Editing Benjamin Lee Whorf (section)

=== Linguistic relativity ===

{{main|Linguistic relativity}}
Whorf is best known as the main proponent of what he called the principle of linguistic relativity, but which is often known as "the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis", named for him and Edward Sapir. Whorf never stated the principle in the form of a hypothesis, and the idea that linguistic categories influence perception and cognition was shared by many other scholars before him. But because Whorf, in his articles, gave specific examples of how he saw the grammatical categories of specific languages related to conceptual and behavioral patterns, he pointed towards an empirical research program that has been taken up by subsequent scholars, and which is often called "Sapir–Whorf studies".<ref>{{harvcoltxt|Carroll|2005}}; {{harvcoltxt|Newcombe|Uttal|2006}}</ref>

==== Sources of influence on Whorf's thinking ====
[[File:Whorf Shawnee Example.png|400px|thumb|Whorf's illustration of the difference between the English and Shawnee gestalt construction of cleaning a gun with a ramrod. From the article "Language and Science", originally published in the MIT technology Review, 1940. Image copyright of MIT Press.]]

Whorf and Sapir both drew explicitly on [[Albert Einstein]]'s principle of [[general relativity]]; hence linguistic relativity refers to the concept of grammatical and semantic categories of a specific language providing a frame of reference as a medium through which observations are made.<ref name="Heynick 1983"/><ref>{{harvcoltxt|Alford|1981}}</ref> Following an original observation by Boas, Sapir demonstrated that speakers of a given language perceive sounds that are acoustically different as the same, if the sound comes from the underlying [[phoneme]] and does not contribute to changes in semantic meaning. Furthermore, speakers of languages are attentive to sounds, particularly if the same two sounds come from different phonemes. Such differentiation is an example of how various observational frames of reference leads to different patterns of attention and perception.<ref>{{harvcoltxt|Lee|1996|p=88}}</ref>

Whorf was also influenced by [[gestalt psychology]], believing that languages require their speakers to describe the same events as different gestalt constructions, which he called "isolates from experience".<ref>{{harvcoltxt|Lee|1996|p=202}}</ref> An example is how the action of cleaning a gun is different in English and [[Shawnee language|Shawnee]]: English focuses on the instrumental relation between two objects and the purpose of the action (removing dirt); whereas the Shawnee language focuses on the movement—using an arm to create a dry space in a hole. The event described is the same, but the attention in terms of [[Figure-ground (perception)|figure and ground]] are different.<ref>{{harvcoltxt|Lamb|2000}}; {{harvcoltxt|Lee|1996|pp=120–124}}</ref>

==== Degree of influence of language on thought ====
If read superficially, some of Whorf's statements lend themselves to the interpretation that he supported [[linguistic determinism]]. For example, in an often-quoted passage Whorf writes:
{{blockquote|text=We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native language. The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscope flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds—and this means largely by the linguistic systems of our minds. We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it in this way—an agreement that holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the patterns of our language. The agreement is of course, an implicit and unstated one, but its terms are absolutely obligatory; we cannot talk at all except by subscribing to the organization and classification of data that the agreement decrees. We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar, or can in some way be calibrated.<ref name="SCIENCE" group="w" />}}

The statements about the obligatory nature of the terms of language have been taken to suggest that Whorf meant that language completely determined the scope of possible conceptualizations.<ref name="Pinker 1994"/> However, neo-Whorfians argue that here Whorf is writing about the terms in which we speak of the world, not the terms in which we think of it.<ref>{{harvcoltxt|Gumperz|Levinson|1996|p=22}}; {{harvcoltxt|Levinson|2012}}</ref> Whorf noted that to communicate thoughts and experiences with members of a [[speech community]] speakers must use the linguistic categories of their shared language, which requires moulding experiences into the shape of language to speak them—a process called "thinking for speaking". This interpretation is supported by Whorf's subsequent statement that "No individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality, but is constrained by certain modes of interpretation even when he thinks himself most free". Similarly, the statement that observers are led to different pictures of the universe has been understood as an argument that different conceptualizations are not comparable, making translation between different conceptual and linguistic systems impossible. Neo-Whorfians argue this to be a misreading since throughout his work one of his main points was that such systems could be "calibrated" and thereby be made commensurable, but only when we become aware of the differences in conceptual schemes through linguistic analysis.<ref name="LeavittPhil" />

