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=== Value === Pleasure is intimately connected to ''[[Value (ethics)|value]]'' as something that is desirable and worth seeking. According to [[axiological hedonism]], it is the only thing that has [[intrinsic value (ethics)|intrinsic value]] or is ''good in itself''.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Haybron |first1=Daniel M. |title=The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being |year=2008 |publisher=Oxford University Press |page=62 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HAYTPO-8}}</ref> This position entails that things other than pleasure, like knowledge, virtue or money, only have ''instrumental value'': they are valuable because or to the extent that they produce pleasure but lack value otherwise.<ref name="Weijers"/> Within the scope of axiological hedonism, there are two competing theories about the exact relation between pleasure and value: ''quantitative hedonism'' and ''qualitative hedonism''.<ref name="Moore"/><ref name="Weijers"/> Quantitative hedonists, following [[Jeremy Bentham]], hold that the specific content or quality of a pleasure-experience is not relevant to its value, which only depends on its quantitative features: intensity and duration.<ref name="Moore"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Sweet |first1=William |title=Jeremy Bentham: 4. Moral Philosophy |url=https://iep.utm.edu/bentham/#H4 |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=3 February 2021}}</ref> On this account, an experience of intense pleasure of indulging in food and sex is worth more than an experience of subtle pleasure of looking at fine art or of engaging in a stimulating intellectual conversation. Qualitative hedonists, following [[John Stuart Mill]], object to this version on the grounds that it threatens to turn axiological hedonism into a "philosophy of swine".<ref name="Weijers"/> Instead, they argue that the quality is another factor relevant to the value of a pleasure-experience, for example, that the ''lower pleasures'' of the body are less valuable than the ''higher pleasures'' of the mind.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Heydt |first1=Colin |title=John Stuart Mill: ii. Basic Argument |url=https://iep.utm.edu/milljs/#SH2d |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=3 February 2021}}</ref>
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