Editing Battle of Chosin Reservoir (section)

===Outcome assessment===
Roy E. Appleman, the author of US Army official history ''South to Naktong, North to Yalu'', writes that both sides could claim victory: the PVA 9th Corps ultimately held the battlefield, while X&nbsp;Corps held off the PVA 9th Corps in a series of battles that enabled it to withdraw most of its forces as an effective tactical unit.{{sfn|Appleman|1990|pp=355–356}} Writing for National Public Radio, [[Anthony Kuhn]] said that both sides have remembered the battle in "starkly differing" ways: for the United States, it won because its forces broke out of their encirclement largely intact and "inflicted heavy losses on the Chinese" while for China, it won because it "drove a vastly technologically superior foe from the battlefield, and eventually forced it to sign an armistice agreement some three years later."<ref>{{cite news |last1=Kuhn |first1=Anthony |title='God ... Let Us Survive': Remembering Korean War's Chosin Battle And Evacuation |agency=National Public Radio |date=December 4, 2020 |url=https://www.npr.org/2020/12/04/941237449/god-let-us-survive-remembering-korean-wars-chosin-battle-and-evacuation}}</ref> [[Allan R. Millett]] qualifies his assessment of the battle as a Chinese "geographic victory" in that they ejected X&nbsp;Corps from North Korea with the PVA’s tactical failure of achieving their stated objective of destroying the 1st Marine Division, adding that the campaign gave the UN confidence that it could withstand the superior numbers of the Chinese forces.{{sfn|Millett}} The official Chinese history, published by [[PLA Academy of Military Science]], states that despite the heavy casualties, the PVA 9th Corps had earned its victory by successfully protecting the eastern flank of Chinese forces in Korea, while inflicting over 10,000 casualties to the UN forces.{{sfn|Chinese Military Science Academy|2000|p=126}}

[[Eliot A. Cohen]] writes that the retreat from Chosin was a UN victory which inflicted such heavy losses on the PVA 9th Corps that it was put out of action until March 1951.{{sfn|Cohen|2012|p=186}} Paul M. Edwards, founder of the Center for the Study of the Korean War,{{sfn|Center for Study}} draws parallels between the battle at Chosin and the [[Dunkirk evacuation]]. He writes that the retreat from Chosin following a "massive strategic victory" by the Chinese has been represented as "a moment of heroic history" for the UN forces.{{sfn|Edwards|2018|p=66}} Appleman, on the other hand, questioned the necessity of a sea-borne evacuation to preserve the UN forces, asserting that X&nbsp;Corps had the strength to break out of the Chinese encirclement at Hungnam at the end of the battle.{{sfn|Appleman|1990|pp=371–372}} Chinese historian Li Xiaobing acknowledges X&nbsp;Corps' successful withdrawal from North Korea, and writes that the Battle of Chosin "has become a part of Marine lore, but it was still a retreat, not a victory."{{sfn|Li|2014|p=52}} [[Bruce Cumings]] simply refers to the battle as a "terrible defeat" for the Americans.{{sfn|Cumings|2005|p=280}}

Patrick C. Roe, who served as an intelligence officer with the 7th Marine Regiment at Chosin,{{sfn|Hull|2001}} asserts that X&nbsp;Corps directly allowed the Eighth Army to hold the south{{efn|"Loss of the 1st Marine Division would have resulted in the loss of a substantial portion of X&nbsp;Corps. Instead, X&nbsp;Corps was withdrawn intact, while inflicting such damage upon the twelve divisions of the 9th Army that they were out of action until the last days of March. With the reinforcement by X&nbsp;Corps, and with the absence of nearly 40% of total Chinese strength, the Eighth Army was able to hold the south." See {{harvnb|Roe|2000|pp=411–2}}}} and quoted MacArthur in corroborating his view.{{efn|"General MacArthur agreed that this was the decisive battle. In commenting on a study by the Marine Corps Board, he wrote: "The Marine Corps Board of Study rightfully points out that the campaign of the 1st Marine Division with attached Army elements in North Korea was 'largely responsible for preventing reinforcement of CCF forces on Eighth Army front by 12 divisions during a period when such reinforcement might have meant to Eighth Army the difference between maintaining a foothold in Korea or forced evacuation therefrom.'...""See {{harvnb|Roe|2000|p=412}}}} Yu Bin, a historian and a former member of the [[Chinese People's Liberation Army]], states that while the destruction of Task Force Faith{{efn|Yu Bin states that it was the 32nd Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division that was destroyed, reflecting the Chinese mis-identification of the composition of Task Force Faith.{{sfn|Roe|2000|p=329}}}} was viewed as the single greatest Chinese victory of the war, ultimately the PVA 9th Corps had become "a giant hospital" while failing to destroy the numerically inferior UN forces at Chosin as planned.{{sfn|Ryan|Finkelstein|McDevitt|2003|p=130}} {{ill|Zhang Renchu|zh|张仁初}}, whose 26th Army was blamed for allowing the X&nbsp;Corps to escape,{{sfn|Xue & Li Part Four|2000}} had threatened suicide over the outcome, while Song Shilun offered to resign his post.{{sfn|Spurr|1988|p=266}}

The battle exacerbated inter-service hostility, the Marines blaming the US Army and its leadership for the failure.{{sfnm|1a1=Edwards|1y=2006|1p=129|2a1=Edwards|2y=2018|2p=67}} The collapse of the army units fighting on the east of the reservoir was regarded as shameful, and for many years afterwards their role in the battle was largely ignored. Later studies concluded that Task Force MacLean/Faith had held off for five days a significantly larger force than previously thought and that their stand was a significant factor in the Marines' survival. This was eventually recognized in September 1999 when, for its actions at Chosin, Task Force Faith was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation, an award that General Smith blocked when it was first proposed in 1952.{{sfn|Seelinger|2015}}{{sfn|Vogel|2000}}

The Marines evacuated from North Korea and spent January and most of February 1951 rebuilding in the relatively secure South Korea, where they destroyed the well-respected but already weakened North Korean [[10th Division (North Korea)|10th Division]] in [[counter-guerrilla]] operations during the [[First and Second Battles of Wonju#Anti-guerrilla operations|Second Battle of Wonju]].{{sfn|Mossman|1990|p=227}}{{sfn|Brown|2001|p=11}} The Marines returned to regular and heavy action on 21 February in [[Operation Killer]].{{sfn|Brown|2001|pp=20–23}}