Editing Baruch Spinoza (section)

===''Ethics''===
[[File:Benedictus de Spinoza cover portrait.jpg|thumb|Engraving of Spinoza, captioned in Latin, "A Jew and an atheist"; he vehemently denied being an atheist.]]
{{Main|Ethics (Spinoza book)}}
Spinoza considered ''The Ethics'' his chief project and philosophical legacy.{{sfn|Israel|2023|p=507}} The work has been associated with that of [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz|Leibniz]] and [[René Descartes]] as part of the [[Rationalism|rationalist]] school of thought,<ref>{{cite web |last=Montanarelli |first=Lisa |title=Spinoza stymies 'God's attorney' / Stewart argues the secular world was at stake in Leibniz face off |url=https://www.sfgate.com/books/article/spinoza-stymies-god-s-attorney-stewart-argues-2543764.php |website=SFGate |date=8 January 2006 |access-date=20 March 2024}}</ref> which includes the assumption that ideas correspond to reality perfectly, in the same way that mathematics is supposed to be an exact representation of the world. The ''Ethics'', a "superbly cryptic masterwork",{{citation  needed|date=April 2025}} contains many unresolved obscurities and is written with a forbidding mathematical structure modeled on Euclid's geometry. The writings of [[René Descartes]] have been described as "Spinoza's starting point".<ref name=tws9912>{{cite news
| first=Harold |last=Bloom|author-link=Harold Bloom
| title = Deciphering Spinoza, the Great Original – Book review of ''Betraying Spinoza. The Renegade Jew Who Gave Us Modernity'' by Rebecca Goldstein
|work=The New York Times
| date = 16 June 2006
| url = https://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/16/arts/16iht-idside17.1986759.html
| access-date =8 September 2009
}}</ref> Spinoza's first publication was his 1663 geometric exposition of proofs using [[Euclid]]'s model with definitions and axioms of Descartes' ''[[Principles of Philosophy]]''. Following Descartes, Spinoza aimed to understand truth through logical deductions from 'clear and distinct ideas', a process which always begins from the 'self-evident truths' of [[axiom]]s.{{sfn|Scruton|2002|pages=31–32}} However, his actual project does not end there: from his first work to his last, there runs a thread of "attending to the highest good" (which also is the highest truth) and thereby achieving a state of peace and harmony, either metaphysically or politically. In this light, the Principles of Philosophy might be viewed as an "exercise in geometric method and philosophy", paving the way for numerous concepts and conclusions that would define his philosophy (see Cogitata Metaphysica).{{sfn|Shirley|2002|p=109}}

====Metaphysics====
Spinoza's [[metaphysics]] consists of one thing, substance, and its modifications (modes). Early in ''The Ethics'' Spinoza argues that only one substance is absolutely [[Infinity|infinite]], self-caused, and eternal. He calls this substance "[[God]]", or "[[Nature]]". He takes these two terms to be [[synonymous]] (in the [[Latin]] the phrase he uses is ''"Deus sive Natura"''). For Spinoza, the whole of the [[natural]] [[universe]] consists of one substance, God, or, what is the same, Nature, and its modifications (modes).
{{blockquote|It cannot be overemphasized how the rest of Spinoza's philosophy—his philosophy of mind, his epistemology, his psychology, his moral philosophy, his political philosophy, and his philosophy of religion—flows more or less directly from the metaphysical underpinnings in Part I of the ''Ethics''.{{sfn|Della Rocca|2008|p=33}}}}

=====Substance, attributes, and modes=====
{{Blockquote|Spinoza sets forth a vision of Being, illuminated by his awareness of God. They may seem strange at first sight. To the question "What is?" he replies: "Substance, its attributes, and modes".|[[Karl Jaspers]]{{sfn|Jaspers|1974|p=9}}}}

