Editing Russian Orthodox Church (section)

====Patriarch Aleksey II (1990–2008)====
[[File:Russian Orthodox Episcopal Ordination.jpg|thumb|upright=1.15|Russian Orthodox episcopal consecration by [[Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow|Patriarch Alexius II]] [[Patriarch of Moscow and all the Rus'|of Moscow and All Russia]]]]

Metropolitan [[Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow|Alexy (Ridiger)]] of [[Saint Petersburg|Leningrad]], ascended the patriarchal throne in 1990 and presided over the partial return of Orthodox Christianity to Russian society after 70 years of repression, transforming the ROC to something resembling its pre-communist appearance; some 15,000 churches had been re-opened or built by the end of his tenure, and the process of recovery and rebuilding has continued under his successor [[Patriarch Kirill of Moscow|Patriarch Kirill]]. According to official figures, in 2016 the Church had 174 dioceses, 361 bishops, and 34,764 parishes served by 39,800 clergy. There were 926 monasteries and 30 theological schools.<ref>Русская церковь объединяет свыше 150 млн. верующих в более чем 60 странах – митрополит Иларион Interfax.ru 2 March 2011</ref>

The Russian Church also sought to fill the ideological vacuum left by the [[collapse of Communism]] and even, in the opinion of some analysts, became "a separate branch of power".<ref>{{cite news |url= http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto120520081735416422&page=1 |title=Russia's church mourns patriarch |access-date=8 December 2008 |author=Charles Clover |date=5 December 2008 |newspaper=Financial Times |location= London |url-status=dead |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20100329045043/http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto120520081735416422&page=1 |archive-date=29 March 2010 }}</ref>

In August 2000, the ROC adopted its Basis of the Social Concept<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.mospat.ru/en/documents/social-concepts/|title=The Basis of the Social Concept|access-date=5 March 2015|archive-date=27 March 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150327212920/https://mospat.ru/en/documents/social-concepts/|url-status=dead}}</ref> and in July 2008, its Basic Teaching on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.mospat.ru/en/documents/dignity-freedom-rights/|title=The Russian Orthodox Church's Basic Teaching on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights|access-date=5 March 2015|archive-date=27 March 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150327202203/https://mospat.ru/en/documents/dignity-freedom-rights/|url-status=dead}}</ref>

[[File:RIAN archive 749019 Opening of monument to victims of political repressions.jpg|thumb|upright|Opening of monument to the victims of [[Political repression in the Soviet Union|political repressions]], [[Moscow]], 1990]]

Under Patriarch Aleksey, there were difficulties in the relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and the [[Holy See|Vatican]], especially since 2002, when [[Pope John Paul II]] created a [[Catholic]] diocesan structure for Russian territory. The leaders of the Russian Church saw this action as a throwback to prior attempts by the Vatican to [[proselytism|proselytize]] the Russian Orthodox faithful to become Roman Catholic. This point of view was based upon the stance of the Russian Orthodox Church (and the [[Eastern Orthodox Church]]) that the Church of Rome is in schism, after breaking off from the Orthodox Church. The Roman Catholic Church, on the other hand, while acknowledging the primacy of the Russian Orthodox Church in Russia, believed that the small Roman Catholic minority in Russia, in continuous existence since at least the 18th century, should be served by a fully developed church hierarchy with a presence and status in Russia, just as the Russian Orthodox Church is present in other countries (including constructing a cathedral in Rome, near the [[Vatican City|Vatican]]).

