Editing Vietnam War (section)

==Gulf of Tonkin and Johnson's escalation, 1963–1969==
{{Main|Joint warfare in South Vietnam, 1963–1969}}
{{Further|United States in the Vietnam War#Americanization|January 1964 South Vietnamese coup|September 1964 South Vietnamese coup attempt|December 1964 South Vietnamese coup|1965 South Vietnamese coup}}
Kennedy [[Assassination of John F. Kennedy|was assassinated]] on 22 November 1963. Vice President [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] had not been heavily involved with policy toward Vietnam;<ref name="Karnow 1997 336_339">{{Harvnb|Karnow|1997|pp=336–339}}. Johnson viewed many members he inherited from Kennedy's cabinet with distrust because he had never penetrated their circle during Kennedy's presidency; to Johnson's mind, those like [[W. Averell Harriman]] and [[Dean Acheson]] spoke a different language.</ref>{{Refn|group="A"|Shortly after the assassination of Kennedy, when [[McGeorge Bundy]] called Johnson on the phone, Johnson responded: "Goddammit, Bundy. I've told you that when I want you I'll call you."<ref>{{Cite book |last=VanDeMark |first=Brian |title=Into the Quagmire |date=1995 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=New York |page=13}}</ref>}} however, upon becoming president, he immediately focused on it. On 24 November, he said, "the battle against communism{{Nbsp}}... must be joined{{Nbsp}}... with strength and determination."<ref>{{Harvnb|Karnow|1997|p=339}}. Before a small group, including Henry Cabot Lodge, Johnson also said, "We should stop playing cops and robbers [a reference to Diệm's failed leadership] and get back to{{Nbsp}}... winning the war{{Nbsp}}... tell the generals in Saigon that Lyndon Johnson intends to stand by our word{{Nbsp}}... [to] win the contest against the externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy."</ref> Johnson knew he had inherited a deteriorating situation,<ref name="Karnow 1997 339">{{Harvnb|Karnow|1997|p=339}}: "At a place called Hoa Phu, for example, the strategic hamlet built during the previous summer now looked like it had been hit by a hurricane.{{Nbsp}}... Speaking through an interpreter, a local guard explained to me that a handful of Viet Cong agents had entered the hamlet one night and told the peasants to tear it down and return to their native villages. The peasants complied without question."</ref> but adhered to the widely accepted domino argument for defending the South: Should they retreat or appease, either action would imperil other nations.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hunt |first=Michael |title=The World Transformed – 1945 to the Present |date=2016 |publisher=Oxford |isbn=978-0-19-937102-0 |location=New York |pages=169–171}}</ref> Findings from RAND's [[Viet Cong Motivation and Morale Project]] bolstered his confidence that an air war would weaken the insurgency. Some argue the policy of North Vietnam was not to topple other non-communist governments in South East Asia.<ref name=McNamara/>{{Rp|48}}

The military revolutionary council, meeting in lieu of a strong South Vietnamese leader, had 12 members. It was headed by General [[Dương Văn Minh]], whom journalist [[Stanley Karnow]], recalled as "a model of lethargy".{{sfn|Karnow|1997|p=340}} Lodge cabled home about Minh: "Will he be strong enough to get on top of things?" Minh's regime was overthrown in January 1964 by General [[Nguyễn Khánh]].{{sfn|Karnow|1997|p=341}} There was persistent instability in the military: several coups—not all successful—occurred in a short period of time.

===Gulf of Tonkin incident===
{{Main|Gulf of Tonkin incident}}
{{Further|Credibility gap}}
[[File:Bombing in Vietnam.jpg|thumb|upright=.8|A U.S. [[Douglas B-66 Destroyer|B-66 Destroyer]] and four [[Republic F-105 Thunderchief|F-105 Thunderchiefs]] dropping bombs on [[North Vietnam]] during [[Operation Rolling Thunder]]]]
On 2 August 1964, {{USS|Maddox|DD-731|6}}, on an intelligence mission along North Vietnam's coast, fired upon and damaged torpedo boats approaching it in the Gulf of Tonkin.<ref name=Kolko/>{{Rp|124}} A second attack was reported two days later on {{USS|Turner Joy|DD-951|6}} and ''Maddox''. The circumstances were murky.<ref name=Hastings/>{{Rp|218–219}} Johnson commented to Undersecretary of State George Ball that "those sailors out there may have been shooting at flying fish."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Kutler |first=Stanley I. |title=Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War |date=1996 |publisher=Charles Scribner's Sons |isbn=978-0-13-276932-7 |page=249}}</ref> An [[National Security Agency|NSA]] publication declassified in 2005 revealed there was no attack on 4 August.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Shane |first=Scott |date=31 October 2005 |title=Vietnam Study, Casting Doubts, Remains Secret |work=The New York Times] |url=https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/2005/10/31/politics/31war.html |access-date=4 July 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081211090222/http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/31/politics/31war.html?fta=y&pagewanted=all |archive-date=11 December 2008 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription}}</ref>

