restrictions |url=https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2023/12/society-economy/fisheries-2/ |access-date=5 September 2024 |agency=ASIAPRESS |publisher=RIMJIN-GANG |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240822065358/https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2023/12/society-economy/fisheries-2/ |archive-date=22 August 2024 |location=Japan}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=The state of North Korea's smuggling activities |url=https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2024/06/society-economy/statesmuggling/ |access-date=5 September 2024 |agency=ASAIPRESS |publisher=RIMJIN-GANG |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240822065530/https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2024/06/society-economy/statesmuggling/ |archive-date=22 August 2024 |location=Japan}}</ref><ref name="asiaPRESS"/>

===Tourism===
{{Main|Tourism in North Korea}}

===Food===
====Agriculture====
{{Main|Agriculture in North Korea}}

[[File: DPRK rice.jpg|thumb|Crops growing in North Korea]]

North Korea's sparse agricultural resources limit agricultural production. Climate, terrain, and soil conditions are not particularly favorable for farming,<ref name="Savada1994"/> with a relatively short cropping season. Only about 17% of the total landmass, or approximately {{convert|2000000|ha|km2|disp=output only}}, is arable, of which {{convert|1400000|ha|km2|disp=output only}} is well suited for cereal cultivation;<ref name="FAO-WFP-2013"/> the major portion of the country is rugged mountain terrain.<ref name="Savada1994"/>

The weather varies markedly according to elevation, and lack of precipitation, along with infertile soil, makes land at elevations higher than 400 meters unsuitable for purposes other than grazing. Precipitation is geographically and seasonally irregular, and in most parts of the country as much as half the annual rainfall occurs in the three summer months. This pattern favors the cultivation of paddy rice in warmer regions that are outfitted with irrigation and flood control networks.<ref name="Savada1994"/> Rice yields are 5.3 tonnes per hectare, close to international norms.<ref name="38north-20131218"/> In 2005, North Korea was ranked by the [[FAO]] as an estimated 10th in the production of fresh fruit<ref name="FAO-2005-619">{{cite web |url=http://www.fao.org/es/ess/top/commodity.html?lang=en&item=619&year=2005 |title=Major Food and Agricultural Commodities and Producer: Countries by commodity |year=2005 |publisher=[[Food and Agriculture Organization|Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations]] |access-date=April 8, 2022 |url-status=unfit |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090805235547/http://www.fao.org/es/ess/top/commodity.html?lang=en&item=619&year=2005 |archive-date=August 5, 2009 }}</ref> and as an estimated 19th in the production of [[apple]]s.<ref name="FAO-2005-515">{{cite web |url=http://www.fao.org/es/ess/top/commodity.html?item=515&lang=en&year=2005 |title=Major Food and Agricultural Commodities and Producer: Countries by commodity |year=2005 |publisher=[[Food and Agriculture Organization|Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations]] |access-date=April 8, 2022 |url-status=unfit |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090313171151/http://www.fao.org/es/ess/top/commodity.html?item=515&lang=en&year=2005 |archive-date=March 13, 2009 }}</ref>

Farming is concentrated in the flatlands of the four west coast provinces, where a longer growing season, level land, adequate rainfall, and good irrigated soil permit the most intensive cultivation of crops. A narrow strip of similarly fertile land runs through the eastern seaboard [[Hamgyŏng]] provinces and [[Kangwon Province (North Korea)|Kangwŏn]] Province, but the interior provinces of [[Chagang]] and [[Ryanggang]] are too mountainous, cold, and dry to allow much farming. The mountains contain the bulk of North Korea's forest reserves while the foothills within and between the major agricultural regions provide lands for livestock grazing and fruit tree cultivation.<ref name="Savada1994"/>