==== Hopi time ====
{{main|Hopi time controversy}}
Whorf's study of Hopi time has been the most widely discussed and criticized example of linguistic relativity. In his analysis he argues that there is a relation between how the [[Hopi]] people conceptualize time, how they speak of temporal relations, and the grammar of the Hopi language. Whorf's most elaborate argument for the existence of linguistic relativity was based on what he saw as a fundamental difference in the understanding of time as a conceptual category among the Hopi.<ref name="HABITUAL" group="w" /> He argued that the Hopi language, in contrast to English and other [[Standard Average European|SAE languages]], does not treat the flow of time as a sequence of distinct countable instances, like "three days" or "five years", but rather as a single process. Because of this difference, the language lacks nouns that refer to units of time. He proposed that the Hopi view of time was fundamental in all aspects of their culture and furthermore explained certain patterns of behavior. In his 1939 memorial essay to Sapir he wrote that "... the Hopi language is seen to contain no words, grammatical forms, construction or expressions that refer directly to what we call 'time', or to past, present, or future..."<ref name="HABITUAL" group="w" />

Linguist [[Ekkehart Malotki]] challenged Whorf's analyses of Hopi temporal expressions and concepts with numerous examples how the Hopi language refers to time.<ref name="MALOTKI">{{harvcoltxt|Malotki| 1983}}</ref> Malotki argues that in the Hopi language the system of tenses consists of future and non-future and that the single difference between the three-tense system of European languages and the Hopi system, is that the latter combines past and present to form a single category.<ref group="n">It is not uncommon for non-Indo-European languages not to have a three way tense distinction, but instead to distinguish between realis (past/present) and irrealis (future) moods, and describe the past distinction using [[Completive (aspect)|completive aspect]]. This, for example, is the case in [[Greenlandic language|Greenlandic]]. But this had not been recognized when Whorf wrote. See [[Bernard Comrie]]'s {{harvcoltxt|Comrie|1984}} review of Malotki in which he argues that many of Malotki's examples of a tense distinction in fact rather suggest a modality distinction.</ref>

Critics of Whorf frequently refer to Malotki's data, which would appear to contradict Whorf's statements on Hopi, in order to refute his concept of linguistic relativity; while other scholars have defended the analysis of Hopi, arguing that Whorf's claim was not that Hopi lacked words or categories to describe temporality, but that the Hopi concept of time is altogether different from that of English speakers.<ref name="Dinwoodie" /><ref name="cliff">{{cite journal |last1=Goddard |first1=Cliff |title=Whorf meets Wierzbicka: variation and universals in language and thinking |journal=Language Sciences |date=2003 |volume=25 |issue=4 |page=393-432 |doi=10.1016/S0388-0001(03)00002-0 |url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0388000103000020 |access-date=12 April 2024 |quote=At this point, the discussion of Whorf’s work on Hopi has a tendency to break down. Critics of Whorf quote various of his statements which appear to be contradicted by Malotki’s data. Supporters counter that the critics haven’t understood what Whorf really meant, and that even if Whorf was mistaken on a few linguistic details his overall contention that the Hopi have a fundamentally different conceptualisation of time is valid. In my view, a good deal of the confusion is caused by a lack of agreement about what exactly constitutes a ‘‘fundamentally’’ different conceptualisation of time.}}</ref> Whorf described the Hopi categories of [[tense (grammar)|tense]], noting that time is not divided into past, present and future, as is common in European languages, but rather a single tense refers to both present and past while another refers to events that have not yet happened and may or may not happen in the future. He also described a large array of stems that he called "tensors" which describes aspects of temporality, but without referring to countable units of time as in English and most European languages.<ref>{{harvcoltxt|Lee|1996|p=140}}; {{harvcoltxt|Lee|1991}}</ref>