The second "attack" led to [[Operation Pierce Arrow|retaliatory airstrikes]], and prompted Congress to approve the [[Gulf of Tonkin Resolution]] on 7 August.<ref name="Moïse">{{Cite book |last=Moïse |first=Edwin E. |url=https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780807823002 |title=Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War |date=1996 |publisher=University of North Carolina Press |isbn=978-0-8078-2300-2 |url-access=registration}}</ref>{{Rp|78}} The resolution granted the president power "to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression" and Johnson relied on this as giving him authority to expand the war.<ref name=Hastings/>{{Rp|221}} Johnson pledged he was not "committing American boys to fighting a war that I think ought to be fought by the boys of Asia to help protect their own land".<ref name=Hastings/>{{Rp|227}}

The [[United States National Security Council|National Security Council]] recommended an escalation of the bombing of North Vietnam. Following an [[Attack on Camp Holloway|attack on a U.S. Army base]] on 7 February 1965,<ref>{{Cite web |last=Simon |first=Dennis M. |date=August 2002 |title=The War in Vietnam, 1965–1968 |url=http://faculty.smu.edu/dsimon/Change-Viet2.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090426064833/http://faculty.smu.edu/dsimon/Change-Viet2.html |archive-date=26 April 2009 |access-date=7 May 2009}}</ref> airstrikes were initiated, while Soviet Premier [[Alexei Kosygin]] was on a [[state visit]] to North Vietnam. [[Operation Rolling Thunder]] and [[Operation Arc Light]] expanded aerial bombardment and ground support operations.{{Sfn|Nalty|1998|pp=97, 261}} The bombing campaign, which lasted three years, was intended to force North Vietnam to cease its support for the VC by threatening to destroy North Vietnamese air defenses and infrastructure. It was additionally aimed at bolstering South Vietnamese morale.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Tilford |first=Earl L. |url=https://media.defense.gov/2017/Apr/07/2001728434/-1/-1/0/B_0040_TILFORD_SETUP.PDF |title=Setup: What the Air Force did in Vietnam and Why |date=1991 |publisher=Air University Press |page=89|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20230404230151/https://media.defense.gov/2017/Apr/07/2001728434/-1/-1/0/B_0040_TILFORD_SETUP.PDF|archive-date=April 4, 2023}}</ref> Between March 1965 and November 1968, ''Rolling Thunder'' deluged the north with a million tons of missiles, rockets and bombs.{{sfn|Karnow|1997|p=468}}

===Bombing of Laos===
{{Main|Laotian Civil War}}
Bombing was not restricted to North Vietnam. Other aerial campaigns, targeted different parts of the VC and PAVN infrastructure. These included the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos and Cambodia. The ostensibly neutral Laos had become [[Laotian Civil War|the scene of a civil war]], pitting the [[Kingdom of Laos|Laotian government]] backed by the US, against the Pathet Lao and its North Vietnamese allies.

Aerial bombardment against the Pathet Lao and PAVN forces was carried out by the US to prevent the collapse of the Royal central government, and deny use of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Between 1964-73, the U.S. dropped two million tons of bombs on Laos, nearly equal to the 2.1&nbsp;million tons of bombs it dropped on Europe and Asia during World War II, making Laos the most heavily bombed country in history.<ref name="KiernanTaylor">{{Cite journal |last1=Kiernan |first1=Ben |author-link=Ben Kiernan |last2=Owen |first2=Taylor |date=26 April 2015 |title=Making More Enemies than We Kill? Calculating U.S. Bomb Tonnages Dropped on Laos and Cambodia, and Weighing Their Implications |url=http://apjjf.org/2015/13/16/Ben-Kiernan/4313.html |journal=The Asia-Pacific Journal |volume=13 |issue=17 |id=4313 |access-date=18 September 2016|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20230326111723/https://apjjf.org/Ben-Kiernan/4313.html|archive-date=March 26, 2023}}</ref>