Since self-sufficiency remains an important pillar of North Korean ideology, self-sufficiency in food production is deemed a worthy goal. Another aim of government policies—to reduce the gap between urban and rural living standards—requires continued investment in the agricultural sector. The stability of the country depends on steady, if not rapid, increases in the availability of food items at reasonable prices. In the early 1990s, there were severe food shortages.<ref name="Savada1994"/><ref name="undp.org">United Nations Development Program, Millennium Development Goals and the DPRK, retrieved October 21, 21, 2011, {{cite web|url=http://www.undp.org/dprk/mdgs.shtml |title=Millennium Development Goals and the DPRK |access-date=May 15, 2013 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111201032637/http://www.undp.org/dprk/mdgs.shtml |archive-date=December 1, 2011 }}</ref><ref>{{cite report |last1=Woo-Cumings |first1=Meredith |title=The Political Ecology of Famine: The North Korean Catastrophe and Its Lessons |date=2002 |hdl=10419/111123 |hdl-access=free }}</ref>

[[File:North Korea tractor.jpg|left|thumb|A tractor in North Korea]]
The most far-reaching statement on agricultural policy is embodied in Kim Il Sung's 1964 ''[[Theses on the Socialist Agrarian Question in Our Country]]'', which underscores the government's concern for agricultural development.<ref>{{cite book|last=Josephson |first=Paul R. |title=Would Trotsky Wear a Bluetooth?: Technological Utopianism under Socialism, 1917–1989 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=rOvHOUziXSAC&pg=PA143 |date=December 25, 2009 |publisher=The Johns Hopkins University Press |location=Baltimore |isbn=978-0-8018-9841-9 |page=143 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170225095658/https://books.google.com/books?id=rOvHOUziXSAC&pg=PA143 |archive-date=February 25, 2017 }}</ref> Kim emphasized technological and educational progress in the countryside as well as collective forms of ownership and management. As industrialization progressed, the share of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries in the total national output declined from 63.5% and 31.4%, respectively, in 1945 and 1946, to a low of 26.8% in 1990. Their share in the labor force also declined from 57.6% in 1960 to 34.4% in 1989.<ref name="Savada1994"/>

In the 1990s, the decreasing ability to carry out mechanized operations (including the pumping of water for irrigation), as well as lack of chemical inputs, was clearly contributing to reduced yields and increased harvesting and post-harvest losses.<ref name="FAO-WFP-2013"/>

Incremental improvements in agricultural production have been made since the late 1990s, bringing North Korea close to self-sufficiency in [[staple food]]s by 2013. In particular, rice yields have steadily improved, though yields on other crops have generally not improved. The production of protein foods remains inadequate. Access to chemical fertilizer has declined, but the use of compost and other organic fertilizer has been encouraged.<ref name="FAO-WFP-2013">{{cite report|url=http://www.fao.org/docrep/019/aq118e/aq118e.pdf |title=FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea |publisher=Food and Agriculture Organization/World Food Programme |year=2013 |access-date=January 7, 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140107145549/http://www.fao.org/docrep/019/aq118e/aq118e.pdf |archive-date=January 7, 2014 }}</ref><ref name="38north-20131218">{{cite news|url=http://38north.org/2013/12/rireson121813/ |title=The State of North Korean Farming: New Information from the UN Crop Assessment Report |author=Randall Ireson |publisher=U.S.–Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies |work=[[38 North]] |date=December 18, 2013 |access-date=January 7, 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140710015244/http://38north.org/2013/12/rireson121813/ |archive-date=July 10, 2014 }}</ref>

====Fisheries====
{{Main|Fishing industry in North Korea}}
North Korean fisheries export seafood, primarily [[crab]], to [[Dandong, Liaoning]], illicitly.<ref name="SCMPFISH">{{cite news |newspaper=[[South China Morning Post]] |title=The fishy side of China's ban on North Korean imports |url=http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2109193/fishy-side-chinas-ban-north-korean-imports |date=August 31, 2017 |first=Choi |last=Chi-yuk |access-date=August 31, 2017 |archive-date=August 31, 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170831141328/http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2109193/fishy-side-chinas-ban-north-korean-imports |url-status=live }}</ref> Crabs, clams and conches from the [[Yellow Sea]] waters of North Korea are popular in China, possibly because the less salty water improves taste.<ref name="SCMPFISH"/>

====Food distribution system====
Since the 1950s, a majority of North Koreans have received their food through the [[public distribution system (North Korea)|public distribution system]] (PDS). The PDS requires farmers in agricultural regions to hand over a portion of their production to the government and then reallocates the surplus to urban regions, which cannot grow their own foods. About 70% of the [[Demographics of North Korea|North Korean population]], including the entire [[urban population]], receives food through this government-run system.<ref name="FAO-WFP-2013"/>

