Editing Deconstruction (section)

====Not a critique====
Derrida states that deconstruction is not a [[critique]] in the [[Kantianism|Kantian]] sense.<ref name="Wood"/>{{rp|3}} This is because [[Immanuel Kant|Kant]] defines the term ''critique'' as the opposite of [[dogmatism]]. For Derrida, it is not possible to escape the dogmatic baggage of the language used in order to perform a pure critique in the Kantian sense. Language is dogmatic because it is inescapably [[Metaphysics|metaphysical]]. Derrida argues that language is inescapably metaphysical because it is made up of [[Sign (linguistics)|signifiers]] that only refer to that which transcends them—the signified.{{Citation needed|date=April 2015}} In addition, Derrida asks rhetorically "Is not the idea of knowledge and of the acquisition of knowledge in itself metaphysical?"<ref name="Allison"/>{{rp|5}} By this, Derrida means that all claims to know something necessarily involve an assertion of the metaphysical type that something ''is'' the case somewhere. For Derrida the concept of neutrality is suspect and dogmatism is therefore involved in everything to a certain degree. Deconstruction can challenge a particular dogmatism and hence de-sediment dogmatism in general, but it cannot escape all dogmatism all at once.