Following [[Maimonides]], Spinoza defined [[Substance theory|substance]] as "that which is in itself and is conceived through itself", meaning that it can be understood without any reference to anything external.<ref name=Scruton41>{{harvnb|Scruton|2002|page=41}}</ref> Being conceptually independent also means that the same thing is [[Ontology|ontologically]] independent, depending on nothing else for its existence and being the 'cause of itself' (''causa sui'').<ref name=Scruton41 /> A mode is something which cannot exist independently but rather must do so as part of something else on which it depends, including properties (for example color), relations (such as size) and individual things.<ref name=Scruton42>{{harvnb|Scruton|2002|page=42}}</ref> Modes can be further divided into 'finite' and 'infinite' ones, with the latter being evident in every finite mode (he gives examples of "motion" and "rest").{{sfn|Scruton|2002|page=43}} The traditional understanding of an [[Property (philosophy)|attribute]] in philosophy is similar to Spinoza's modes, though he uses that word differently.<ref name=Scruton42 /> To him, an attribute is "that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance", and there are possibly an infinite number of them.{{sfn|Scruton|2002|page=44}} It is the essential nature that is "attributed" to reality by intellect.{{sfn|Scruton|2002|page=45}}
[[File:Portrait of a man, thought to be Baruch de Spinoza, attributed to Barend Graat.jpg|thumb|180px|Probable portrait of Spinoza, by [[Barend Graat]], 1666]]

Spinoza defined [[God]] as "a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence", and since "no cause or reason" can prevent such a being from existing, it must exist.{{sfn|Scruton|2002|page=45}} This is a form of the [[ontological argument]], which is claimed to prove the existence of God, but Spinoza went further in stating that it showed that only God exists.<ref name=Scruton38>{{harvnb|Scruton|2002|page=38}}</ref> Accordingly, he stated that "Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can exist or be conceived without God".<ref name=Scruton38 />{{sfn|Lin|2007|p=273}} This means that God is identical with the universe, an idea which he encapsulated in the phrase "''Deus sive Natura''" ('God or Nature'), which some have interpreted as [[atheism]] or [[pantheism]].{{sfn|Scruton|2002|page=51}} Though there are many more of them, God can be known by humans through either the attribute of extension or the attribute of thought.{{sfn|Scruton|2002|page=57}} Thought and extension represent giving complete accounts of the world in mental or physical terms.{{sfn|Scruton|2002|page=59}} To this end, he says that "the mind and the body are one and the same thing, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension".{{sfn|Scruton|2002|p=60}}

After stating his proof for God's existence, Spinoza addresses who "God" is. Spinoza believed that God is "the sum of the natural and physical laws of the universe and certainly not an individual entity or creator".<ref>Cannon, J. A. (2009, May 17). World in time of upheaval: Sources of enlightenment. Deseret News.</ref> Spinoza attempts to prove that God is just the substance of the universe by first stating that substances do not share attributes or essences and then demonstrating that God is a "substance" with an infinite number of attributes, thus the attributes possessed by any other substances must also be possessed by God. Therefore, God is just the sum of all the substances of the universe. God is the only substance in the universe, and everything is a part of God. This view was described by [[Charles Hartshorne]] as [[Classical Pantheism]].<ref name="auto4">Charles Hartshorne and William Reese, "Philosophers Speak of God", Humanity Books, 1953 ch. 4</ref>

Spinoza argues that "things could not have been produced by God in any other way or in any other order than is the case".<ref>Baruch Spinoza. ''Ethics'', in'' Spinoza: Complete Works'', trans. by Samuel Shirley and ed. by Michael L. Morgan (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2002), see Part I, Proposition 33.</ref> Therefore, concepts such as 'freedom' and 'chance' have little meaning.{{sfn|Scruton|2002|page=51}} This picture of Spinoza's determinism is illuminated in ''Ethics'': "the infant believes that it is by free will that it seeks the breast; the angry boy believes that by free will he wishes vengeance; the timid man thinks it is with free will he seeks flight; the drunkard believes that by a free command of his mind he speaks the things which when sober he wishes he had left unsaid. … All believe that they speak by a free command of the mind, whilst, in truth, they have no power to restrain the impulse which they have to speak."{{sfn|Curley|1996|p=73}} In his letter to G. H. Schuller (Letter 58), he wrote: "men are conscious of their desire and unaware of the causes by which [their desires] are determined."<ref>''Ethics'', Pt. I, Prop. XXXVI, Appendix: "[M]en think themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of their volitions and desires, and never even dream, in their ignorance, of the causes which have disposed of them so to wish and desire."</ref> He also held that knowledge of true causes of passive emotion can transform it into an active emotion, thus anticipating one of the key ideas of [[Sigmund Freud]]'s [[psychoanalysis]].{{sfn|Scruton|2002|p=86}}