Before the floods, recipients were generally allotted 600–700&nbsp;grams per day while high officials, military men, heavy laborers, and public security personnel were allotted slightly larger portions of 700–800&nbsp;grams per day.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Goodkind|first1=Daniel|last2=West|first2=Loraine|title=The North Korean Famine and Its Impact Demographic|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2695207|journal=Population Council|jstor=2695207|access-date=March 8, 2021|archive-date=March 8, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210308114755/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2695207|url-status=live}}</ref> As of 2013, the target average distribution was 573 grams of cereal equivalent per person per day, but varied according to age, occupation, and whether rations are received elsewhere (such as school meals).<ref name="FAO-WFP-2013"/> However, as of 2019, this number has been reduced to 312 grams per day according to an investigation conducted by the [[United Nations]] between March 29 and April 12.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/north-korea-food-insecurity-food-aid/|title=North Korea Cuts Food Rations to Just 11 Ounces per Day|date=May 3, 2019 |access-date=December 19, 2019|archive-date=December 19, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191219010000/https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/north-korea-food-insecurity-food-aid/|url-status=live}}</ref>

Decreases in production affected the quantity of food available through the public distribution system. Shortages were compounded when the North Korean government imposed further restrictions on collective farmers. When farmers, who had never been covered by the PDS, were mandated by the government to reduce their own food allotments from 167 kilograms to 107 kilograms of grain per person each year, they responded by withholding portions of the required amount of grain. By 2008, the system had significantly recovered, and, from 2009 to 2013, daily per person rations averaged at 400 grams per day for much of the year, though in 2011 it dropped to 200 grams per day from May to September.<ref name="FAO-WFP-2013"/>

It is estimated that in the early 2000s, the average North Korean family drew some 80% of its income from small businesses that were technically illegal (though unenforced) in North Korea. In 2002 and in 2010, [[Jangmadang|private markets]] were progressively legalized.<ref name="atimes-20110923">{{cite news|url=http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/MI23Dg02.html |title=It's not all doom and gloom in Pyongyang |publisher=Asia Times |date=September 23, 2011 |access-date=October 9, 2011 |url-status=unfit |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110924095232/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/MI23Dg02.html |archive-date=September 24, 2011 }}</ref> As of 2013, urban and farmer markets were held every 10 days, and most urban residents lived within 2&nbsp;km of a market, with markets having an increasing role in obtaining food.<ref name="FAO-WFP-2013"/>

In recent years the government policy shifted towards a more controlled commercial networks, by restricting local markets and pushing sales in State-Owned Stores.<ref name="rfa.org">{{cite web |last1=Ahn |first1=Chang Gyu |title=Illegal nighttime markets pop up in North Korea |url=https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/markets-02282024155938.html |website=RFA |access-date=9 September 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240425153144/https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/markets-02282024155938.html |archive-date=25 April 2024}}</ref><ref name="North Korea Restricts Local Markets">{{cite web |last1=Jeong |first1=Yon Park |title=North Korea Restricts Local Markets, Pushing Sales in State-Owned Stores |url=https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/markets-06032021152857.html |website=RFA |access-date=9 September 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240224134223/https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/markets-06032021152857.html |archive-date=24 February 2024}}</ref>

====Crisis and famine====
{{Main|North Korean famine}}
From 1994 to 1998, North Korea suffered a famine. Since North Korea is a closed country, the number of specific deaths in the incident is difficult to know. According to different literature, the starved or malnourished death toll is estimated to be between 240,000 and 480,000. Since 1998 there has been a gradual recovery in agriculture production, which by 2013 brought North Korea back close to self-sufficiency in [[staple food]]s. However, as of 2013, most households have borderline or poor food consumption, and consumption of protein remains inadequate.<ref name="FAO-WFP-2013"/>

In the 1990s, the North Korean economy saw stagnation turning into crisis. Economic assistance received from the Soviet Union and China was an important factor of its economic growth. Upon its collapse in 1991, the Soviet Union withdrew its support and demanded payment in hard currency for imports. China stepped in to provide some assistance and supplied food and oil, most of it reportedly at concessionary prices.{{Citation needed|date=January 2008}} The North Korean economy was undermined and its industrial output began to decline in 1990. Deprived of industrial inputs, including fertilizers, pesticides, and electricity for irrigation, agricultural output also started to decrease even before North Korea had a series of natural disasters in the mid-1990s. This evolution, combined with a series of natural disasters including record floods in 1995, caused one of the worst economic crises in North Korea's history. Other causes of this crisis were high defense spending (about 25% of GDP) and bad governance.