The objective of stopping North Vietnam and the VC was never reached. The [[Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force]] [[Curtis LeMay]], however, had long advocated saturation bombing in Vietnam and wrote of the communists that "we're going to bomb them back into the Stone Age".<ref name=Hastings/>{{Rp|328}}

===The 1964 offensive===
[[File:DongXoaiHuey-65a.JPG|thumb|ARVN Forces and a US Advisor inspect a downed helicopter, [[Battle of Dong Xoai]], June 1965]]
Following the Tonkin Resolution, Hanoi anticipated the arrival of US troops and began expanding the VC, as well as sending increasing numbers of PAVN personnel southwards. They were outfitting the VC forces and standardizing their equipment with [[AK-47]] rifles and other supplies, as well as forming the [[9th Division (Vietnam)|9th Division]].<ref name=Hastings/>{{Rp|223}}<ref>{{Cite book |title=Vietnam War After Action Reports |publisher=BACM Research |page=[{{GBurl|id=Dch3m7u2K5YC|p=84}} 84] |language=en}}</ref> "From a strength of approximately 5,000 at the start of 1959 the Viet Cong's ranks grew to about 100,000 at the end of 1964{{Nbsp}}... Between 1961-64 the Army's strength rose from about 850,000 to nearly a million men."{{Sfn|Demma|1989}} U.S. troop numbers deployed to Vietnam during the same period were much lower: 2,000 in 1961, rising to 16,500 in 1964.<ref name="Kahin">{{Cite book |last1=Kahin |first1=George |title=The United States in Vietnam: An analysis in depth of the history of America's involvement in Vietnam |last2=Lewis |first2=John W. |author-link2=John Wilson Lewis |date=1967 |publisher=Delta Books}}</ref> The use of captured equipment decreased, while more ammunition and supplies were required to maintain regular units. Group 559 was tasked with expanding the Ho Chi Minh Trail, in light of the bombardment by US warplanes. The war had shifted into the final, conventional phase of Hanoi's [[Viet Cong and PAVN strategy, organization and structure#The Protracted War conflict model|three-stage protracted warfare model]]. The VC was now tasked with destroying the ARVN and capturing and holding areas; however, it was not yet strong enough to assault towns and cities.

In December 1964, ARVN forces suffered heavy losses at the [[Battle of Bình Giã]],<ref>{{Cite book |last=Moyar |first=Mark |title=Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965 |date=2006 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-86911-9 |page=[{{GBurl|id=phJrZ87RwuAC|p=339}} 339]}}</ref> in a battle both sides viewed as a watershed. Previously, the VC had utilized hit-and-run guerrilla tactics. At Binh Gia, however, they defeated a strong ARVN force in a conventional battle and remained in the field for four days.<ref name="McNeill">{{Cite book |last=McNeill |first=Ian |title=To Long Tan: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950–1966 |date=1993 |publisher=Allen & Unwin |isbn=978-1-86373-282-6}}</ref>{{Rp|58}} Tellingly, South Vietnamese forces were again defeated in June 1965 at the [[Battle of Đồng Xoài]].<ref name=McNeill/>{{Rp|94}}

===American ground war===
{{See also|Buddhist Uprising}}
[[File:Vietcongsuspect.jpg|thumb|A Marine from [[1st Battalion, 3rd Marines]], moves a suspected Viet Cong during a search and clear operation held by the battalion {{Convert|15|mi|km|0}} west of [[Da Nang Air Base]], 1965.]]
On 8 March 1965, 3,500 [[United States Marine Corps|U.S. Marines]] were landed near [[Da Nang]], South Vietnam.<ref name=Hastings/>{{Rp|246–247}} This marked the beginning of the American ground war. U.S. public opinion overwhelmingly supported the deployment.<ref>{{Cite web |date=17 October 2002 |title=Generations Divide Over Military Action in Iraq |url=http://www.people-press.org/2002/10/17/generations-divide-over-military-action-in-iraq |publisher=Pew Research Center|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20221121005317/https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2002/10/17/generations-divide-over-military-action-in-iraq/|archive-date=21 November 2022}}</ref> The Marines' initial assignment was defense of [[Da Nang Air Base]]. The first deployment was increased to nearly 200,000 by December.<ref name=McNamara/>{{Rp|349–351}} U.S. military had long been schooled in offensive warfare. Regardless of political policies, U.S. commanders were institutionally and psychologically unsuited to a defensive mission.<ref name=McNamara/>{{Rp|349–351}}