There occurred strident conflicts with the Ecumenical Patriarchate, most notably over the Orthodox Church in [[Estonia]] in the mid-1990s, which resulted in [[1996 Moscow–Constantinople schism|unilateral suspension of eucharistic relationship between the churches by the ROC]].<ref>Телеграмма Патриаха Алексия Патриаху Константинопольскому Варфоломею I от 23 февраля 1996 // [[:ru:Журнал Московской Патриархии|ЖМП]] 1996, № 3 (Официальная часть).</ref> The tension lingered on and could be observed at the meeting in Ravenna in early October 2007 of participants in the Orthodox–Catholic Dialogue: the representative of the Moscow Patriarchate, Bishop [[Hilarion Alfeyev]], walked out of the meeting due to the presence of representatives from the [[Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church]] which is in the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. At the meeting, prior to the departure of the Russian delegation, there were also substantive disagreements about the wording of a proposed joint statement among the Orthodox representatives.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://orthodoxeurope.org/page/14/130.aspx#3|title=No 130 (October 21, 2007) » Europaica Bulletin » OrthodoxEurope.org|access-date=5 March 2015}}</ref> After the departure of the Russian delegation, the remaining Orthodox delegates approved the form which had been advocated by the representatives of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=3945|title=Interfax-Religion|access-date=5 March 2015}}</ref> The Ecumenical See's representative in Ravenna said that Hilarion's position "should be seen as an expression of authoritarianism whose goal is to exhibit the influence of the Moscow Church. But like last year in Belgrade, all Moscow achieved was to isolate itself once more since no other Orthodox Church followed its lead, remaining instead faithful to Constantinople."<ref>[http://new.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=10597 Progress in dialogue with Catholics, says Ecumenical Patriarchate new.asianews.it 19 October 2007.] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081226125657/http://new.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=10597 |date=26 December 2008 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cwnews.com/news/viewstory.cfm?recnum=54270 |title=Ecumenical progress, Russian isolation, after Catholic-Orthodox talks|website= [[Catholic World News]]|date= 19 October 2007}}</ref>

[[File:Cross Procession in Novosibirsk 01.jpg|thumb|A cross Procession in [[Novosibirsk]], Siberia.]]

Canon [[Michael Bourdeaux]], former president of the [[Keston Institute]], said in January 2008 that "the Moscow Patriarchate acts as though it heads a state church, while the few Orthodox clergy who oppose the church-state symbiosis face severe criticism, even loss of livelihood."<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/faith/article3172785.ece |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080725095124/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/faith/article3172785.ece |url-status=dead |archive-date=25 July 2008 |title=President Putin and the patriarchs|author=Michael Bourdeaux|work=[[The Times]]'|date= 11 January 2008}}</ref> Such a view is backed up by other observers of Russian political life.<ref>[http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2008-30-16.cfm Piety's Comeback as a Kremlin Virtue.] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081211003954/http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2008-30-16.cfm |date=11 December 2008 }}, Alexander Osipovich, ''[[The Moscow Times]]'', 12 February 2008. p. 1.</ref> Clifford J. Levy of ''[[The New York Times]]'' wrote in April 2008: "Just as the government has tightened control over political life, so, too, has it intruded in matters of faith. The Kremlin's surrogates in many areas have turned the Russian Orthodox Church into a de facto official religion, warding off other Christian denominations that seem to offer the most significant competition for worshipers. [...] This close alliance between the government and the Russian Orthodox Church has become a defining characteristic of Mr. Putin's tenure, a mutually reinforcing choreography that is usually described here as working '[[Symphonia (theology)|in symphony]]'."<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/24/world/europe/24church.html?_r=1&scp=4&sq=russia&st=nyt&oref=slogin |author=Clifford J. Levy|title=At Expense of All Others, Putin Picks a Church|work= [[The New York Times]]|date= 24 April 2008}}</ref>

Throughout Patriarch Alexy's reign, the massive program of costly restoration and reopening of devastated churches and monasteries (as well as the construction of new ones) was criticized for having eclipsed the church's principal mission of evangelizing.<ref>[http://portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=67353&topic=618 Патриарх Алексий Второй: эпоха упущенных возможностей] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090803072116/http://portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=67353&topic=618 |date=3 August 2009 }} RISU 11 December 2008</ref><ref>[http://kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1094071&ThemesID=1011 Ветряные мельницы православия Kommersant, 15 December 2008].</ref>

On 5 December 2008, the day of Patriarch Alexy's death, the ''[[Financial Times]]'' said: "While the church had been a force for liberal reform under the Soviet Union, it soon became a center of strength for conservatives and nationalists in the post-communist era. Alexei's death could well result in an even more conservative church."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto120520081735416422&page=2 |title=Russia's church mourns patriarch |access-date=8 December 2008 |first=Charles |last=Clover |date=5 December 2008 |work=The [[Financial Times]] |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100329050911/http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto120520081735416422&page=2 |archive-date=29 March 2010 }}</ref>