In December 1991, North Korea established a "zone of free economy and trade" to include the northeastern port cities of Unggi ([[Sonbong|Sŏnbong]]), Ch'ŏngjin, and Najin. The establishment of this zone also had ramifications on the questions of how far North Korea would go in opening its economy to the West and to South Korea, the future of the development scheme for the [[Tumen River]] area, and, more important, how much North Korea would reform its economic system.<ref name="Savada1994"/>

North Korea announced in December 1993 a three-year transitional economic policy placing primary emphasis on agriculture, light industry, and foreign trade. However, lack of fertilizer, natural disasters, and poor storage and transportation practices have left the country more than a million tons per year short of grain self-sufficiency.<ref name="Bloomberg2016">{{cite web|last1=McFerron|first1=Whitney|title=North Korea Food Supply Imperiled by Drought, UN Says|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-27/north-korea-s-food-supply-imperiled-by-water-shortages-un-says|website=Bloomberg.com|access-date=February 23, 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160710111621/http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-27/north-korea-s-food-supply-imperiled-by-water-shortages-un-says|archive-date=July 10, 2016|date=April 27, 2016|quote=North Korea's already-low food supplies are about to get worse after poor rainfall in the past year slashed the nation's critical rice crop, the United Nations said.  At least 70% of North Korea's population, or about 18 million people, already rely on the government as their main source of food grain and for months has received well below the targeted daily ration, UN's Food & Agriculture Organization said in a report Wednesday. The country will need to import almost 700,000 metric tons of grain to meet its needs this year, but government purchases are only expected to reach 300,000 tons, the report said.}}</ref><ref name="UPI2016">{{cite web|last1=Shim|first1=Elizabeth|title=North Korea's food shortage grows but elites remain unaffected, Seoul says|url=http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/09/27/North-Koreas-food-shortage-grows-but-elites-remain-unaffected-Seoul-says/4001474997303/|website=UPI.com|access-date=February 23, 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170120044413/http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/09/27/North-Koreas-food-shortage-grows-but-elites-remain-unaffected-Seoul-says/4001474997303/|archive-date=January 20, 2017|date=September 27, 2016|quote=In 2014, North Korea's food shortage was estimated to be 340,000 tons and 407,000 tons in 2015. In 2015, North Korea's grain production was hit heavily by a drought. A lack of fertilizer and other resources could have also contributed to the deficit, according to the report.}}</ref> Moreover, lack of foreign exchange to purchase spare parts and oil for electricity generation left many factories idle.<ref name="RandPark2010Dissertation">{{cite web|last1=Park|first1=Ki-Tae|title=Analyzing North Korea's Decision-Making Process on its Nuclear Weapons Programs with the Rational Choice and Cognitive Choice Models|url=http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2010/RAND_RGSD268.pdf|website=Rand.org|publisher=Pardee Rand Graduate School|access-date=February 23, 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130310231533/http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2010/RAND_RGSD268.pdf|archive-date=March 10, 2013|date=2010|quote=This severe shortage of oil imports and coal production provided the first phase of vicious cycle of economic recession by getting industrial factories idle in the first place. Pyongyang, in return, could have not produced export merchandize enough to earn foreign reserve due to the low operation rates of its factories and lack of raw materials, thereby significantly reducing its foreign reserve acquisition. The lack of foreign exchange reserves again caused the shortage of oil import and then the oil shortage made its amount of agricultural product diminish sharply due to the inability to use its machinery and artificial fertilizers, most of which are highly dependent on oil and coal consumption in their production.}}</ref>

The 1990s famine paralyzed many of the Stalinist economic institutions. The government pursued Kim Jong Il's ''[[Songun]]'' policy, under which the military is deployed to direct production and infrastructure projects. As a consequence of the government's policy of establishing economic self-sufficiency, the North Korean economy has become increasingly isolated from that of the rest of the world, and its industrial development and structure do not reflect its international competitiveness. Domestic firms are shielded from international as well as domestic competition; the result is chronic inefficiency, poor quality, limited product diversity, and underutilization of plants.{{Citation needed|date=January 2008}} This [[protectionism]] also limits the size of the market for North Korean producers,<ref name="Savada1994"/> which prevents taking advantage of [[Economy of scale|economies of scale]].