General [[William Westmoreland]] informed Admiral [[U. S. Grant Sharp Jr.]], commander of U.S. Pacific forces, that the situation was critical,<ref name=McNamara/>{{Rp|349–351}} "I am convinced that U.S. troops with their energy, mobility, and firepower can successfully take the fight to the NLF (Viet Cong)".<ref>United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense, vol. 4, p. 7.</ref> With this recommendation, Westmoreland advocated an aggressive departure from America's defensive posture and the sidelining of the South Vietnamese. By ignoring ARVN units, the U.S. commitment became open-ended.<ref name=McNamara/>{{Rp|353}} Westmoreland outlined a three-point plan to win:
* Phase 1. Commitment of U.S. and allied forces necessary to halt the losing trend by the end of 1965.
* Phase 2. U.S. and allied forces mount major offensive actions to seize the initiative to destroy guerrilla and organized enemy forces. This phase would end when the enemy had been worn down and driven back from major populated areas.
* Phase 3. If the enemy persisted, a period of 12–18 months following Phase 2 would be required for final destruction of forces remaining in remote base areas.<ref>United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense, vol. 5, pp. 8–9.</ref>

The plan was approved by Johnson and marked a profound departure from the insistence that South Vietnam was responsible for defeating the VC. Westmoreland predicted victory by December 1967.<ref>United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense, vol. 4, pp. 117–19. and vol. 5, pp. 8–12.</ref> Johnson did not communicate this change to the media, instead he emphasized continuity.<ref>''Public Papers of the Presidents, 1965.'' Washington, DC Government Printing Office, 1966, vol. 2, pp. 794–99.</ref> The change in policy depended on matching the North Vietnamese and VC in a contest of [[attrition warfare|attrition]] and [[morale]]. The opponents were locked in a cycle of [[Conflict escalation|escalation]].<ref name=McNamara/>{{Rp|353–354}} However the Johnson administration ruled out invasion of North Vietnam due to fears of Chinese or Soviet intervention.<ref>{{cite book|last=Lind|first=Michael|title=Vietnam, The Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America's Most Disastrous Military Conflict|publisher=Free Press|year=1999|isbn=0-684-84254-8|page=83-89|quote="Until recently, the lack of detailed information about the Sino-Vietnamese relationship in the 1960s made it impossible for historians to judge whether the Johnson administration had been realistic in its fears of possible Chinese intervention or whether, as critics claimed, those fears had been exaggerated. In the 1990s, however, new archival evidence from China and Vietnam made it clear that the Johnson administration's fears were justified. The possibility that Mao would have sent combat troops to fight the United States in Vietnam had been quite real. It is now known that in late 1964 and early 1965, China clarified its commitment to North Vietnam. If the United States did not merely bomb North Vietnam but invaded it, China would send combat troops as it had during the Korean War."}}</ref> Westmoreland and McNamara touted the [[Body count#Vietnam War|body count]] system for gauging victory, a metric that proved flawed.<ref name=Mohr>{{Cite news |last=Mohr |first=Charles |date=16 May 1984 |title=McNamara on Record, Reluctantly, on Vietnam |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1984/05/16/us/mcnamara-on-record-reluctantly-on-vietnam.html|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20230404185613/https://www.nytimes.com/1984/05/16/us/mcnamara-on-record-reluctantly-on-vietnam.html|archive-date=April 4, 2023 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription}}</ref>

[[File:Vietnamese villagers suspected of being communists by the US Army - 1966.jpg|thumb|upright=.9|Peasants suspected of being Viet Cong under detention of U.S. Army, 1966]]
The American buildup transformed the South Vietnamese economy and had a profound effect on society. South Vietnam was inundated with manufactured goods. Washington encouraged its [[Southeast Asia Treaty Organization|SEATO]] allies to contribute troops; Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines{{sfn|Karnow|1997|p=556}} agreed. South Korea asked to join the [[Many Flags]] program in return for economic compensation. Major allies, however, notably Canada and the UK, declined troop requests.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Church |first=Peter |title=A Short History of South-East Asia |date=2006 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-0-470-82481-8 |page=193}}</ref>