According to Eric Schliesser, Spinoza was skeptical regarding the possibility of knowledge of nature and as a consequence at odds with scientists such as Galileo and Huygens.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9223/ |website=PhilSci-Archive |title = "Spinoza and the Philosophy of Science: Mathematics, Motion, and Being"|date = 9 July 2012}}</ref>

=====Causality=====
Although the [[principle of sufficient reason]] is commonly associated with [[Gottfried Leibniz]], Spinoza employs it in a more systematic manner. In Spinoza's philosophical framework, questions concerning why a particular phenomenon exists are always answerable, and these answers are provided in terms of the relevant cause. Spinoza's approach involves first providing an account of a phenomenon, such as goodness or consciousness, to explain it, and then further explaining the phenomenon in terms of itself. For instance, he might argue that consciousness is the degree of power of a mental state.{{sfn|Della Rocca|2008|p=30}}

Spinoza has also been described as an "[[Epicureanism|Epicurean]] materialist",<ref name="tws9912" /> specifically in reference to his opposition to Cartesian mind-body dualism. This view was held by Epicureans before him, as they believed that atoms with their probabilistic paths were the only substance that existed fundamentally.<ref name="Konstan">{{Cite SEP|last=Konstan|first=David|url-id=epicurus|title=Epicurus|date=July 8, 2022}}</ref>{{sfn|Curley|1996|p=118}} Spinoza, however, deviated significantly from Epicureans by adhering to strict determinism, much like the Stoics before him, in contrast to the Epicurean belief in the probabilistic path of atoms, which is more in line with contemporary thought on [[quantum mechanics]].<ref name="Konstan" /><ref>{{cite web|title=Baruch Spinoza, "Human Beings are Determined"|url=http://philosophy.lander.edu/intro/spinoza.shtml|access-date=21 February 2017|work=Lander.edu}}</ref>

=====The emotions=====
One thing which seems, on the surface, to distinguish Spinoza's view of the emotions from both [[René Descartes|Descartes']] and [[David Hume|Hume's]] pictures of them is that he takes the emotions to be [[cognition|cognitive]] in some important respect. [[Jonathan Bennett (philosopher)|Jonathan Bennett]] claims that "Spinoza mainly saw emotions as caused by cognitions. [However] he did not say this clearly enough and sometimes lost sight of it entirely."{{sfn|Bennett|1984|p=276}}
Spinoza provides several demonstrations which purport to show truths about how human emotions work. The picture presented is, according to Bennett, "unflattering, coloured as it is by universal [[egoism]]".{{sfn|Bennett|1984|p=277}}

====Ethical philosophy====
Spinoza's notion of blessedness figures centrally in his ethical philosophy. Spinoza writes that blessedness (or salvation or freedom), "consists, namely, in a constant and eternal love of God, or in God's love for men.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Spinoza |first=Benedictus de |url=https://archive.org/details/ethics0000spin_w3j0 |title=Ethics |publisher=[[Penguin Books]] |year=1996 |isbn=9780140435719 |pages=176}}</ref> Philosopher [[Jonathan Bennett (philosopher)|Jonathan Bennett]] interprets this as Spinoza wanting "'blessedness' to stand for the most elevated and desirable state one could possibly be in."{{sfn|Bennett|1984|p=371}} Understanding what is meant by "most elevated and desirable state" requires understanding Spinoza's notion of ''[[conatus]]'' (''striving'', but not necessarily with any [[teleology|teleological]] baggage){{citation needed|date=February 2024}} and that "perfection" refers not to (moral) value, but to completeness. Given that individuals are identified as mere modifications of the infinite Substance, it follows that no individual can ever be fully complete, i.e., perfect, or blessed. Absolute perfection, is, in Spinoza's thought, reserved solely for Substance. Nevertheless, modes can attain a lesser form of blessedness, namely, that of pure understanding of oneself as one really is, i.e., as a definite modification of Substance in a certain set of relationships with everything else in the universe. That this is what Spinoza has in mind can be seen at the end of the ''[[Ethics (Spinoza book)|Ethics]]'', in E5P24 and E5P25, where Spinoza makes two final key moves, unifying the metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical propositions he has developed over the course of the work. In E5P24, he links the understanding of particular things to the understanding of God, or Substance; in E5P25, the ''conatus'' of the mind is linked to the third kind of knowledge (''Intuition''). From here, it is a short step to the connection of Blessedness with the ''amor dei intellectualis'' ("intellectual love of God").{{citation needed|date=February 2024}}