North Korea, led by Kim Jong Un, declined external aid for flood recovery, relocating 15,400 displaced people to Pyongyang while emphasizing self-reliance. Despite offers from Russia, China, and others, the North has chosen to manage the crisis independently.<ref>{{cite news |title=Thousands of flood victims will be brought to capital for temporary care, North Korean leader says |date=10 August 2024 |url=https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2024/aug/10/thousands-of-flood-victims-will-be-brought-to-capi/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240811204147/https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2024/aug/10/thousands-of-flood-victims-will-be-brought-to-capi/ |archive-date=August 11, 2024 |access-date=12 August 2024 |url-status=live }}</ref>


The food shortage was primarily precipitated by the loss of fuel and other raw materials imports from China and the Soviet Union which had been essential to support an energy intensive and energy inefficient farming system. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the former concessional trade relationships which benefited the North Korea were not available. The three flood and drought years between 1994 and 1996 only served to complete the collapse of the agriculture sector.<ref name="undp.org"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Ireson |first1=Randall |title=Food Security in North Korea: Designing Realistic Possibilities |url=http://fsi-media.stanford.edu/evnts/4140/Ireson_FoodSecurity_2006.pdf |publisher=Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University |access-date=June 15, 2007 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150904004856/http://fsi-media.stanford.edu/evnts/4140/Ireson_FoodSecurity_2006.pdf |archive-date=September 4, 2015 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=CIA World Fact Book |date=November 24, 2021 |url=https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/korea-north/ |access-date=January 24, 2021 |archive-date=August 12, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150812052526/https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html |url-status=live }}</ref>
In 2004, more than half (57%) of the population did not have enough food to stay healthy. 37% of children had their growth stunted and {{frac|1|3}} of mothers severely lacked nutrition.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Central Bureau of Statistics |title=DPRK 2004 Nutrition Assessment Report of Survey Results |url=http://www.unicef.org/dprk/dprk_national_nutrition_assessment_2004_final_report_07_03_05.pdf |access-date=June 15, 2015 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304092506/http://www.unicef.org/dprk/dprk_national_nutrition_assessment_2004_final_report_07_03_05.pdf |archive-date=March 4, 2016 }}</ref>

In 2006, the World Food Program (WFP) and FAO estimated a requirement of 5.3 to 6.5 million tons of grain when domestic production fulfilled only 3.825 million tons.<ref>{{cite journal|journal=[[Human Rights Watch]] |title=A matter of survival: the North Korean government's control of food and the risk of hunger |year=2006 |volume=18 |issue=3 |url=http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-peoples-republic-korea/matter-survival-north-korean-governments-control-food-and |url-status=live |access-date=December 14, 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131215011748/http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-peoples-republic-korea/matter-survival-north-korean-governments-control-food-and |archive-date=December 15, 2013 }}</ref> The country also faces [[land degradation]] after forests stripped for agriculture resulted in soil erosion.<ref>{{cite web |title=CIA&nbsp;— The World Factbook |date=November 24, 2021 |url=https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/korea-north/ |publisher=Central Intelligence Agency |access-date=January 24, 2021 |archive-date=August 12, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150812052526/https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html |url-status=live }}</ref> In 2008, a decade after the worst years of the famine, total production was 3.34 million tons (grain equivalent) compared with a need of 5.98 million tons. Thirty seven percent of the population was deemed to be insecure in food access.<ref>{{cite web|title=FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 8 December 2008 |url=http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/emergencies/docs/FAO-WFP_Crop_and_Food_Supply_Assessment_Mission_Report.pdf |website=fao.org |access-date=January 15, 2009 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150904004856/http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/emergencies/docs/FAO-WFP_Crop_and_Food_Supply_Assessment_Mission_Report.pdf |archive-date=September 4, 2015 }}</ref> Weather continued to pose challenges every year, but overall food production grew gradually, and by 2013, production had increased to the highest level since the crisis, to 5.03 million tons cereal equivalent, against a minimum requirement of 5.37 MMT.<ref>{{cite web|title=FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 28 November 2013 |url=http://www.fao.org/docrep/019/aq118e/aq118e.pdf |website=fao.org |access-date=January 15, 2015 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150306030926/http://www.fao.org/docrep/019/aq118e/aq118e.pdf |archive-date=March 6, 2015 }}</ref>