The U.S. and its allies mounted complex [[search and destroy]] operations. In November 1965, the U.S. engaged in its first major battle with the PAVN, the [[Battle of Ia Drang]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Galloway |first=Joseph |date=18 October 2010 |title=Ia Drang – The Battle That Convinced Ho Chi Minh He Could Win |url=http://www.historynet.com/ia-drang-where-battlefield-losses-convinced-ho-giap-and-mcnamara-the-u-s-could-never-win.htm |access-date=2 May 2016 |publisher=Historynet|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20230322083652/https://www.historynet.com/ia-drang-where-battlefield-losses-convinced-ho-giap-and-mcnamara-the-u-s-could-never-win/?f|archive-date=March 22, 2023}}</ref> The operation was the first large scale helicopter air assault by the U.S., and first to employ [[Boeing B-52 Stratofortress]] bombers in support.<ref name=Hastings/>{{Rp|284–285}} These tactics continued in 1966–67, however, the PAVN/VC insurgents remained elusive and demonstrated tactical flexibility. By 1967, the war had generated large-scale internal refugees, 2&nbsp;million in South Vietnam, with 125,000 people evacuated and rendered homeless during [[Operation Masher]] alone,<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Ward |first1=Geoffrey C. |title=The Vietnam War: An Intimate History |last2=Burns |first2=Ken |date=5 September 2017 |publisher=Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group |isbn=978-1-5247-3310-0 |page=[{{GBurl|id=i4KyDQAAQBAJ|q=125}} 125] |language=en |quote=By the end of the year, more than 125,000 civilians in the province had lost their homes{{Nbsp}}...}}</ref> the largest search and destroy operation to that point. Operation Masher had negligible impact, however, as the PAVN/VC returned to the province just four months after it ended.<ref name="Ward">{{Cite book |last1=Ward |first1=Geoffrey C. |title=The Vietnam War: An Intimate History |last2=Burns |first2=Ken |date=2017 |publisher=Alfred A. Knopf |isbn=978-0-307-70025-4}}</ref>{{Rp|153–156}} Despite major operations, which the VC and PAVN would typically evade, the war was characterized by smaller-unit engagements.<ref name="GS">{{Cite book |title=The Pentagon Papers (Gravel Edition), Volume 4 |at=Section 4, pp. 277–604 |chapter=Chapter 2, US Ground Strategy and Force Deployments, 1965–1968 |access-date=12 June 2018 |chapter-url=https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon4/pent9.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190626210700/https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon4/pent9.htm |archive-date=26 June 2019 |url-status=dead |via=International Relations Department, Mount Holyoke College}}</ref> The VC and PAVN would initiate 90% of large firefights, and thus the PAVN/VC would retain strategic initiative despite overwhelming US force and fire-power deployment.<ref name=GS/> The PAVN and Viet Cong had developed strategies capable of countering US military doctrines and tactics: see [[NLF and PAVN battle tactics]].

Meanwhile, the political situation in South Vietnam began to stabilize with the arrival of prime minister Air Marshal [[Nguyễn Cao Kỳ]] and figurehead chief of state, General [[Nguyễn Văn Thiệu]], in mid-1965 at the head of a junta. In 1967, Thieu became president with Ky as his deputy, after rigged elections. Though they were nominally a civilian government, Kỳ was supposed to maintain real power through a behind-the-scenes military body. However, Thiệu outmanoeuvred and sidelined Kỳ. Thiệu was accused of murdering Kỳ loyalists through contrived military accidents. Thiệu remained president until 1975, having won a [[1971 South Vietnamese presidential election|one-candidate election in 1971]].{{sfn|Karnow|1997|p=706}}

Johnson employed a "policy of minimum candor"{{sfn|Karnow|1997|p=18}} with the media. Military information officers sought to manage coverage by emphasizing stories that portrayed progress. This policy damaged public trust in official pronouncements. As coverage of the war and the Pentagon diverged, a so-called [[credibility gap]] developed.{{sfn|Karnow|1997|p=18}} Despite Johnson and Westmoreland publicly proclaiming victory and Westmoreland stating the "end is coming into view",<ref>{{Cite news |title=TWE Remembers: General Westmoreland Says the "End Begins to Come Into View" in Vietnam |language=en |work=Council on Foreign Relations |url=https://www.cfr.org/blog/twe-remembers-general-westmoreland-says-end-begins-come-view-vietnam |access-date=12 June 2018|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20230605025020/https://www.cfr.org/blog/twe-remembers-general-westmoreland-says-end-begins-come-view-vietnam|archive-date=June 5, 2023}}</ref> internal reports in the ''[[Pentagon Papers]]'' indicate that VC forces retained strategic initiative and controlled their losses. VC attacks against static US positions accounted for 30% of engagements, VC/PAVN ambushes and encirclements for 23%, American ambushes against VC/PAVN forces for 9%, and American forces attacking Viet Cong emplacements only 5%.<ref name=GS/>