Editing Problem of induction (section)

===Karl Popper===
[[Karl Popper]], a [[philosophy of science|philosopher of science]], sought to solve the problem of induction.<ref>{{cite book
| title = The Logic of Scientific Discovery
| author = Karl Popper
| year = 1959
| pages = Ch. 1
| quote = ...&nbsp;the theory to be developed in the following pages stands directly opposed to all attempts to operate with the ideas of inductive logic.
| isbn = 978-84-309-0711-3
| title-link = The Logic of Scientific Discovery
| publisher = Marban
| author-link = Karl Popper
}}</ref><ref>{{cite news
| url = http://www.abc.net.au/rn/science/ss/stories/s75303.htm
| title = A Portrait of Sir Karl Popper
| author = Alan Saunders
| work = The Science Show
| publisher = [[Radio National]]
| date = 15 January 2000
| access-date = 27 December 2007
}}</ref> He argued that science does not use induction, and induction is in fact a myth.<ref>{{cite book
| title = Conjectures and Refutations
| author = Karl Popper
| year = 1963
| page = 53
| quote = Induction, i.e. inference based on many observations, is a myth. It is neither a psychological fact, nor a fact of ordinary life, nor one of scientific procedure.
| isbn = 978-0-06-131376-9
| title-link = Conjectures and Refutations
| publisher = Harper & Row
| author-link = Karl Popper
}}</ref> Instead, knowledge is created by [[conjecture]] and criticism.<ref>{{cite book |author=Karl Popper |title=Conjectures and Refutations |title-link=Conjectures and Refutations |year=1963 |isbn=978-0-06-131376-9 |page=53 |publisher=Harper & Row |quote=The actual procedure of science is to operate with conjectures: to jump to conclusions – often after one single observation. |author-link=Karl Popper}}</ref> The main role of observations and experiments in science, he argued, is in attempts to criticize and refute existing theories.<ref>{{cite book |author=Karl Popper |title=Conjectures and Refutations |title-link=Conjectures and Refutations |year=1963 |isbn=978-0-06-131376-9 |page=128 |publisher=Harper & Row |quote=Tests proceed partly by way of observation, and observation is thus very important; but its function is not that of producing theories. It plays its role in rejecting, eliminating, and criticizing theories. |author-link=Karl Popper}}</ref>

According to Popper, the problem of induction as usually conceived is asking the wrong question: it is asking how to justify theories given they cannot be justified by induction. Popper argued that justification is not needed at all, and seeking justification "begs for an authoritarian answer". Instead, Popper said, what should be done is to look to find and correct errors.<ref>{{cite book
| title = Conjectures and Refutations
| author = Karl Popper
| year = 1963
| page = 25
| quote = I propose to replace&nbsp;... the question of the sources of our knowledge by the entirely different question: 'How can we hope to detect and eliminate error?'
| isbn = 978-0-06-131376-9
| title-link = Conjectures and Refutations
| publisher = Harper & Row
| author-link = Karl Popper
}}</ref> Popper regarded theories that have survived criticism as better corroborated in proportion to the amount and stringency of the criticism, but, in sharp contrast to the inductivist theories of knowledge, emphatically as less likely to be true.{{clarify|date=October 2018|reason=This misrepresents totally Popper's view.}}<ref>''Logic of Scientific Discovery'', section 43.</ref> Popper held that seeking for theories with a high probability of being true was a false goal that is in conflict with the search for knowledge. Science should seek for theories that are most probably false on the one hand (which is the same as saying that they are highly falsifiable and so there are many ways that they could turn out to be wrong), but still all actual attempts to falsify them have failed so far (that they are highly corroborated).

[[Wesley C. Salmon]] criticizes Popper on the grounds that predictions need to be made both for practical purposes and in order to test theories. That means Popperians need to make a selection from the number of unfalsified theories available to them, which is generally more than one. Popperians would wish to choose well-corroborated theories, in their sense of corroboration, but face a dilemma: either they are making the essentially inductive claim that a theory's having survived criticism in the past means it will be a reliable predictor in the future; or Popperian corroboration is no indicator of predictive power at all, so there is no rational motivation for their preferred selection principle.<ref>{{cite book
| title = The Foundations of Scientific Inference
| url = https://archive.org/details/foundationsscien00salm
| url-access = limited
| author = Wesley C. Salmon
| year = 1967
| pages = [https://archive.org/details/foundationsscien00salm/page/n35 26]
| publisher = [Pittsburgh] University of Pittsburgh Press
| isbn = 9780822951186
| author-link = Wesley C. Salmon
}}</ref>

[[David Miller (philosopher)|David Miller]] has criticized this kind of criticism by Salmon and others because it makes inductivist assumptions.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Miller |first1=David |title=Critical rationalism: A restatement and defense |date=1994 |publisher=Open Court |location=Chicago}}</ref> Popper does not say that corroboration is an indicator of predictive power. The predictive power{{according to whom|date=October 2016}} is in the theory itself, not in its corroboration. The rational motivation for choosing a well-corroborated theory is that it is simply easier to falsify: Well-corroborated means that at least one kind of experiment (already conducted at least once) could have falsified (but did not actually falsify) the one theory, while the same kind of experiment, regardless of its outcome, could not have falsified the other. So it is rational to choose the well-corroborated theory: It may not be more likely to be true, but if it is actually false, it is easier to get rid of when confronted with the conflicting evidence that will eventually turn up. Accordingly, it is wrong to consider corroboration as a reason, a [[justificationism|justification]] for believing in a theory or as an argument in favor of a theory to convince someone who objects to it.<ref>Thomas Bullemore, [https://www.academia.edu/4154895/Some_Remarks_on_the_Pragmatic_Problem_of_Induction "Some Remarks on the Pragmatic Problem of Induction"], Academia.edu.</ref>