In 2014, North Korea had an exceptionally good harvest, 5.08 million tonnes of cereal equivalent, almost sufficient to feed the entire population.<ref name="aljazeera-20140327">{{cite news|url=http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/03/n-korea-myth-starvation-2014319124439924471.html |title=N Korea and the myth of starvation |author=Andrei Lankov |publisher=Al Jazeera |date=March 27, 2014 |access-date=November 8, 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141121211528/http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/03/n-korea-myth-starvation-2014319124439924471.html |archive-date=November 21, 2014 }}</ref> While food production had recovered significantly since the hardest years of 1996 and 1997, the recovery was fragile, subject to adverse weather and year to year economic shortages. Distribution was uneven, with the Public Distribution System being largely ineffective. North Korea now has in most years lower malnutrition levels than in some richer Asian countries.<ref name=ap-20190322>{{cite news |url=https://apnews.com/fe394eef5f7848f5be284d21a4b7624a |title=North Korea, seeking food aid, links sanctions to shortages |last=Talmadge |first=Eric |publisher=Associated Press |date=March 22, 2019 |access-date=April 2, 2019 |archive-date=May 8, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190508232655/https://apnews.com/fe394eef5f7848f5be284d21a4b7624a |url-status=live }}</ref> However, in 2019 North Korea had the worst harvest in over a decade, which the United Nations described as a "hunger crisis".<ref>{{Cite web|date=May 3, 2019|title=North Korean families facing deep 'hunger crisis' after worst harvest in 10 years, UN food assessment shows|url=https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/05/1037831|access-date=October 20, 2021|website=UN News|language=en|archive-date=October 20, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211020073325/https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/05/1037831|url-status=live}}</ref>

===Mining===
{{Main|Mining in North Korea}}
According to a 2012 report by South Korea-based North Korea Resource Institute (NKRI), North Korea has substantial reserves of iron ore, coal, limestone, and magnesite.<ref name=KH82612>{{cite news|title=N.K. mineral resources may be worth $9.7tr|url=http://view.koreaherald.com/kh/view.php?ud=20120826000070|access-date=August 27, 2012|newspaper=[[The Korea Herald]]|date=August 26, 2012|agency=Yonhap News}}</ref> In addition, North Korea is thought to have tremendous potential rare metal resources, which have been valued in excess of US$6 trillion.<ref>{{cite news|title=North Korea, New Land of Opportunity? |url=http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/north-korea-new-land-of-opportunity-01192012.html |access-date=September 2, 2012 |newspaper=Bloomberg Business News |date=January 19, 2012 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120817080358/http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/north-korea-new-land-of-opportunity-01192012.html |archive-date=August 17, 2012 }}</ref>

It is the world's 18th largest producer of [[List of countries by iron production|iron]] and [[List of countries by zinc production|zinc]], and has the [[Coal#World coal reserves|22nd largest]] [[coal]] reserves in the world. It is also the 15th largest [[List of countries by fluorite production|fluorite producer]] and 12th largest producer of [[List of countries by copper mine production|copper]] and [[List of countries by salt production|salt]] in Asia. Other major natural resources in production include [[lead]], [[tungsten]], [[graphite]], [[magnesite]], [[gold]], [[pyrite]]s, [[fluorspar]], and [[hydropower]].

