Editing Physicalism (section)

==== Physicalist response ====
Some physicalists, like Andre Melnyk, accept the dilemma's first horn: they accept that the current definition of physicalism is very likely false as long it is more plausible than any currently formulated rival proposition, such as dualism. Melnyk maintains that this is the attitude most scientists hold toward scientific theories anyway. For example, a defender of evolutionary theory may well accept that its current formulation is likely to be revised in the future but defend it because they believe current evolutionary theory is more likely than any current rival idea, such as creationism. Thus Melnyk holds that one should define physicalism in relation to current physics and have a similar attitude toward its truth as most scientists have toward the truth of currently accepted scientific theories.<ref name="Melnyk1997" />

Some physicalists defend physicalism via alternative characterizations of physicalism. [[Frank Cameron Jackson|Frank Jackson]], for example, has argued for an "object-based" conception of the physical.<ref>See Jackson, 1998, p.7; Lycan, 2003.</ref> [[David Papineau]]<ref>See Papineau, 2002</ref> and Barbara Montero<ref>See Montero, 1999</ref> have argued for a "via negativa" characterization of the physical.<ref>See Montero and Papineau, 2005</ref> The gist of this approach is characterize the physical in terms of what it is not: the mental. In other words, the via negativa strategy understands the physical as the non-mental.