Editing Richard Helms (section)

===Soviet missiles===
The Soviet Union developed a new series of long-range missiles, called the [[SS-9 Scarp|SS-9]] (NATO codename ''Scarp''). A question developed concerning the extent of their capability to carry nuclear weapons; at issue was whether the missile was a [[Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle]] (MIRV) or not. The CIA information was that these missiles were not 'MIRVed' but [[United States Department of Defense|Defense]] intelligence considered that they were of the more potent kind. If so, the Soviet Union was possibly aiming at a [[Pre-emptive nuclear strike|first strike nuclear capacity]]. The Nixon administration, desiring to employ the existence of such a Soviet threat to justify a new American [[antiballistic missile]] system, publicly endorsed the Defense point of view. Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security advisor, asked Helms to review the CIA's finding, yet Helms initially stood by his analysts at the CIA. Eventually, however, Helms compromised.<ref>Helms (2002) pp. 384–388, 390.</ref><ref>Ranelagh (1986) pp. 490–499.</ref>

[[File:Minuteman III MIRV path.svg|thumb|right|upright=0.8|American [[Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle|MIRV]]: sequence of [[LGM-30 Minuteman|Minuteman III]]: 1 missile, 3 targets]]
[[Melvin Laird]], Nixon's Secretary of Defense, had told Helms that the CIA was intruding outside its area, with the result that it 'subverted administration policy'. Helms, in part, saw this MIRV conflict as part of bureaucratic maneuvering over extremely difficult-to-determine issues, in which the CIA had to find its strategic location within the new Nixon administration. Helms later remembered:

<blockquote>I realized that there was no convincing evidence in the Agency or at [[the Pentagon]] which would prove either position. Both positions were estimates—speculation—based on identical fragments of data. My decision to remove the contested paragraph was based on the fact that the Agency's estimate—that the USSR was not attempting to create a first-strike capability – as originally stated in the earlier detailed National Estimate would remain the Agency position.<ref>Helms (2002) at 387 (quote).</ref></blockquote>

One CIA analyst, Abbott Smith, viewed this flip-flop not only as "a cave-in on a matter of high principle", according to author [[John Ranelagh]], "but also as a public slap in the face from his director, a vote of no confidence in his work." Another analyst at the United States Department of State, however, had reinserted the "contested paragraph" into the intelligence report. When a few years later the nature of the Soviet SS-9 missiles became better understood, the analysts at the CIA and at State were vindicated. "The consensus among agency analysts was that Dick Helms had not covered himself with glory this time."<ref>Ranelagh (1986) p. 497 (quote), p. 498 (quote).</ref>