Editing Battle of Cannae (section)

== Historical significance ==
=== Effects on Roman military doctrine ===
[[File:Shield of Henry II of France.jpg|thumb|upright=0.8|A shield of [[Henry II of France]] depicting Hannibal's victory at Cannae, an allusion to France's conflict with the Holy Roman Empire during the 16th century]]
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Cannae played a major role in shaping the [[Roman military structure|military structure]] and [[Roman infantry tactics, strategy and battle formations|tactical organization]] of the [[Military establishment of the Roman Republic|Republican army]]. At Cannae, the Roman infantry assumed a formation similar to the Greek [[phalanx]]. This left them vulnerable to Hannibal's tactic of [[double envelopment]] since their inability to maneuver independently from the mass of the army made it impossible for them to counter the strategic encirclement used by the Carthaginian cavalry. The laws of the Roman state requiring command to alternate between the two consuls restricted strategic consistency.{{citation needed|date=August 2018}}

In the years following Cannae, striking reforms were introduced to address these deficiencies. First, the Romans "articulated the phalanx, then divided it into columns, and finally split it up into a great number of small tactical bodies that were capable, now of closing together in a compact impenetrable union, now of changing the pattern with consummate flexibility, of separating one from the other and turning in this or that direction."<ref>Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig, Felix Gilbert, ''Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age'' (Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 337.</ref> For instance, at [[Battle of Ilipa|Ilipa]] and [[Battle of Zama|Zama]], the {{lang|la|[[principes]]}} were formed up well to the rear of the {{lang|la|[[hastati]]}}—a deployment that allowed a greater degree of mobility and maneuverability. The culminating result of this change marked the transition from the traditional [[maniple (military unit)|manipular]] system to the [[cohort (military unit)|cohort]] under [[Gaius Marius]], as the basic infantry unit of the Roman army.{{citation needed|date=August 2018}}

In addition, a unified command came to be seen as a necessity. After various political experiments, [[Scipio Africanus]] was made general-in-chief of the Roman armies in Africa, and was assured this role for the duration of the war. This appointment may have violated the constitutional laws of the [[Roman Republic]] but, as Delbrück wrote, it "effected an internal transformation that increased her military potentiality enormously" while foreshadowing the decline of the Republic's political institutions. Furthermore, the battle exposed the limits of a citizen-[[militia]] army. Following Cannae, the Roman army gradually developed into a professional force.{{citation needed|date=August 2018}}

=== Status in military history ===
Cannae is as famous for Hannibal's [[military tactics|tactics]] as it is for the role it played in [[Military history of ancient Rome|Roman history]]. Not only did Hannibal inflict a defeat on the Roman Republic in a manner unrepeated for over a century until the lesser-known [[Battle of Arausio]], but the battle also has acquired a significant reputation in military history. As military historian [[Theodore Ayrault Dodge]] wrote:

{{blockquote|Few battles of ancient times are more marked by ability... than the battle of Cannae. The position was such as to place every advantage on Hannibal's side. The manner in which the far from perfect Hispanic and Gallic foot was advanced in a wedge in [[echelon formation|echelon]]... was first held there and then withdrawn step by step, until it had reached the converse position... is a simple masterpiece of battle tactics. The advance at the proper moment of the African infantry, and its wheel right and left upon the flanks of the disordered and crowded Roman legionaries, is far beyond praise. The whole battle, from the Carthaginian standpoint, is a consummate piece of art, having no superior, few equal, examples in the history of war.<ref>Theodore Ayrault Dodge, ''Hannibal'' (New York: Perseus Publishing, 2004), pp. 378–379.</ref>}}

[[Will Durant]] wrote, "It was a supreme example of generalship, never bettered in history... and it set the lines of military tactics for 2,000 years".<ref>Will Durant, ''The Story of Civilization'', vol. III (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944), p. 51.</ref>

Hannibal's [[double envelopment]] at Cannae is often viewed as one of the greatest battlefield maneuvers in history, and is cited as the first successful use of the [[pincer movement]] within the [[Western world]] to be recorded in detail.<ref>{{cite web |last=O'Neill |first=Timothy R. |url=http://home.comcast.net/~8cv/references/rotr-handbook.pdf |title=Reconnaissance on the Rappahannock Field Manual |page=65 |access-date=July 4, 2013 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150930221705/http://home.comcast.net/~8cv/references/rotr-handbook.pdf |archive-date=September 30, 2015}}</ref>

=== Cannae model ===
<!-- For citations of these statements, look to O'Connell's ''The Ghosts of Cannae'' below -->
Apart from being one of the greatest defeats inflicted on Roman arms, Cannae represents the archetypal [[battle of annihilation]], a strategy that has rarely succeeded since. As [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]], the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in World War II, wrote, "Every ground commander seeks the battle of annihilation; so far as conditions permit, he tries to duplicate in modern war the classic example of Cannae".<ref>Eisenhower, D. 1948. ''Crusade in Europe'', 325.</ref> "Cannae" has become a byword for military success, and the battle is studied in military academies around the world. The notion that an entire army could be encircled and annihilated within a single stroke led to a fascination among Western generals for centuries, including [[Frederick the Great]] and [[Helmuth Graf von Moltke|Helmuth von Moltke]], who attempted to create their own "Cannae".<ref name="Hanson1996" />

Delbrück's seminal study of the battle influenced German military theorists, particularly Chief of the German General Staff [[Alfred von Schlieffen]], whose "[[Schlieffen Plan]]" was inspired by Hannibal's double envelopment maneuver. Schlieffen believed that the "Cannae model" would continue to be applicable in [[maneuver warfare]] throughout the 20th century:

{{blockquote|A battle of annihilation can be carried out today according to the same plan devised by Hannibal in long forgotten times. The enemy front is not the goal of the principal attack. The mass of the troops and the reserves should not be concentrated against the enemy front; the essential is that the flanks be crushed. The wings should not be sought at the advanced points of the front but rather along the entire depth and extension of the enemy formation. The annihilation is completed through an attack against the enemy's rear... To bring about a decisive and annihilating victory requires an attack against the front and against one or both flanks...<ref>von Schlieffen, Alfred (2012). ''Alfred Von Schlieffen's Military Writings: Military History and Policy'' (Robert Foley, ed., trans.). Routledge.</ref>}}

Schlieffen later developed his own [[operational art|operational]] doctrine in a series of articles, many of which were translated and published in a work entitled ''Cannae''.

In 1991, General [[Norman Schwarzkopf Jr.]], commander of [[Coalition of the Gulf War|coalition forces]] in the [[Gulf War]], cited Hannibal's triumph at Cannae as inspiration for the rapid and successful coalition operations during the conflict.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2001|p=180}}