Editing Potsdam Conference (section)

== Aftermath ==
{{Further|Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki|Eastern Bloc|Cold War}}
Truman had mentioned an unspecified "powerful new weapon" to Stalin during the conference. Towards the end of the conference, on July 26, the [[Potsdam Declaration]] gave Japan an ultimatum to surrender unconditionally or meet "prompt and utter destruction", which did not mention the new bomb<ref>{{Cite web |title=How The Potsdam Conference Shaped The Future Of Post-War Europe |url=https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/how-the-potsdam-conference-shaped-the-future-of-post-war-europe |access-date=12 February 2018 |website=Imperial War Museums |language=en}}</ref> but promised that "it was not intended to enslave Japan". The Soviet Union was not involved in that declaration since it was still neutral in the war against Japan. Japanese Prime Minister [[Kantarō Suzuki]] did not respond,<ref name="mokusatsu">{{Cite web |title=Mokusatsu: One Word, Two Lessons |url=http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/tech_journals/mokusatsu.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130606143059/http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/tech_journals/mokusatsu.pdf |archive-date=6 June 2013 |access-date=20 March 2013 |df=dmy-all}}</ref> which was interpreted as a sign that the Japanese had ignored the ultimatum.<ref>"Mokusatsu, Japan's Response to the Potsdam Declaration", Kazuo Kawai, ''Pacific Historical Review'', Vol. 19, No. 4 (November 1950), pp. 409–414.</ref> As a result, the [[atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki|United States dropped atomic bombs]] on [[Hiroshima]] on 6 August and on [[Nagasaki]] on 9 August 1945. The justifications used were that both cities were legitimate military targets and that it was necessary to end the war swiftly and preserve American lives.

When Truman informed Stalin of the atomic bomb, he said that the United States "had a new weapon of unusual destructive force",<ref>{{Cite web |last=Putz |first=Catherine |date=18 May 2016 |title=What If the United States Had Told the Soviet Union About the Bomb? |url=https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/what-if-the-united-states-had-told-the-soviet-union-about-the-bomb/ |access-date=8 July 2016 |website=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]]}}</ref> but Stalin had full knowledge of the atomic bomb's development from Soviet spy networks inside the [[Manhattan Project]]<ref>{{Cite book |last=Groves |first=Leslie |author-link=Leslie Groves |url=https://archive.org/details/nowitcanbetolds00grov |title=Now it Can be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project |publisher=Harper & Row |date=1962 |isbn=0-3067-0738-1 |location=New York |pages=[https://archive.org/details/nowitcanbetolds00grov/page/142 142–145] |oclc=537684 |url-access=registration}}</ref> and told Truman at the conference that he hoped Truman "would make good use of it against the Japanese."<ref>{{Cite web |date=5 June 2014 |title=Soviet Atomic Program - 1946 |url=https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/soviet-atomic-program-1946 |access-date=24 July 2020 |website=[[Atomic Heritage Foundation]]}}</ref>

The Soviet Union converted several countries of Eastern Europe into satellite states within the [[Eastern Bloc]], such as the [[People's Republic of Poland]], the [[People's Republic of Bulgaria]], the [[People's Republic of Hungary]],<ref name="granville">Granville, Johanna, ''The First Domino: International Decision Making during the Hungarian Crisis of 1956'', Texas A&M University Press, 2004. {{ISBN|1-5854-4298-4}}</ref> the [[Czechoslovak Socialist Republic]],<ref>{{Harvnb|Grenville|2005|pp=370–71}}</ref> the [[People's Republic of Romania]],<ref>''The American Heritage New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy'', Third Edition. Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005.</ref> and the [[People's Republic of Albania]].<ref name="cook17">{{Harvnb|Cook|2001|p=17}}</ref> Many of those countries had seen [[Revolutions of 1917–1923#List of conflicts|failed Socialist revolutions prior to World War II]].

Regarding the establishment of the [[Oder–Neisse line]], President Truman reported that Stalin had presented the occupation of [[Kresy|Eastern Poland]] by the Soviet Union and Polish annexation of [[Silesia]] and eastern [[Pomerania]] as a fait accompli. Taken by surprise, the Western Allies had been forced to abandon the principles of the [[Atlantic Charter]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Michael A. Hartenstein |title=Die Oder-Neisse-Linie: Geschichte der Aufrichtung und Anerkennung einer problematischen Grenze |publisher=Hänsel-Hohenhausen |date=1997 |pages=69}}</ref>