In 2015, North Korea exported 19.7 million tonnes of coal, worth $1.06 billion, much of it to China.<ref>[http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2053695/china-suspends-north-korean-coal-imports-three-weeks China suspends North Korean coal imports for three weeks in line with UN sanctions] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161212054426/http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2053695/china-suspends-north-korean-coal-imports-three-weeks |date=December 12, 2016 }}, SCMP, December 11, 2016</ref>
In 2016 it was estimated that coal shipments to China accounted for about 40% of exports.<ref>{{cite news |title=Striking black gold: How North Koreans became coal entrepreneurs |url=https://www.nknews.org/2016/06/striking-black-gold-how-north-koreans-became-coal-entrepreneurs/ |first=Andrei |last=Lankov |work=[[NK News]] |date=June 14, 2016 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160614123513/https://www.nknews.org/2016/06/striking-black-gold-how-north-koreans-became-coal-entrepreneurs/ |archive-date=June 14, 2016 |access-date=June 14, 2016 }}</ref>

However, starting from February 2017 China suspended all North Korean coal imports, although according to China overall trade with North Korea increased.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/world/asia/china-north-korea-trade-coal-nuclear.html?_r=0 |last1=Perlez|first1=Jane|author2=Yufan Huang|title=China Says Its Trade With North Korea Has Increased |date=April 13, 2017 |access-date=April 22, 2017 | work=[[The New York Times]]|url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170622203936/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/world/asia/china-north-korea-trade-coal-nuclear.html?_r=0 |archive-date=June 22, 2017 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/18/world/asia/north-korea-china-coal-imports-suspended.html |author=Choe Sang-Hun|title=China Suspends All Coal Imports From North Korea|date=February 18, 2017| work=[[The New York Times]] |access-date=February 25, 2017 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170219080116/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/18/world/asia/north-korea-china-coal-imports-suspended.html |archive-date=February 19, 2017 }}</ref>

===Information technology and culture===
{{see also|Korea Computer Center}}
North Korea has a developing information technology industry. In 2018, a technological exhibition unveiled a new [[Wi-Fi]] service called [[Mirae (Wi-Fi)|Mirae]] ("Future"), which allowed mobile devices to access the intranet network in Pyongyang. The exhibition also showcased a [[home automation]] system using [[speech recognition]] in Korean.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-46563454|title=North Korea's high-tech pursuits: Propaganda or progress?|first=Pratik|last=Jakhar|publisher=BBC|date=December 15, 2018|access-date=December 16, 2018|archive-date=August 7, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200807103256/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-46563454|url-status=live}}</ref>

North Korea established the Artificial Intelligence Research Institute under the Bureau of the Information Industry Guidance in 2013, which in 2021 was incorporated into the [[Ministry of Information Industry (North Korea)|Ministry of Information Industry]].<ref name=38north-20240123>{{cite web |url=https://www.38north.org/2024/01/north-koreas-artificial-intelligence-research-trends-and-potential-civilian-and-military-applications/ |title=North Korea's Artificial Intelligence Research: Trends and Potential Civilian and Military Applications |last=Kim |first=Hyuk |publisher=The Henry L. Stimson Center |work=[[38 North]] |date=23 January 2024 |access-date=30 January 2024 |archive-date=January 30, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240130141817/https://www.38north.org/2024/01/north-koreas-artificial-intelligence-research-trends-and-potential-civilian-and-military-applications/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

North Korea's [[cartoon animation]] studios such as [[SEK Studio]] sub-contract work from South Korean animation studios.<ref>{{Cite news|first=Sunny|last=Lee|title=US cartoons 'made in North Korea' |date=March 14, 2007|url=http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/IC14Dg03.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070321004339/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/IC14Dg03.html|url-status=unfit|archive-date=March 21, 2007|access-date=October 27, 2010|work=[[Asia Times Online]]}}</ref> [[Mansudae Overseas Projects]] builds monuments around the world.<ref name=millions>{{cite news|last=Winn |first=Patrick |title=North Korea propaganda unit builds monuments abroad |url=http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/south-korea/110802/north-korea-cambodia-propaganda-angkor-wat |work=Global Post |access-date=October 11, 2012 |date=August 3, 2011 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121016211348/http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/south-korea/110802/north-korea-cambodia-propaganda-angkor-wat |archive-date=October 16, 2012 }}</ref>